Advancing comparison of democratic innovations: a medium-N fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis of participatory budgeting by Ryan, Matt
University of Southampton Research Repository
ePrints Soton
Copyright © and Moral Rights for this thesis are retained by the author and/or other 
copyright owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial 
research or study, without prior permission or charge. This thesis cannot be 
reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing 
from the copyright holder/s. The content must not be changed in any way or sold 
commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the 
copyright holders.
  
 When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given e.g.
AUTHOR (year of submission) "Full thesis title", University of Southampton, name 
of the University School or Department, PhD Thesis, pagination
http://eprints.soton.ac.uk   
   
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON 
 
FACULTY OF Social and Human Sciences 
 
Politics and International Relations 
 
 
Advancing comparison of democratic Innovations: A medium-N 
fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis of participatory 
budgeting. 
 
by 
 
Matthew Ryan 
 
Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
September 2014 
 
   i 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON 
ABSTRACT 
SOCIAL AND HUMAN SCIENCES 
Politics 
Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
ADVANCING COMPARISON OF DEMOCRATIC INNOVATIONS: A 
MEDIUM-N FUZZY-SET QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING. 
Matthew George Ryan 
This thesis asks when and how ordinary citizens gain substantial control over 
important collective decisions. In particular I highlight conditions that explain 
citizen  control  of  decision-making  in  participatory  budgeting  programmes 
worldwide.  The  thesis  further  sets  out  to  test  the  value  of  new  tools  in 
comparative political science for answering such a question. I apply Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA) in an attempt to cumulate existing knowledge and 
engage in logical systematic comparison across cases. 
It is shown that the QCA approach is an underutilised complement to existing 
research strategies in the social sciences. Despite some important challenges 
and limitations outlined in the thesis, QCA is shown to be an effective tool for 
cumulating and systematically reviewing evidence in order to contribute to the 
development of knowledge about social phenomena in a coherent way. QCA can 
effectively inform researcher’s choices about the requisite degrees of parsimony 
and complexity to use in explaining social phenomena. 
Contrary to previous findings based on single-case or small-N analysis I find that 
there  are  no  single  necessary  conditions  for  achieving  or  negating  strong 
democratic outcomes in participatory programmes. The meaningful involvement 
of  citizens  in  governing  collectively  occurs  when  both  political  and 
administrative leaders have the will and capacity to implement programmes and 
this is combined with either fiscal freedom to spend money on programmes or 
active  demand  for  involvement  from  civil  society  actors.  I  show  however 
considerable equifinality in causation as bureaucratic and political support can 
contribute to failure where both civil society support and finance are absent.     ii 
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Chapter 1:   Introduction 
1.1  Participatory Budgeting: Why and how we would we 
study it? 
When  and  how  do  ordinary  citizens  gain  substantial  control  over  important 
collective decisions? The key aim of this thesis is to shed more systematic light 
on the drivers of success or failure in participatory budgeting (PB) programmes. 
This  is  an  important  objective.  PB  has  been  lauded  by  academics,  activists, 
Intergovernmental  Organisations  (IGOs),  Non-governmental  Organisations 
(NGOs) and many other governing bodies and agencies worldwide. It is almost 
certainly the most rapidly diffusing democratic innovation of the last two and a 
half decades. Where PB has been successful it has given succour to democracy; 
reengaging the disengaged; improving capacities and political skills through 
participation; redistributing public funds to those most in need; counteracting 
clientelism  and  encouraging  effective  governance.  Where  it  fails  it  risks 
increasing disengagement; strengthening clientelist or malevolent elite rule and 
increasing anti-politics by diminishing any hope that ordinary people can make 
valuable contributions to collective decision-making. 
PB can be defined ‘a minima as the involvement of citizens in the budgetary 
decisions of a public body and labelled as such by the actors’ (Talpin 2011: 32). 
However most definitions would set a higher set of requirements to distinguish 
PB as a democratic innovation distinct from traditional budget consultations. 
Sintomer et al., who have done more than most to try to bring some order to a 
concept that has diffused rapidly around the globe provide the following minimal 
criteria  
[The process]…allows the participation of non-elected citizens in the conception 
and/or allocation of public finances and… 
 
1)  The  financial  and/or  budgetary  dimension  must  be  discussed; 
participatory budgeting deals with scarce resources.  
  2 
2)  The municipal level must be involved or a (decentralised) district with an 
elected body and some power over administration (the neighbourhood 
level is not enough). 
3)  It  must  be  a  repeated  process  (one  meeting  or  one  referendum  on 
financial issues are not examples of participatory budgeting). 
4)  The process must include some form of public deliberation within the 
framework  of  specific  meetings/forums  (the  opening  up  of 
administrative  meetings  or  traditional  representative  instances  to 
‘ordinary’ citizens is not participatory budgeting). 
5)  Some accountability with regard to output is required.   
                Sintomer et al. (2008: 168; 2014: 3). 
 
The difficulties in defining PB are returned to within the thesis and PB is not only 
of interest here such that the thesis may provide clear evidence of what works 
when  for  those  motivated  by  concerns  for  participatory  governance.  It  also 
provides the opportunity to ask important questions as to how comparativists 
should seek to make sense of seemingly new, innovative and emerging forms of 
policy.  Governance-driven  policy-making  increases  both  the  pressures  and 
opportunities  to  innovate.  This  requires  vigilance  among  political  scientists 
interested  in  classifying  phenomena  and  providing  causal  explanations  of 
classes of phenomena. Where social scientists are attracted to understand cases 
because of the seemingly unique stories they tell it begs the question as to how 
we can build on this in-depth knowledge to provide systematic evidence for 
causal  theories.  The  thesis  therefore  also  seeks  to  address  practically  the 
important  issues  raised  when  political  reforms  are  recognised  for  their 
exceptional  characteristics  and  political  scientists  wish  to  move  beyond  the 
lessons of one or two strong exemplars.   
1.2  Participation and governance 
As  governing  mass  societies  becomes  increasingly  more  complex,  the 
democratic  legitimacy  of  collective  decisions  comes  further  under  threat. 
Increases  in  external  constraints,  especially  financial,  on  representative  
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government’s  capacities  to  govern  both  national  and  locally,  are  well-
documented.  The  great  bulwark  that  democracy  promised  against  decisions 
which  would  not  work  in  the  interest  of  citizens  was  meaningful  citizen 
involvement in and access to decision-making. While support for the principles 
of  democracy  continues  to  rise  worldwide,  participation  in  the  traditional 
institutions of government in democratic states (elections and political parties) 
is at an all-time low (Stoker 2006).  
Citizens of traditional democracies increasingly react with a mixture of anger 
and despair when they feel the blunt consequences of decisions that were made 
without their explicit consent and often without much regard for their collective 
benefit or cost. Perhaps the most glaring example of this in modern times is 
manifest in the continuing fallout to the global financial meltdown of 2008. 
Notwithstanding  the  long  history  of  direct  democratic  practices,  particularly 
where town meetings or referenda are part and parcel of political culture, Mark 
Warren has identified an increasing worldwide trend towards ‘governance-driven 
democratisation’ (2009). In response to crises of legitimacy, democratic rulers 
have actively begun to invite citizens to take a more direct and on-going role in 
political decision-making. Although they may take their inspiration from as far 
back as ancient Athens, many of these initiatives introduce a novel take on the 
appropriate architecture for democratic government. These are what Smith calls 
‘democratic innovations’ - “institutions that have been specifically designed to 
increase  and  deepen  citizen  participation  in  the  political  decision-making 
process” (Smith, 2009: 2).  
In  the  last  number  of  years  the  democratic  innovation  that  has  excited 
governors,  civil  society  activists  and  academics  more  than  any  other  is 
participatory budgeting. Perhaps not since the acceleration of the cooperative 
movement in the last century has a participatory innovation seen such rapid 
diffusion. PB has been taken up in waves by a wide number of governments, as 
well as other public and semi-private decision-making bodies in Latin America, 
Europe,  North  America,  Asia  and  Africa,  and  even  in  non-democratic  states 
(Sintomer et al. 2008, 2010, 2013). PB has had a long affinity with the World 
Social Forum and been promoted throughout its networks of committed activists 
who recognise its potential to democratise spending decisions. It is lauded by 
the World Bank as a model of ‘good governance’ and actively promoted by a  
  4 
small unit within the bank (Goldfrank 2013). It has also been promoted and 
supported by the United Nations through its HABITAT programme.  
It is not surprising then that there has been growing academic interest in PB.  
Scholars from a range of disciplinary backgrounds have sought to understand 
its  potential  and  analyse  its  successes  and  failures.  Despite  this,  Goldfrank 
summarises the state of the art thus: 
With  some  exceptions,  scholars  have  either  provided  long  lists  of 
potentially relevant variables or attempted to extract lessons from one 
or more successful cases, making general conclusions difficult…recent 
research offers some clues as to why [PB] experiments are increasingly 
successful,  yet  a  compelling  framework  that  integrates  actors, 
preconditions, and institutional design remains elusive (2011: 24 - 25).  
 
The vast majority of scholarly work on PB has taken the form of single-case 
studies or small-N comparisons of a handful of cases. There are a number of 
reasons scholars may have been reluctant to do more than this. For one thing 
the rapid diffusion and adaptation of PB can make it seem somewhat a moving 
target,  disincentivising  those  who  prefer  to  work  with  more  neatly  defined 
populations.  To  move  beyond  the  impasse  will  require  a  degree  of 
methodological  innovation.  Nevertheless  previous  work  provides  us  as  a 
research community with two invaluable assets; 1) a lot of skilfully generated 
data  describing  cases  and  their  conditions  and  2)  a  number  of  competing 
hypotheses on the necessary and sufficient conditions for success and failure in 
participatory governance.  
The second important aim of this thesis is to assess the merits of qualitative 
comparative  analysis  (QCA)  as  an  approach  for  cultivating  insights  in  an 
emerging field of research.   
Much  like  statistical  modelling,  QCA  is  a  method  which  can  provide 
parsimonious summaries of complex relationships which may signal cause and 
effect  across  large  numbers  of  cases.  Unlike  statistical  modelling  QCA  is 
designed  to  expose  set-theoretic  causation  (for  example  relationships  of 
necessity and sufficiency) among variables (Wagemann and Schneider: 2012). 
Moreover  proponents  of  the  method  would  claim  that  it  can  commendably 
harmonise theory, qualitative data and quantitative data (Ragin 2000), and is a  
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particularly  apt  approach  when  a  researcher  is  faced  with  a  medium-N
1  
population of cases (Berg-Schlosser and Cronqvist: 2005).  
Turning back to PB, we have at our disposal rich data on a medium -N of cases 
(cumulating existing studies), and a number of competing causal claims , the 
majority of which are set-theoretic rather than correlational. The PB phenomenon 
seems fertile ground for QCA research. Despite its exponential -like growth in 
use among social scientists as well as  other disciplines (see Thiem and Dusa: 
2013; also Rihoux et al. 2013), the QCA method is still maturing. In this thesis 
the method is applied to an emerging population of cases and its effectiveness 
in providing interesting insights in such a scenario is assessed. 
1.3  Wider debates 
There  are  a  number  of  important  debates  to  which  evidence  from  a  more 
systematic comparison of PBs could speak. All relate to the proper place (if there 
is any) for participatory democratic innovation and the extent of a role for the 
‘ordinary citizen’
2  in the governance of modern societies.  
1) The first debate sets a standard for democratic innovation that centres on 
whether participatory innovation can be a useful contributor to representative 
democracy and effective public administration. For some, democracy is justified 
by its ends, and good decisions that truly benefit the collective can only be made 
by an elite few (Schumpeter 1949). Minimal safeguards in the form of regular(ish) 
elections can ensure competition among elites and negate reactionary mob rule.  
Contra  such  supporters  of  elite  rule,  we  might  argue that  opportunities  for 
participation, even in between elections, can often be beneficial. If we assume 
that the standard for democratic decisions is that they approach as much as 
                                           
 
1 It is difficult if not foolish to try to pinpoint in the abstract a range in the number of cases that defines a 
medium-N. What we have in mind are opportunities for research where there exist more than a handful 
of cases and less than enough cases to avail of powerful statistical techniques for analysing correlations 
when controlling for confounding factors. Of course any decision about research strategies will always 
require the weighing of a number of factors including the availability of data and the structure of types 
and kinds of cases. 
2 ‘Ordinary citizens’ are taken to be citizens that do not take an established part in state decision making 
as elected representatives or public administrators. In some cases this distinction is not always easy to 
make.  
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possible the benefit of all, well-designed opportunities to gather information 
from citizens and allow them to respond to one another could improve the 
quality  of  collective  decisions.  Although  authors  take  the  concept  of 
‘deliberative’ in a variety of directions this is its most recurring contribution to 
democratic theory. 
Even if we believe that there are good reasons (e.g. grounds of competence) for 
restricting elements of decision-making to experts and elected representatives, 
it may be that we would like to provide decision-makers with complimentary 
institutions that harness what we might call ‘proximal expertise’. By proximal 
expertise  I  mean  the  innate  expertise  of  the  citizen  who  knows  best  how 
decisions currently and potentially affect her/him and others close to them. One 
intriguing finding from the first PBs in Porto Alegre was that citizen’s expressed 
priorities  for  expenditure  on  public  works  that  differed  from  what  their 
representatives thought their priorities were (Abers 2000, Santos 1998, Baiocchi 
2005). If it can be shown that, at least some of the time, democratic innovations 
which are tried in traditional settings but in different contexts were recognised 
as effective modes of governing with positive outcomes for citizens, then it 
suggests  that  those  who  see  elections  and  parties  as  the  only  effective 
institutions for democratic governance need to think again. 
2) Financial decisions are often considered the ‘black box’ of government; a 
realm of decision-making restricted on grounds of necessary competence to 
technocrats  and  seasoned  professional  politicians  skilled  in  bargaining.  For 
Carole Pateman, PB as practised in Porto Alegre provides an example of “how 
central  components  of  participatory  democracy  can  be  institutionalized 
successfully in what is conventionally seen as an expert, technical area,” (2012: 
10). And ‘ordinary citizens’ with little formal education have shown capacities to 
increase their budget literacy through participation in PB (Abers: 2000). The 
second  debate  then,  which  speaks  to  a  higher  standard  for  democratic 
innovations, starts out by asking what the conditions for successful democratic 
innovation might be. Ideal PB enables increased popular control over elements 
of  budgets  by  institutionalising  citizens’  participation  in  making  spending 
decisions. The second question which the research presented here can aim to 
answer is under what conditions more transformative and sustained effects of 
political participation might occur (and under what conditions they are negated).  
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3) The third debate to which we might want to speak to is whether participatory 
designs can be enablers for change at a more systemic level. There is much 
debate among deliberative democrats about the conditions for a ‘deliberative 
system’ (Mansbridge et al. 2012); and what role different institutions might play 
in  that  system.  Gret  and  Sintomer,  for  instance,  argue  that  participants  in 
successful PBs can act as a type of ‘social vanguard’ providing a positive example 
that can organically grow to involve those across the spectrum interested in 
reconnecting with democracy (2005: 92-96). For democratic innovations to have 
a systemic effect is a higher standard still; and one for which we may only be 
able to produce indicative evidence at this juncture. But by highlighting  the 
systemic effect of successful outcomes across cases we may be able to pinpoint 
the cases and types which require closer scrutiny and fresh examination via 
process-tracing or other appropriate methodological tools. 
4)  A  fourth  important  debate  revolves  around  what  the  appropriate 
methodological tools are for comparative political scientists wishing to cumulate 
rich, in-depth qualitative pieces of research that combine both common and 
disparate elements. Some of QCA’s ambitions lie in providing at least modest 
solutions  to  the  challenge  of  combining  the  essential  knowledge  of  micro-
processes that tell the rich stories of interesting cases with analysis that builds 
on this knowledge by providing robust systematic cross-case comparison. Yet 
only a few QCA studies have set out explicitly to cumulate existing and diverse 
qualitative pieces and almost none have attempted to look at emerging sub-
fields using fuzzy-set QCA. The thesis therefore also looks to speak to wider 
debates about what value developments in set-theoretic analysis can add for 
comparative politics and provide a test of the use of QCA where interesting 
questions are not easily answered using traditional methods of inquiry. 
 
1.4  Historical context: Democracy and participation  
Democracy is seen as desirable by vast swathes of the world’s population (at 
least as far as a common understanding of the concept can be assumed) (Stoker, 
2006:  23).  Ideology,  social  movements  and  revolution  have  variously  been 
responsible for shifting vast populations from subjects of leviathan rulers to 
sovereign citizens of democratic states. Yet despite the many definite historical  
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accounts of progressive instances, the sense remains that this is an ongoing, 
contingent  and  precarious  venture.  Any  teleological  understanding  of  a 
democratic project has been challenged in contemporary times. The expansion 
of  civil  liberties,  political  and  social  rights  was  crucial  to  advancing  the 
democratic project in previous eras (Marshall 1950). However, with increasing 
retrenchment of liberties and decreasing participation in formal politics this 
expansion can be seen to be at best in the responsive phase of a dialectical 
progression, or worse still in permanent decline (O’ Tuama, 2009: 142, see also 
Stoker 2006). 
Democracy  is  a  complex  and  contested  concept.  In  significant  contexts 
‘democracy’ can be taken to mean everything from an abstract ideal type of 
governance where sovereignty is located with the people as a whole, to a formula 
of  institutional  arrangements  which  denotes  a type of  political  regime, to  a 
placeholder  for a perpetual struggle with imbalances of power. Schumpeter, 
famously defined democracy in very minimal terms as an institutional method 
by which elites compete for votes so as to rule over relatively uneducated masses 
(1942: 269). For long periods during the 20
th century this wisdom was accepted 
by  political  theorists  and  those  working  within  the  emerging  discipline  of 
empirical political science. Nevertheless within the last fifty years, developments 
within empirical social science have shown that participation by citizens in the 
governing of their collective affairs, beyond voting for representatives is possible 
(Dahl  1961,  Mansbridge  1983,  Bryan  2004).  Moreover,  Pateman  (1970)  has 
documented a long and rich history within democratic theory which does not 
withstand normative assertions that ‘too much’ democracy is undesirable. With 
these empirical and theoretical accounts, democracy is imbued with far more 
potential. Yet, visions of what political equality could or should look like, and 
how it may or would be achieved, continue to be debated.  And it remains an 
empirical question (with some competing evidence) as to whether ‘another world 
is possible’ (if desirable), (c.f. Michels 2001, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002, de 
Souza Santos 2005, Pateman 2012).  
What is often missing from these debates is systematic analysis of a range of 
cases. That is what this thesis sets out to contribute. We continue to cumulate 
more nuanced knowledge on processes and their context. Still few scholars have 
examined the contextual and structural features of political systems which could 
provide a better understanding of success and failures in empowered democratic  
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innovation.  If  we  desire  to  manipulate  the  world  for  the  better  we  need 
information  on  the  context  in  which  democratic  devices  are  most  likely  to 
succeed or fail. 
1.5  Malaise and innovation  
‘It often works in theory but does it work in practice?’ is not an unfamiliar refrain 
for supporters of democracy to contend with. For those who wish to deepen 
democracy there is a tension between grand republican ideas of citizens ‘forced 
to be free’ and ‘acting in concert’ as Rousseau and Arendt would have, and the 
praxis of engaging those who are otherwise decided for in many hard collective 
decisions.  
Even for those who retain faith in existing democratic institutions there is much 
evidence of a ‘democratic malaise’. Levels of traditional political participation 
have fallen, in terms of both party membership and turnout at elections (Stoker 
2006). In the UK alone membership of the main political parties has fallen from 
over 5% of the electorate in 1964 to just 1% in 2010 (McGuiness, 2012: 5). 
Evidence from the Hansard Society’s Audit of Political Engagement3 has shown 
numbers responding who say they would be certain to vote in an immediate 
general  election  falling  from  51%  to  41%  since  2003.  In  the  same  period 
respondents who claimed to be either very or fairly interested in politics reduced 
from 50% to 42%. It is certainly not the Britain of citizens imbued with a strong 
belief in their  political  efficacy that  Almond  and  Verba encountered  in their 
seminal  comparative  study  of  1963.  The  British  case  is  used  here  as  an 
illustration but there is plenty of evidence that the trend is replicated across the 
world (Dalton 2004, Stoker 2006, Norris 2011, Mair 2013).  
Not even the most radical participatory democrat would look to turn citizens of 
democracies into obsessed political anoraks. Some people have better things to 
do with their time. The trouble is that we are approaching a tipping point where 
disengagement begins to undermine the legitimacy of democracy. Anti-politics; 
                                           
 
3 The Hansard Society’s annual reports which began in 2003 are available at 
http://www.hansardsociety.org.uk/research/public-attitudes/audit-of-political-
engagement/.   
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“an amalgam of behaviours and attitudes that sometimes finds expression in 
alienated inaction with respect to politics or support for populist interventions 
into politics,” is reaching a worrying prevalence (Stoker 2014). It is perhaps most 
interesting that in the same Hansard surveys referred to above that respondents 
who  believed  the  system  of  government  does  not  work  well  and  could  be 
improved  a  lot  or  a  great  deal  rose  from  60%  to  69%.  There  appears  a 
strengthening majority view that the institutions of government do not produce 
the democracy citizen’s would recognise.  
In 1996 Arend Lijphart reminded the American Political Science Association in 
his presidential address of what he labelled democracy’s remaining ‘unresolved 
dilemma’  -  participation  in  these  traditional  institutional  mechanisms  of 
decision-making remains “systematically biased against less well-to-do-citizens,” 
(1997: 1). It is likely that growing trends in anti-politics since then see these 
groups even further marginalised.  So are the institutions themselves the root 
cause of the malaise? And can we design new institutions to compliment the 
traditional ones; to overcome their failings, expose viable devices for reform of 
those institutions or replace them altogether? 
In the recent past, forthright critiques of existing democratic decision-making 
systems  have  come  from  a  broad  church  of  participatory  and  deliberative 
democratic  theorists  (e.g.  Pateman  1970,  Gutmann  and  Thompson  1996, 
Bohman 1997, Young: 2000). At the superficial level at least these criticisms 
share a common problematisation of existing liberal representative democracy. 
The  focus  on  traditional  forms  of  participation,  such  as  voting,  has  been 
challenged because they do not engender significant and long-term engagement 
(Pateman  1970)  and  only  aggregate  what  are  often  relatively  uninformed 
preferences  (Bohman  1997).  From  this  broad  mix  of  tensions  and  critiques 
emerges  a  growing  interest  in  democratic  innovations  that  recast  the 
relationship between political elites and citizens.  Can we design institutions that 
engage the disengaged and give political efficacy to those who have never known 
it? And if so when and how would they work? 
1.6  Democratic legitimacy meets governing societies 
While changes in the role government’s play in governing has had an impact on 
accountability to citizens, in turn, citizens have grown more educated and more  
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critical (see also Beck 1992, Inglehart 1997, Stoker 2006).  Faced with a series 
of  legitimacy  crises  governors  have  been  driven  to  respond.  What  is  most 
interesting about the trend that has followed is that rulers have actively begun 
to  create  more  direct  roles  for  citizens  in  political  decision-making  (Warren 
2009).  
Although the trend has accelerated more recently we can trace it at least as far 
back  as  the  1960s  in  the  U.S.  context.  But  as  soon  as  that  new  wave  of 
‘consultations’  were  first  implemented  they  drew  criticism.  This  time  the 
criticism of democratic reconstruction came not from traditional elitists anxious 
of engaging ‘the great unwashed’. It was founded on a scepticism that pointed 
to the dangers of superficial increases in participation and, therefore, called for 
full citizen control of decisions (Arnstein 1969). Arnstein’s fear was that much 
of  what  passed  for  citizen  consultation  was  an  empty  ritual  aimed  at 
consolidating elite rule. Consultations of this type can at worst be seen as a 
mollifying ‘incumbent democracy’ that tranquilises the genuine critical collective 
socialisation which lies at the heart of ingenuity in free societies (Blaug 2002). 
For Blaug, this engineering of participation by government must be met with a 
degree of scepticism as it may fundamentally be interpreted as a Bismarckian 
bid to protect the ‘representative core’ of the system. It is in response to some 
of these criticisms of derogatorily branded ‘manipulatory’ institutions that a new 
breed of institutions can be said to have emerged; “institutions that have been 
specifically designed to increase and deepen citizen participation in the political 
decision-making process” (Smith, 2009: 2, my italics). These are what Smith 
refers to as ‘democratic innovations’ (idem). 
The  relationship  between  design  and  observation  of  these  democratic 
innovations,  and  the  critical  democratic  theory  highlighted  above  is  less 
straightforward than it may seem. Dalton (2004) has spoken of ‘an unhelpful 
gap’ in the literature between democratic theory and practice. Although the 
aforementioned  critiques  surely  have  had  some  influence  on  invention,  the 
emerging field of academic study surrounding democratic innovations is more 
often characterised by  a handful of determined democratic theorists catching 
up with practice than by experimentalists trialling their own grand designs (with 
some notable exceptions that attempt  both, e.g.  James Fishkin’s Deliberative 
Opinion Polls). In a now seminal article Fung recognized that “political theorists 
and scientists would do well to learn from the emerging practice of mini-publics  
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that are ‘creating instances of more perfect public spheres’” (2003: 338). Does 
what seems to work in practice work in theory and how can empirical political 
science improve and refine democratic theories? 
As innovative programmes of participatory politics have emerged and diffused 
over time, interested scholars have turned to fieldwork, and in the first instance 
to the construction of detailed case-studies of particular types of innovation. 
Examples can be drawn across very different institutional designs from popular 
assemblies such as town meetings (Mansbridge 19834), and community policing 
beat meetings and school boards (Fung 2004), to participatory budgets (Abers 
2000, Baiocchi 2005), and randomly-selected citizen’s assemblies (Davies et al., 
2006,  Warren  and  Pearce  2008).  These  authors  have  broadly  concerned 
themselves with recognising interesting innovations that on the face of it warrant 
investigation because of their perceived or acknowledged exceptional potential 
for increasing democratic legitimacy;  what case-study researchers might call 
information-oriented selection of extreme cases (Flyvbjerg 2006). 
Beyond and because of this pioneering work a more systematic comparative turn 
in the process of understanding these phenomena becomes possible. Following 
Fung’s rally-cry we might ask what it is that allows some cases of innovation to 
seem to deliver democratic goods (and what negates such an outcome). What 
can they teach us about democratic theory and achieving democracy in practice? 
It is these questions and the potential of new methods to provide new and 
important answers to them that lie at the heart of this thesis. 
 
                                           
 
4 Mansbridge’s methodology in this celebrated research in fact involves a cross-type comparison between 
the town meeting case and a case of workplace democracy.   
  13 
   
Chapter 2:   PB Beyond Exceptionalism: A case 
for systematic comparative analysis. 
2.1  Why focus on PB? 
Today, dozens of regular forums and councils discuss nearly every area 
of  local  decisionmaking.  Seminars,  conferences,  and  community 
meetings  in  which  state  officials  and  citizens  discuss  and  decide 
together  on  issues  ranging  from  street  lighting  to  economic 
development policy are an everyday occurrence. Civic groups outside the 
state-sponsored  participatory  structure  –  ranging  from  innumerable 
neighbourhood associations to a powerful Urban Reform Movement – 
have bloomed in the context of political opportunity, (Abers, 2000:217). 
 
So said Rebecca Abers in the first book-length scholarly account of participatory 
budgeting (PB) in Porto Alegre to be published in the English language: Inventing 
Local Democracy, (2000). More than 14 years on a distinct yet diverse body of 
work  has  emerged  analysing  the  various  effects  of  PB  in  Porto  Alegre,  the 
diffusion of this innovation across the world and lately the different outcomes 
in different cases of its implementation. But why has this phenomenon that 
began in this city captured the imagination of so many? What is it, and what is 
really unique about it? What or how much do we know about it? And why are 
broader  comparative  analyses  so  rare?  This  chapter  aims  to  provide  some 
answers to these questions. 
Talpin  suggests  we  can  define  participatory  budgeting  ‘a  minima  as  the 
involvement of citizens in the budgetary decisions of a public body and labelled 
as such by the actors’  (2011: 32). But this says nothing of levels of citizen 
control. PB is a renowned democratic innovation because in its ideal type it 
promises  a  tangible  increase  in  democratic  legitimacy.  Ideal  PB  enables 
increased  popular  control  over  elements  of  budgets  by  institutionalising 
citizens’ participation in making spending decisions. It exemplifies a successful 
materialisation  of  participatory  political  theory  into  institutional  design  by 
encouraging open and diverse participation, and allowing ‘ordinary citizens’ to 
create, shape and renew institutions and rule-structures themselves. Much of the  
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design  of  PB  has  common  tenets  with  Athenian  democratic  practices  and 
principles  in  realising  democratic  goods  (Smith,  2009).  In  an  ideal  PB  this 
exceptional  scale  of  deep,  public  participation  is  combined  with  structured 
deliberation and design-rules that limit the threat of co-option and capture by 
powerful  vested interest  and  also  resist the evolution of new  elites.  PB is  a 
relatively young phenomenon, its inception generally traced to the late 1980s in 
the Brazilian municipalities of Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte. In practice, what 
does PB look like? 
Defining PB, even in one city, is no easy task. Take Porto Alegre: A concise 
definition would need to negotiate the emphases that different observers place 
on different aspects of the case.  Like many things, the procedures and the 
success of PB in Porto Alegre are the product of a mixture of design, hard work 
and accident. Even so, it remains the template on  which the Worker’s Party 
(Partido  dos  Trabalhadores  or  PT)  has  introduced  PB  in  several  Brazilian 
municipalities5. Unlike almost all other ideas of the same generation which show 
similar democratic potential6, this innovation has become  institutionalised in 
many diverse locations and has diffused rapidly across municipal and national 
borders. Diffusion has come through a number of channels with many significant  
IGOs and NGOs advocating for PB in various forms. The experiences and results 
of  its  adaptation  to  other  decision -making  venues  have  been  highly 
differentiated (Sintomer et al., 2008, 2010).  
Wampler attempts to summarise the key components of PB based on the 
Brazilian model as concisely as possible. He notes that the ‘guiding tenets’ are: 
a municipality divided into regions; the provision of budget information by the 
government and the facilitation of regular meetings at various stages of the 
budget cycle for deliberation and election of delegates; a ‘quality of life’ index 
based on technical criteria used to redistribute resources based on need; a “bus 
caravan  of  priorities”,  in  which  elected  delegates  visit  all  project  sites;  a 
municipal council made up of two councilors per region, a right to veto the 
                                           
 
5 Governing parties from across the political spectrum have now introduced PB in various Brazilian 
municipalities. Nevertheless, the program is indelibly linked to the PT and its instigation, promotion and 
facilitation continues to be one of their flagship policies. 
6 For a list see Warren (2009).  
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budget for the municipal legislature; and regional committees elected to monitor 
implementation  of  projects  (2007a:  26).  Avritzer,  even  more  succinctly 
emphasises  four  characteristics:  the  delegation  of  sovereignty  to  regional 
assemblies;  the  combination  of  direct  and  representative  participation;  self-
regulation; and ‘inversion’ of priorities by technical criteria (2006: 623-624). 
Other  factors  that  could  be  added  to  definitions  might  include  outreach  to 
disadvantaged groups by government and reorganisation of bureaucracies to 
name a few.  
There is some consensus then on where PB has come from and what it is. Though 
the  Porto  Alegre  model  may  be  the  inspiration  for  programmes,  PB  has 
necessarily been implemented in different ways in different contexts. Although 
PB  has  changed  and adapted, this presents  researchers  aiming to explain a 
phenomenon with an important resource – a number of cases and explanations 
that vary. As George and Bennett have it, “When explanations for the outcome 
of individual cases vary, the results can be cumulated and contribute to the 
development of  a rich differentiated theory  about that phenomenon”  (2005: 
216). It is within the study of participatory budgeting that the most interesting 
examples  of  comparative  work  on  democratic  innovations  have  begun  to 
emerge. Before contributing to a rich and differentiated theory I want to trace 
the developments in PB scholarship on which I aim to build. 
2.2  Existing Studies in PB – A new phenomenon? Starting 
from a single case. 
Our  understanding  of  a  class  of  phenomena  called  democratic  innovations 
and/or PB has grown over time. The natural starting point for any phenomenon 
that appears to observers new or different in comparison to known phenomena 
is to begin with an ethnographic case study. So it began with in depth studies of 
Porto Alegre. As Abers says of her approach  
On the first trip I discovered that Porto Alegre was the only PT administration at 
the time around which there was widespread consensus that participatory policy 
had been successful at mobilizing people and at actually giving participants real 
deliberative power. This consensus led me to choose that city as an “exemplary” 
case of a successful participatory policy (200: 230).  
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For Baiocchi, “the case study of a relevant or unique case can allow for theoretical 
innovation because of its attention to process and anomaly…as an instance of 
state-civil society relations, [Porto Alegre] forces us to rethink theory”, (2005: 
165, italics in original). He is of course correct and we will return to the prospect 
for harnessing the methodological wisdom wrought from studying a distinctive 
case beyond one or a small few cases. These first observers identified Porto 
Alegre as an extreme or unique case of ‘participatory policy’ or ‘state-civil society 
relations’. 
The extensive  observations  and interviews  carried out  by  both Baiocchi  and 
Abers rely on mixed methods approaches to collecting data with a focus on the 
advantages of ethnography in exposing in   detail conditions underlying unusual 
phenomena. Gret and Sintomer take a slightly more top-down, deductive case-
study approach, focusing on how the innovative practices developed in Porto 
Alegre relate to existing political, social and critical theories. Still, this allows 
them  to  make  a  number  of  important  observations  about  the  theoretical 
relationship between direct and representative democracy in the light of the case 
e.g.  lot  and  referenda  are  as  yet  unfamiliar  as  devices  for  guaranteeing 
democratic  equality  in  Porto  Alegre  (2005:  133).  The  idea  of  adapting  and 
combining democratic innovations and devices is later picked up on by Smith 
(2009:  190).  We  will  return  our  attention  to  a  discussion  of  sequencing 
democratic innovations and devices in the concluding parts of this thesis. Along 
with detailed articles based on their own first-hand research by Santos (2005)7 
and  Goldfrank  (2003)   these  three  book-length  studies  represent  the   first 
academic treatments of PB in Porto Alegre to appear in the English language (one 
translated from French). 
Focusing on the treatments with a detailed data-generating motivation; Baiocchi 
and Abers accounts are important because to put it in Baiocchi’s own words they 
“sought to contribute to the already extensive discussion of democratic theory 
through  an  actual  examination  of  instances  of  popular  participation  in 
                                           
 
7 A version of this paper was originally published in Politics and Society (1998) 26 (4) pp.461-510.  
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government decision making” (2005: 142). These actual examinations of cases 
of democratic innovation perhaps have been all too rare – with some notable 
exceptions - examples include Bryan (2004) and Mansbridge (1983) on Town 
Meetings, Davies et al. (2006) looking at a Citizen’s Council, Warren and Pearse 
(2008) on the Citizen’s Assembly in British Columbia that took place in 2006 
and Fishkin’s (1996) and Dienel’s (1989) accounts of their separate personal 
inventions).  This paucity may also have been a problem of exposure. Laterally 
accumulation  of  case  studies  of  participatory  processes  has  been  aided  by 
networks inspired by growing knowledge of the variety of cases and projects 
such as www.participedia.net. 
2.3  The complex story of Porto Alegre: How is it 
exceptional? 
Ethnography is not often suited to parsimonious accounts which distinguish and 
index variables. Rich complexity is its strength. The attention to detail of these 
early accounts highlights numerous conditions and processes which ostensibly 
have made the key contributions to the exceptional outcomes in this case. How 
did these field-researchers interpret this Porto Alegre exception?  
Both Baiocchi and Abers focus on change in the state-civil society relation as a 
key condition of interest (in writing up at least, if they may have begun with a 
more grounded approach). This interest speaks to theories that focus on the 
necessity  of  organised  combative  civil  society  organisation  for  functioning 
democratic polities. Baiocchi suggests that under specific conditions combative 
civil society can be bolstered and even incarnated by state action (2005: 145). 
For Baiocchi what was interesting about the Porto Alegre experiment was that 
for  the  first  time  demands  from  civil  society  were  decoupled  from  political 
allegiance (2005: 138). For PB to succeed it was of utmost importance that the 
PT  administration  helped  create  an  institutional  space  where  both  social 
movements and unorganised citizens participate on an equal footing (2005: 
150; see also Ganuza and Baiocchi 2012). Although the party, in this case the 
PT, may have had an instrumental goal of creating a strong grassroots support, 
it gambled on achieving this through a long-term commitment to a participatory 
ideology and institutionalising the devolution of power. This involved significant 
commitment  to  change  in  the  face  of  potential  political  barriers  including  
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complete  reorganisation  of  the  planning  bureaucracy  and  increasing  the 
municipal tax-take (Santos, 2005: 328). Goldfrank gives a vivid account of the 
very uncertain beginnings and many failures and troubles that greeted the PT’s 
participatory  agenda  in  the  early  years  (2003).  Perhaps  the  most  important 
lesson for us from this study, along with Abers’ analysis and Santos’ detailed 
description of PB’s evolution is that of the longevity of commitment needed for 
institutionalisation of participatory innovations. 
Abers explains that over time the introduction of PB in Porto Alegre resulted in 
a virtuous cycle whereby increased mobilisation and the reduction of inequalities 
gradually augmented one another, benefiting from a political commitment to 
support meaningful participation and execute the decided upon priorities laid 
out in the participatory budget (2000: 218). Mobilisation of groups that had not 
previously been organised is of central importance in her account. She also 
suggests that these groups flourished and were not co-opted. She provides a 
degree  of  empirical  evidence  to  refute  the  considerable  scepticism  in  the 
literature towards forms of top-down mobilisation. In Porto Alegre the state 
acted as an ‘external agent’ in the same way as NGOs have traditionally done to 
mobilize movements. What is more, by implementing decisions of participants, 
mobilisation was increased almost exponentially in the first few years via these 
‘demonstration effects’, (idem: 138). As Goldfrank explains “participants could 
point  out  to  their  neighbours  and  friends  the  very  projects  that  they  had 
prioritised  the  year  before…compared  with  1990,  participation  in  the  1991 
budget assemblies more than tripled,” (2003: 39). 
Porto Alegre possessed a distinctively vibrant civil society during the last years 
of the military dictatorship (Santos, 2005: 313). When the PB struggled in its first 
two years, the willingness and capacity of civil society activists to defend the 
process  but  challenge  the  execution  of  it  at  the  expense  of  the  mayoral 
administration’s public reputation was a key factor in stimulating the structural 
changes described above, (Goldfrank, 2003: 35-37). Of particular interest in the 
case is the role played by an autonomous umbrella group representing civil 
society  across  neighbourhoods  in  the  city.  The  Porto  Alegre  Union  of 
Neighbourhood  Associations  (UAMPA)  is  where  the  idea  and  impetus  for 
community control over municipal finances can be first recognised (Avritzer, 
2005: 386; Ganuza and Baiocchi, 2012: 3). Both Baiocchi and Abers stress that 
UAMPA  later  declined  and  was  in  effect  replaced  by  the  PB.    Baiocchi’s  
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comparison of districts within Porto Alegre’s PB structure allows him to conclude 
that  “pre-existing  civic  networks  were  not  found  necessary  to  ensure  the 
routinazation of the process, and in fact, very  strong  associations  proved a 
stumbling  block,”  e.g.  in  the  Norte  region  (2005:  138).  Nevertheless  urban 
associations are still the primary sources of information on matters participatory 
budgeting (Gret and Sintomer, 2005: 84). Later comparativists have taken up 
and identified the history of organised combative civil society activism to which 
this nods in their accounts of other PB successes (e.g. Wampler 2008). I will have 
more to say about the degree to which certain conditions can combine with their 
contexts to produce results that differ substantially in their quality later on. 
A further important contribution to the successful appeal of the case comes in 
the development of rules that allow for participants to behave and think in a way 
that encourages them to put themselves in other’s shoes.  Rules matter and as 
Smith and Wales succinctly put it, “preferences are not exogenous to institutional 
setting,” (2000: 52, see also Fung and Wright 2000). In Porto Alegre the rules 
successfully balanced different logics; e.g. majoritarian democracy, distribution 
according to need and technical knowledge; at various levels of decision-making 
(Gret and Sintomer, 2005: 44-52). The act of creating such rules can have a 
functional overspill which allows participants to take ownership of, and advance, 
even more innovative solutions to democratic dilemmas. Abers shows that in the 
districts that she observed, over time, citizens took ownership of developing 
rules  that  fostered  and  institutionalised  solidarity  and  democratic  norm 
formation, (2000: 179). The separation of rule-making from the application of 
those rules emulated some original liberal democratic practices that have been 
lamentably lost in modern legislatures. 
PB’s appeal has not been limited to those obsessed only with how a process 
might achieve a relatively narrow conception of deliberative empowerment: For 
instance  Santos  remarks  on  five  different  observable  changes  including 
bureaucratic  organisation;  methods  of  distribution;  representative 
accountability;  autonomy  of  participatory  institutions  and  competing 
legitimacies  (2005).  We  will  have  more  to  say  ahead  about  identifying  and 
separating relevant independent variables for relevant dependent variables and 
hypothesising directions of causation when comparing PBs. Many observers have 
been attracted to PB in the first instance because it achieves distributional justice 
(more-so than democracy per se). Certainly this aim was embedded from the  
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beginning in PT objectives and in the PB rules (idem: 325). The relationship 
between democracy and equality of outcome is a complex one and (although I 
simplify) Leftist sympathisers have traditionally been associated with schools of 
thought that see the latter as preceding the former and not the other way round. 
While a detailed discussion of democracy and justice is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, the important point about PB in Porto Alegre is that although rules for 
yearly spending decisions obliged distribution towards poorer regions, these 
rules  were  formed  and  reformed  through  public  deliberation  across  various 
levels of the PB (see Santos, 2005: 325-329; Abers 200: 180).8  
Of course deliberation in Porto Alegre is not ideal and is accompanied by other 
forms of political arbitration (Baiocchi: 78). Moreover, 
Often people who organised in the effort to resolve immediate nee ds 
demobilised once the needs were fulfilled. It took many  years for the 
regional budget forums to initiate serious discussions of broader- based 
issues such as economic development and city planning, and only a 
small number of regional budget participants went on to join broader 
policymaking groups such as the  thematic forums (Abers: 221). 
 
Although  the  prerogatives  of  deliberative  theorists  may  be  to  narrow  the 
conception of democracy to one that draws its legitimacy from ideal publicity 
and  justification,  for  many ,  deliberation  is  a  necessary  but  not  sufficient 
condition for democracy (Pateman, 2012: 8). PB does not achieve all democratic 
goods ideally and transform all participants. Nevertheless, when compared to 
the inertia and clientelism all too per vasive in modern societies it seems to 
provide  some  image  of  what  the  ‘school  of  democracy’  theorists  (Pateman, 
Dewey etc.) might have had in mind. It is not a ‘rosy picture’ but it is an improved 
alternative (see Smith 2008 and Ryan and Smith 2013 with deference to Fishkin 
et al. 2010).  
                                           
 
8 It is interesting that Marquetti et al. report that during the period 1990-2000 in Porto Alegre some 
measures show relative inequality rising, despite the improvement in absolute condition of the poor 
(2012: 79). As they point out it is likely that this is a result of a number of external factors but it puts the 
overall redistributive potential of strong local economic democracy in perspective.  
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The book-length narratives to which I refer provide a far greater description of 
events in this case than it would be right for me to reproduce here (both Santos, 
2005 and Smith 2008 provide clear and full explanations of the entire PB process 
in  Porto  Alegre,  see  also  Smith,  2008  for  a  fuller  summary  of  these  early 
contributions). I could have included even more articles and essays on Porto 
Alegre as some have laterally appeared as a result of translations but a review 
of the literature on that case would become saturated at this point. What matters 
for our purposes is to get a sense of how trained, first-hand observers have done 
the hard work to communicate a simple story of how exceptional outcomes 
relevant to desires for a deepened democracy occurred there. They did this by 
simplifying and translating into a communicable narrative an identification of 
conditions which were non-trivial in relation to the outcome and which differed 
in degree of quality to accepted or previous norms. 
2.4  Diffuse - Compare   
At this point in the story of the evolution of PB scholarship all we have is one 
exceptional case. The worth of the cases discussed in this chapter should not be 
valued solely or their potential contribution to developing more general theories 
and as a stepping stone to large-N research. In and of themselves they are 
inherently valuable and our attempts to move towards larger-N research can only 
create a supplementary rather than a comparatively better form of knowledge. 
We  must  inevitably  move  up  the  ladder  of  abstraction  without  stretching 
concepts  (Sartori:  1970),  and  lose  some  of  the  detail  and  understanding  of 
process that can only be garnered by direct observation and intensive treatment 
of a single case. Nevertheless “each case is only a case, and it is difficult to build 
any theoretical generalizations from the individual cases,” (Peters 2013: 167). 
This is especially true when it is not made clear what the case is a case of – or at 
least when the focus is on how a case departs from a class of cases. In what 
follows we will discuss new ways of increasing the N with the aim of harnessing 
rather than replacing case-based knowledge. Ethnographies can open up doors 
for a number of academic/research endeavours.   
The foundation of scientific research is comparison. Both Abers and Baiocchi in 
actuality have a comparative element to their study at the city-district level - 
Abers chose to focus her investigation in the Glória and Extremo do sul district,  
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with Baiocchi similarly comparing three districts. Both utilise a most-different 
strategy comparing districts with varying degrees of clientelistic practices to 
assess  systematically  any  differences  in  PB  experiences  where  civil  society 
activism was in a more positive or negative frame of health at the introduction 
of the programme. At a broader level, well-read case researchers are always 
aware of comparisons in drawing lessons from their observations as well as 
choosing research sites and strategies. Abers for instance makes a suggestion 
that the failure of similar early efforts at participatory budgeting in Brasília were 
probably down to the PT neglecting to make participation a central element of 
their  political  strategy  –  thus  the  beginnings  of  musings  on  some  general 
theories based on induction are evident here. As Mill more eloquently puts it 
“For, as the general conception is itself obtained by a comparison of particular 
phenomena,  so,  when  obtained,  the  mode  in  which  we  apply  it  to  other 
phenomena is again by comparison (1950: 298).” 
There is no getting away from it that Porto Alegre does seem exceptional and 
there may be an argument that it cannot be meaningfully compared with other 
cases in abstract as its conditions are extreme. Baiocchi at one point describes 
it as ‘the Mecca of the Left’ (2005: 157). Further to this many accounts are quick 
to highlight the unique circumstances within Brazil. These include the effect of 
rapid  urbanisation  as  unprecedented  swathes  of  rural  poor  moved  to  cities 
leading to large unplanned settlements (favelas); an extraordinarily patrimonial 
political  culture  where  votes  are  exchanged  for  the  most  basic  of  material 
promises, and a new set of political institutions and opportunities in the wake 
of  the  ‘abertura’  democratic  transition  with  the  opening  up  of  the  political 
opportunity structure following the demise of the military regime (see Santos, 
2005: 208-209; Abers, 2000: 26-28; Pont, 2004: 115; Gret and Sintomer, 2005 
14-15).  In  many  ways  Porto  Alegre  is  an  archetype  for  subsequent  cases of 
democratic innovation within and without Brazil and we will have more to say 
about the methodological implications of this for comparison. The important 
point though is that “if the study is conducted outside a comparative framework, 
it  is  easy  for  the  researcher  to  make  a  number  of  assumptions  about  the 
exceptionalism of the case,” (Peters, 2013: 4). Without a comparative framework 
the  exceptionalism  and  its  degree  in  Porto  Alegre  is  more  assumed  than 
analysed and understood.   
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The news of this case certainly inspired others to think about how it related to 
other institutional innovations; notably as mentioned, those interested in real-
world  applications  of  democratic  theory  e.g.  Fung  (2003),  Fung  and  Wright 
(2003) and Smith (2008). Their work looks at some exceptional innovative, but 
very different, institutional designs and they draw parallels as to how different 
democratic  institutions  can  realise  important  abstract  democratic  goods  in 
different ways. The cases that Fung and also Smith discuss in their work tend to 
be of this variety – they focus on path-breaking institutional innovation. And 
their emphasis is on making connections between how these practical examples 
of innovative participatory institution-building can embody diverse theoretical 
principles of democracy.  
This work broadens our knowledge in further directions but is not without its 
limitations and problems. If the first cases brought to attention are all those with 
exceptional outcomes we might expect that in reality the typical case cannot be 
so, and we cannot be sure of what the typical case looks like and how it differs 
from our exceptional ones. We would expect much like in Galton’s original that 
the  child  would  regress  from  the  exceptional  parent  (say  the  Porto  Alegre 
archetype) towards the mean. The problem here is that we don’t have a good 
sense of a population and we don’t know what the mean might look like. If we 
took a sample of participatory processes over time we would probably expect 
that  the  results  in  Porto  Alegre  were  atypical.  Without  looking  carefully  to 
uncover complex causality in such a sample we do not know that the factors 
identified as crucial to explaining the cases’ successes in these early accounts, 
having effect if removed, would be identified to some extent as artefacts of 
regression towards the mean or something else. This does not take away from 
the strides made by pioneering work here but it warns us to continue down the 
road of cumulation before getting too excited.  
Perhaps more quickly than analysts could publish their (mostly positive) reviews 
of Porto Alegre’s experiences, PB was diffusing and being taken up by other 
governments  at  an  encouraging  rate.  This  was  thanks  in  no  small  part  to 
committed activists in various fora and networks. Their efforts were boosted by 
Porto Alegre’s relationship with the World Social Forum, and in another way by 
endorsements from the World Bank and the UN (See Goldfrank, 2012 for a recent 
discussion of the World Bank’s role in disseminating PB). Many writers speak of 
waves of diffusion as PB spread first across Brazil, then Latin America, later to  
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Europe and North America and further East, even to non-democracies (Cabannes 
2004, Sintomer et al. 2013). Recent developments have seen increasing uptake 
in the U.S.A. 
PB diffusion is more often than not characterised by adaptation of the model to 
local conditions  with individual actors often playing a strong influential role 
(Röcke, 2009: 63-65). One of Röcke’s unique contributions to the literature is to 
show how PB is diffused through different channels and actors who then adapt 
PB to both local conditions and national ‘frames’ of political participation in 
implementation (2009). This is food for thought for those interested in scoping 
a  population  of  worldwide  participatory  budgets  for  comparison  and 
generalisations (see Ch.4 below).  There have been notable attempts to track 
and index the ‘who, what, why, and where’ of diffusion of PB around the world 
(See variously Cabannes 2004; Shah 2007; Röcke 2009, 2014; Herzberg 2011; 
Goldfrank 2012; Wampler 2012; Sintomer et al. 2005, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2013; 
Dias 2014). Building on some of that work, the primary aim of this thesis is to 
ascertain what effects important differences in implementation and context have 
had on the empowerment of citizens, and whether and what causal inference we 
can engage in using advanced tools for logical induction and deduction. I also 
later  contend  that  this  process  leads  to  unique  insights  which  can  aid  the 
ongoing debates about how innovation diffuses. 
2.5  Recognising woods and trees: Moving from an 
exceptional case to a set of cases of an emerging 
phenomenon. 
As trained social scientists we are well aware that any general conclusions drawn 
from a single case are limited. In fact the existence of knowledge only of a single 
case of any phenomena may have an enduring limiting effect on the analysis of 
those who encounter it first. Human researchers are unfortunately bound to be 
afflicted by an availability bias which anchors their understanding of what kinds 
of cases are possible to what kinds of cases they are aware of at any point in 
time. And despite all best intentions and training in scientific methods there are 
many mixed incentives that can guide case selection:  
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Scholarly reputations are made by claiming a case is unique or at least 
unusual,  and that  makes  cumulation  difficult. Claims  of  uniqueness, 
however, are sometimes overstated, and if cases are examined together 
then  there  is  the  capacity  to  create  some  generalisations  out  of 
apparently  disparate  cases…  even  with  all  the  potential  problems, 
cumulation of case materials is preferable to no cumulation … (Peters:  
2013: 170). 
 
Good social science can and has identified, accepted and attempted to develop 
ways of dealing with these considerations.  
In  the  development  of  our  understanding  of  participatory  budgeting  as  a 
successful democratic innovation, first steps towards examining cases together 
came in the form of early comparisons of carefully selected cases of PB. While 
studies  of  individual  cases  in  Brazil  and  beyond  continue  to  dominate  the 
literature,  cross-case  comparative  analysis  has  begun  to  contribute  to  our 
knowledge. William Nylen’s (2003b) important contribution to the development 
of comparative work on PB, was to show that the vast majority of publications 
focused on the paradigmatic ‘successful’ case of Porto Alegre or other cases with 
similarly  positive  outcomes.  He  argued  that  it  was  just  as  important  for 
researchers  to  attend  to  ‘failed’  cases.  Thus  he  points  the  way  towards 
information-based sampling of comparable cases which vary on the outcome as 
well as key influencing conditions. 
Specifically he chooses two cases (Betim and João Monlevade) where the PT has 
been voted out of office after initiating PB to ascertain whether introducing PB 
in alternative contexts would create a similar legacy of deepened democratic 
consciousness as it seemed to have done in Porto Alegre. He found that in both 
cases the “patrimonial, clientelistic and elitists politics” that characterised these 
cities  before  the  PT  government  had  returned.  He  also  goes  some  way  to 
showing equivalent qualities in potentially important explanatory variables such 
as the nature and origins of PT administrations in his cases compared with Porto 
Alegre, i.e. there is an implicit most-similar systems element to the research 
design and case selection that is aimed in the direction of uncovering necessary 
and sufficient causation. The key explanatory variable which differs between 
these two cases taken together and Porto Alegre is that the PB only mobilised  
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partisan  PB  sympathisers  without  attracting  non-partisan  participants  in  the 
same way as highlighted in descriptions of Porto Alegre above.  
There is also a different systems element to the design aimed at identifying 
irrelevant variation. Nylen shows that despite active efforts in Betim in contrast 
somewhat to João Monlevade to avoid politicisation of the process and a strong 
association of PB with PT, the result of a change of government was no different. 
Some of this was down to a strong opposition who in both cases were able to 
reorganise, form alliances, attack and in some ways shape the (il-) legitimacy of 
the PB. Thus it seems on this evidence that we can discard active efforts to avoid 
partisanship by a ruling party instigating PB as a sufficient condition for enduring 
change.  An  all  too  often  ignored  strength  of  comparative  research  is  the 
potential  to  reject  or  eliminate  causal  factors  and  reduce  problems  of 
overdetermination.  Uncovering  ‘hidden’  overdetermination  is  a  particularly 
undersold  value  of  QCA  approaches  and  the  findings  of  my  systematic 
comparisons below emphasise this point.  
Moreover, we can combine Nylen’s finding with evidence of weak opposition 
highlighted in the description that Goldfrank gives of PBs inception in Porto 
Alegre (cumulating knowledge from case studies). Thus we might surmise that 
when  a  weak  opposition  is  combined  with  a  PT  initiated  PB  programme,  a 
partisan PB which is susceptible to a lack of buy-in from those outside the PT is 
avoided. In other words on the evidence of these cases taken together a weak 
opposition is an independent necessary part of a combination of conditions 
which  is  sufficient  to  produce  deepened  participatory  democracy  (an  INUS 
condition, c.f. Mackie 1988). This is a small insight into the logical thinking of 
case-based comparative methods. But it is usually too difficult to transfer these 
comparisons beyond a small number of cases as it becomes too difficult to 
consider all potential combinations of causal factors in one researcher’s head 
(see chapter 3 and 4)!  
2.6  Design varies and context matters 
As with Nylen, Marcelo K. Silva (2003) compares two Brazilian cases; this time in 
in close proximity to Porto Alegre in the state of Rio Grande do Sul (Alvorada 
and Gravataí). His focus is on the effect of PB on civil society and his key question 
is whether a policy innovation from a nearby metropolis works in a similar way  
  27 
   
in cities with different ‘associative environments’ (2003:  114). He describes a 
complex relationship between associations and the PB in both cases. In spite of 
dense networks of neighbourhood associations, these were often characterised 
by clientelism and the support for popular participation characterised by some 
accounts of the organisations in Porto Alegre was absent or opposed to a certain 
degree. The important contribution here is to illustrate that the character of civil 
society  in  a  municipality  cannot  easily  be  dichotomised  as  supportive  or 
unsupportive of participation in an absolute sense. Civil society organisation 
(CSO) support for participation is not indeterminate but it ranges in value where 
organisation can be both supportive and not supportive to various degrees. That 
is, civil society has fuzzy membership in the set of support for participation. 
Another excellent contributor to the development of comparative analysis of 
democratic  innovation  is  Leonardo  Avritzer  (2005).  Avritzer  has  described 
participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre in conjunction with the process in Belo 
Horizonte. He is able to show that PB rules can be effectively adapted to new 
settings and ‘invention’ is often conditioned by pre-existing arrangements and 
cultures of participation and politics (2005: 391). Then by contrasting trends 
using individual-level data for the number of participants in Porto Alegre and 
Belo Horizonte he expands our understanding of incentives for participation. 
When a new administration was elected in the Belo Horizonte case, participation 
waned, before waxing again the following year when it had been demonstrated 
that this new administration was committed to implementing the PB. 
Avritzer’s earlier work (2002) also compares two ‘participatory publics’; PB in 
Porto Alegre with another participatory innovation in Mexico. This is one of many 
examples of comparisons across types of democratic innovation. As we have 
explained this study focuses only on PB as a test case for medium-N comparisons 
within types of democratic innovation. I discuss the implications and potential 
for  medium-N  comparison  across  types  of  innovations  at  greater  length  in 
Chapter  7.  In  a  later  work  as  part  of  a  wider  comparison  of  ‘participatory 
institutions’ (2009) (somewhat similar conceived to democratic innovations, see 
chapter 7 and discussion in Ryan and Smith 2013), Avritzer compares three 
participatory budgets adding the case of Sao Paulo. Of interest here for scholars 
of democratic innovations is a critique of what he calls Fung and Wright’s ‘static 
model’ of institutional design for deepening participatory democracy (idem: 63-
64). Avritzer points out (as I have done above) the methodological disadvantages  
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in early research that considered only the most successful cases (although as I 
have explained this can also be a function of the stage of phenomenological 
development where the understanding of what a case is a case of, and hence 
what  constitutes  an  exceptional  or  average  case,  are  not  self-evident  to  a 
scattered, nascent research community). Avritzer chooses not exceptional or 
failed  cases,  but  cases  whose  redistributive  and  deliberative  outcomes  are 
successful to a matter of degree. He shows that redistributive and deliberative 
successes  in  Sao  Paulo,  an  ‘almost  unsuccessful  case’  (idem:115),  were 
tempered by a context in which the potential for a powerful opposing coalition 
to form was greater, leading the administration to provide alternative avenues 
for public politics which emasculated the PB (idem: 113). 
His second claim against the ‘static’ model rounds on cultural factors; what Fung 
and Wright overlook is that “moving away from very basic variables, we may see 
the presence of other variables, such as clientelism or party interest. Those more 
specific  variables  may  hinder  local  participation,  even  when  broad  enabling 
conditions  are  present,”  (idem).  I  will  argue  below  that  attention  to  the 
importance of cultural idiosyncrasies in causal explanation can be as dangerous 
as it is advantageous and that the measure of any piece of research should be 
transparency and accuracy in abstraction. However, Avritzer highlights a more 
fundamental  aspect  of  comparative  logic  often  overlooked  by  the  preferred 
methods in social science: The presence or absence of a single condition in any 
logical case9 can alter the effect of all other causal combinations on an outcome. 
Moreover his comparison leads him to stro ngly  avow  that  it  is  “interaction 
between  civil  and  political  society”  where  voluntary  associations  develop 
participatory mechanisms AND political actors choose to embed participation in 
their  way  of  governing  that  clearly  explains  successful  participatory  design 
(idem). In other words, as is almost always the case in social science, key causes 
are contingent and causation is combinatorial/conjunctrual. 
                                           
 
9 Each possible combination of presence or absence of relevant causal conditions represents a unique 
logical case. Any number of substantive emprical cases may be the same logical case, i.e. display the same 
values of presence or absence of conditions. In social sciences there are almost always logical cases for 
which  we  have  no  empirical  examples.  These  are  known  as  logical  remainders,  or  sometimes 
counterfactuals. This is further explained in Ch.3.  
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These  comparisons  of  two  or  three  cases  develop  the  literature  and  make 
important  discoveries,  hinting  at  the  relevance  and  irrelevance  of  potential 
causal factors. Still we cannot rely on unconnected small-N comparative designs 
alone to be certain about these causes. It is very difficult, if not impossible, for 
even well-designed comparisons of two to three cases to allow enough variation 
across key factors. This is even more obvious if we do accept that the degree of 
presence  of  one  causal  factor  may  alter  the  effect  of  another.  So  small-N 
comparisons also should be cumulated where possible. 
A significant and welcome recent development has seen large-N comparisons of 
cases of Brazilian PB. Avritzer and Wampler (2005) use descriptive statistics to 
illustrate the diffusion of PB through Brazil, paying particular attention to the 
ideological hue of parties, relative wealth and development, and the size and 
location of municipalities adopting programmes. They show that there was a 
general trend to PB adoption by governments further to the right and in less 
wealthy municipalities over time. They also provide some figures for the number 
of civil society organisations across PB cities in the state of Minas Gerais.  
Spada  uses  sophisticated  econometric  modelling techniques to  compare the 
effect of introducing PB on city finances and separately on the re-election of the 
incumbent political party to the mayoral administration (2010). He is one of the 
first to give a good indication of the effect of implementing PB over time; whether 
there are lags in its effects. He is able to show that there is no clear evidence for 
claims for the improvement in municipal finances in the medium-to-long term 
across Brazilian municipalities adopting PB. His second model is equally salutary 
in that it reorients us towards the realpolitik, and potential gains at play for 
parties  adopting  and  discontinuing  participatory  policies.  There is  a general 
trend towards short-term gains for both these actions (with some differences 
based on size of municipality and ideological hue of party). This work is a serious 
advancement. As above, the acknowledged disadvantage with this method is 
that  it  requires  significant  abstraction  and  an  ‘additive’  understanding  of 
contributions to the outcome i.e. it bears all the advantages and disadvantages 
of stepping back from the complexity of the case. It certainly forces us to go 
back to the cases though and think again about the mechanisms that seemed to 
suggest, in particular, financial reward for municipalities with PB programmes.  
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2.7  A cultural trap? 
One of the strengths of the comparative studies discussed so far is that they 
compare only Brazilian cases. Comparative politics was built on the assumption 
that states vary in numerous important respects. Using the logic of area studies 
the above mentioned authors control for the idiosyncrasies of Brazilian culture, 
political history and institutions of government. Nevertheless at this stage, as 
we have seen, PB had diffused outside Brazil, in particular across Latin America. 
This turns our attention to the question of whether this innovation is indeed an 
innovation that can be taken up in other cross-national contexts.  
Benjamin  Goldfrank  has  done  more  than  most  to  advance  the  cause  of 
cumulating comparative knowledge of PB. He writes that  ‘the recent boom of 
studies on participatory local democracy in Latin America has yet to produce 
compelling cross-national comparative analysis to provide an answer’ (2011: 2) 
and  ‘causal  analysis  of  why  some  fail  while  others  succeed  remains 
underdeveloped’ (idem: 24). Goldfrank compares budget participation in three 
cities  in  different  countries;  Porto  Alegre,  Montevideo,  and  the  Libertador 
municipality in Caracas. Left-wing parties promising participatory reform arrived 
in power in these cases at similar moments but with varying results. Goldfrank’s 
question parallels the one I wish to answer using a larger N; ‘why [and when] do 
participatory experiments aid in deepening democracies in some cities but not 
in  others?’  (idem:  2).    By  comparing  across  countries  here  Goldfrank  can 
conclude that it is through a combination of a relatively decentralised national 
system  of  municipal government  and  weak  institutionalisation of  opposition 
parties that participatory democracy thrives (idem: 7). In his conclusion he turns 
to discuss some further examples of what he says are surprisingly successful 
examples of PB in other contexts in Latin America (idem: 258-260), showing that 
different  cases  of  PB  have  been  characterised  by  equifinality10. This is later 
confirmed by further cross-case analysis in this thesis.  
                                           
 
10 Equifinilaty is assumed where the same outcome is reached by different paths. For an explanation of 
the assumptions on finality in set-theoretic methods see pp.44-49.  
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We need not focus only on the concern of improving democratic governance in 
Latin America. As outlined in the introduction, democratic deficits are a concern 
throughout  the  ‘democratic’  world  (Stoker,  2006;  Pateman:  2012).  In  what 
Giovanni Allegretti calls a ‘return of the caravels’ the particular innovation in 
democratic development of concern here was introduced from the ‘new’ world 
back to the ‘old’ one. There are a few early attempts to take stock of the diffusion 
of PB across Latin America and then further afield, and in particular first to 
Europe, then beyond (Cabannes 2004; Allegretti and Herzberg 2004; Sintomer 
et al, 2005; Shah (ed.) 2007). While relatively  more descriptive than systematic 
in their comparative focus these works both describe a larger number of cases 
than before and try and give a first sense of comparing emerging cases across 
countries with vastly varying political and cultural histories. Both draw together 
many  threads  of  investigation  of  participatory  budgets  and  usefully  set  the 
parameters for the kinds of questions we might want to ask in a more systematic 
way, looking at causal combinations. They give us a sense of the rich complexity 
of the social and political contexts of PB experiments. As our understanding of 
the field develops we will want to search for a useful balance between parsimony 
and complexity in our explanations. 
Similar to Goldfrank’s systematic small-N comparison of budget participation in 
cities in Latin America, Talpin (2011) and Röcke (2009) have compared PB across 
cities  in  different  national  contexts  within  Europe.  Talpin’s  ethnographic 
comparative approach allows him to understand how individuals’ experiences of 
participation  in  budget  decisions  was  shaped  and  reshaped  by  different 
environments. His engulfment in participant observation in Morsang-sur-Orge 
brings us vividly the salutary reminder that behind the scenes of participatory 
experiments  lies  politics;  ‘several  actors  are  involved  in  the  process,  with 
different  motives  and  dispositions,  a  complex  decision-making  process  is 
created, where power is shared by different groups fighting insidiously for it, 
while pretending to be allied for the common good’, (2011: 199). His inductive 
comparative approach shows that even in three relatively radical participatory 
experiments (in their national contexts) the opportunities for participation are 
conditioned by national and local political norms. He is one of an increasing 
number of scholars making important contributions to our understanding of the 
effects of PB on the individual and in particular longitudinal effects of different 
styles and ‘grammars’ of participation.  
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Röcke for her part finds similarly that national frames have a bearing on how 
participation is institutionalised. Her methods of data collection are very similar 
to Talpin’s. She takes her case selection in a slightly different direction, choosing 
a most-different strategy involving the selection of an atypically weak case in 
one national context, an atypically strong case in another and a typical PB case 
in  a third. This allows her to provide answers to questions about how country-
specific contexts and frames shape the diffusion of PB controlling for positive 
and negative cases (in terms of typicality and success). Her case-based inductive-
comparative approach identifies “the political will to introduce a new procedure 
and to support it against administrative and political opposition; administrative 
support for developing and implementing this procedure; financial means to 
publicise and organise the procedure; and the type of diffusion,” as important 
factors  explaining  divergences  in  processes  of  implementation  of  PB  (2009: 
250).  We  will  return  to  discuss  the  key  causal  variants  and  theories  in 
explanations of PB outcomes in Ch. 4-6. 
Within-country analysis outside of Brazil has been less visible. More recently 
Matteo Bassoli’s three-case comparison of PB governance in Italy has provided 
an interesting subnational comparison in a European country where PB has been 
widespread  and  often  more  radical  than  elsewhere  (2012).  Bassoli  takes 
seriously questions around the definition of PB which we will again return to in 
discussions of operationalisation and selection of explanatory conditions for 
cumulation below. His main focus is considering PB as a type of local governance 
arrangement. He provides a fresh note of caution against biases that would 
restrict  PB  to  an  epiphenomenon  of  a  particular  theoretical  tradition  (2012: 
1185). If PB is of any worth it will need to be compared to other similar and 
different  modes  of  innovation  and  of  democratic  governance  (see  further 
discussion Ch. 7). Within a most-different selection of consolidated Italian cases 
(based on geography, population, and the role of the global justice system), 
Bassoli shows that democratic outcomes, both good and bad, were generally 
similar across the cases, thus eliminating some of the conditions of selection as 
causal.  One  interesting  observation  is  that  in  all  three  cases  a  role  for  the 
opposition within the PB was not excessively supported by either the government 
or opposition leading to familiar problems for the PB itself. 
An important lesson to take from this review of literature is that the kinds of 
questions that are asked by small-N comparativists and the variables they favour  
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investigating seem to differ depending on the cases they select to compare. Of 
course it makes sense when doing in-depth research on a handful of cases to 
select carefully those cases best positioned to answer a researcher’s question of 
interest. But it is also clear that the choice of cases tends again to constrain the 
potential for testing the conclusions of one set of cases with another set in 
favour of the potential for ‘new’ findings. 
2.8  Towards a medium-N Systematic Comparison of 
Participatory Budgeting 
Before  moving to introduce the  potential of  qualitative  comparative  analysis 
(QCA) to contribute to the goals of systematic comparison of a larger number of 
cases for moderate but valuable generalisations, I must discuss three bodies of 
work  which  have  already  begun  to  take  us  in  this  direction. 
Brian Wampler’s comparison of eight PB’s in Brazil was the first to show the 
significant possibilities (and challenging considerations) in moving beyond two 
or  three  cases  while  retaining  virtues  of  holistic  case-based  complexity  in 
explanations. His systematic approach to case selection and specification and 
selection of causal conditions, allow him to deduce what conditions of top-down 
and bottom-up incentives, and institutional design rules are necessary and/or 
sufficient to cause qualitative variation in the level of citizen decision-making in 
different  PB  cases.  Chapter  4  of  this  thesis  deals  in  far  more  detail  with 
Wampler’s work, including the details of its contribution, while simultaneously 
showing the added value of applying QCA to existing comparisons. Suffice it to 
say that it was a significant path-breaker for my contributions. 
A more recent sophisticated approach to medium-N comparison comes from 
Baiocchi, Heller and Silva (2011). They recognise from the outset that the case 
for  participatory  democracy  despite  much  spilt  ink  still  rests  on  “rather 
fragmented and thin empirical grounds” (idem: 1). While the study design again 
relies on some rich and demonstrably well-executed fieldwork, perhaps most 
exciting is the scientific approach to case selection. The researchers apply a 
matched  –pair  approach to the selection of  eight  cases to increase relevant 
control and isolate conditions of interest. Their outcome of interest is centred 
on the changes in civil society and its interactions with the state where PB is 
implemented.  Most  comparisons  discussed  up  to  now  have  focused  on  a  
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population  of  cases  where  a  participatory  innovation  has  already  been 
introduced and based the case-selection decision on variation on outcomes and 
key causal conditions. Baoicchi et al.’s design allows them to also ascertain the 
differences between cases where PB is introduced and similar cases where it was 
never;  controlling  for  scale,  geography  and  civil  society  support  for the  PT. 
Further  important  contributions  relevant  to  comparison  of  instances  of 
innovation and non-instances beyond Brazil continue to emerge (c.f. Galais et al. 
2012, Lopes Alves and Allegretti 2012). In Chapter 3 I make the case that the 
turn in considered attention to the bounds of counterfactual analysis is one that 
we should not lose sight of. 
Baiocchi  et  al.  are  also  able  to  give  us  some  insight  into  the  variation  in 
democratic mobilisation of civil society across their 4 cases of PB, renewing 
discussion of a common theme that variation in the capacity of civil society to 
act autonomously and contentiously results in different forms of participatory 
democracies. They find co-optation is a danger where weak civil society meets 
(can be observed in combination with) an organised top-down process. These 
findings bring some nuance to those mentioned earlier. A weak or strong civil 
society may contribute towards one outcome or its negation depending on the 
degree to which other key explanatory conditions are present and how they 
interact. This multifinality11 is a common logical occurrence in the social world 
and one commonly overlooked by social scientists trained to think in ‘additive’ 
terms as we shall see. Moreover, it is food for thought that due to selecting a 
control of cases where the PT had a small winning or losing margin in the 1996 
election (some ten years after democratisation of Brazil), at least some of the 
cases discussed by Baiocchi et al. might be assumed to have relatively strongly 
institutionalised opposition, bringing nuance to Goldfrank’s conclusions above. 
Goldfrank might counter that the cross-national nature of his research can show 
a relative difference in party institutionalisation not present in a subnational 
comparison. And we should not forget that the structure of PBs in Brazil has 
been  mostly  less  formal  and  less  regulated  and  hence  restricted  (Goldfrank 
2011: 256). All in all this points to the necessity of cumulating findings across 
                                           
 
11 Multifinality, meaning that the same condition can lead to different outcomes (depending on its 
context).  
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smaller-N  comparisons  as  at  least  any  attempt  will  begin  to  uncover  what 
comparisons at what levels of abstraction are robust and relevant. 
Finally,  Yves  Sintomer  has  worked  with  an  amalgam  of  colleagues,  many 
mentioned  above,  over  the  years  to  move  in  the  direction  of  worldwide 
comparison and categorisation of the PB landscape. This is an important body 
of work. Subnational comparisons and comparative designs that are drawn from 
an  area  studies  background  in  Latin  America  and  Europe  have  a  sound 
methodological basis but they need to be complemented by cumulative findings 
for an even more ecumenical understanding of the phenomenon at hand. How 
else can we know and discuss the proper levels to which we can generalise? 
Carole Pateman considers that given the empirical evidence “the problem is no 
longer  whether  participatory  democracy  is  feasible,”  and  leaves  us  with  the 
question as to whether “in the rich countries, there is any longer either the 
political culture or the political will to pursue genuine democratization?” (2012: 
15).  Is  Pateman  too  quick  to  draw  a  line  between  the  desired  ‘genuine 
democratisation’ as it might manifest itself in the so-called developed world and 
elsewhere?  Perhaps  conditions  for  participatory  democracy  may  need  to  be 
different  in  these  contexts.  Only  through  comparison  can  we  answer  these 
questions.  
Much like some of the previous work outlined above, Sintomer et al. focus on 
delivering  an  overview  and  providing  some  organising  principles  for 
understanding PB. PB is a quickly-diffusing ‘moving target’ (Baiocchi et al., 2011: 
60), but this kind of work helps us to think about what the scope of PB is and 
what the potential for comparison within the scope might be (what PB is and is 
not). The most interesting analytical contribution of this work so far has been to 
provide a typology of PBs using the logic of Weberian ideal types (see Herzberg 
2011 for a detailed discussion). Their types are based on differences in design, 
often based on the origins of adoption of the innovation, that lead to differing 
conditions of deliberation and the role of civil society. These can offer useful 
visual aids (e.g. Sintomer et al. 2008: 170). At points they suggest that there is 
still too much contrast for systematic comparison and analysis of many different 
PB types (2013: 11; 20). Below I show that careful analysis of the property space 
and movements towards a fully specified typological theory can aid judgements 
on comparability.  
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What these researchers are catalysing is the process of maturation of a new and 
significant sub-field in political studies. The established fields in political studies 
have always benefited from early conceptual work in organising their scope and 
principles  (Lijphart  1971).    We  are  still  at  a  relatively  early  stage  of 
phenomenological  development  with  democratic  innovations.  Yet  iteration 
among  theory-led  concept  refinement  and  comparative  political  science  is 
enabling self-actualisation of a field of research. Simply, as Mill’s methodological 
doctrine would have it, “We compare phenomena with each other to get the 
conception,  and  we  then  compare  those  and  other  phenomena  with  the 
conception...the conception becomes a type of comparison, (Mill 1950: 298).  
Let  us  return  then  to  Goldfrank’s  summation  of  the  state  of  research  on 
participatory democratic processes as it is far better than I could reinvent. He 
contends that “a compelling framework that integrates actors, preconditions, 
and institutional design remains elusive (2011: 24 - 25).” My approach in this 
thesis is to try and provide a response to this that is grounded in systematic 
comparative analysis. 
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Chapter 3:   Developments in comparison and 
case-based methods: Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA) 
Good social science is problem driven and not methodology driven in 
the sense that it employs those methods that for a given problematic, 
best help answer the research questions at hand, Flyvbjerg (2006: 242). 
3.1  Why QCA and why now?  
Designing social research involves trade-offs between complexity and generality. 
There remains an often overblown and unhelpful distinction in social sciences 
between strategies that standardly prioritise one over the other. For Ragin “it is 
easy to exaggerate their differences and to caricature the two approaches, for 
example, by portraying quantitative work on general patterns as scientific but 
sterile  and  oppressive  and  qualitative  research  on  small  Ns  as  rich  and 
emancipatory  but  soft  and  subjective”,  (2000:  22).  Qualitative  Comparative 
Analysis sets itself up as a method that provides an avenue for assuaging some 
of the unhelpful tensions in this distinction.  
The attractiveness of QCA as both a critical methodological approach and a novel 
set of techniques has led to its application across an ever-expanding group of 
diverse disciplines and subdiscplines in the social sciences (Thiem and Dusa, 
2013: 2). It has been one of the few approaches in recent times to come from 
outside the methodological orthodoxy that has not soon been quickly lost again 
to dark corners of the methodological lexicon. The number of peer-reviewed 
articles per year using QCA has grown gradually since the first in 1984; up to 
fifteen in 2005, to thirty-five in 2011, and then more quickly to forty-five in 2012 
and  ninety-nine  in  2013  (idem12). Of those ninety -nine articles sixteen were 
                                           
 
12 Figures for 2012 and 2013 were kindly provided by Alrik Thiem in personal communication (Jan 2014) 
and were published in the COMPASSS newsletter of January 2014 
http://www.compasss.org/newsletter/33.pdf. COMPASSS (COMPArative Methods for  
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agenda-setting articles introducing QCA to new sub-disciplines (among them 
Ryan  and  Smith  2012).  QCA  has  not  yet  been  employed  extensively  or 
sophisticatedly in the field of political participation and deliberative democratic 
innovation. My work attempts to investigate the usefulness of the method while 
introducing it to that field. 
The following chapters aim to 1) Introduce advanced applications of QCA to the 
field of political participation, providing exemplars with substantive outcomes 
2) discuss how QCA’s formal logic can provide a tool for researchers that enables 
them  to  make  more  transparent  and  improved  decisions  on  the  requisite 
parsimony and complexity in explanations of the social world, 3) discuss new 
opportunities for cumulating scholarly knowledge and systematically reviewing 
existing evidence using QCA and 4) investigate whether information gleaned 
from qualitative comparative analyses provides a new, robust and  interactive 
means by which policymakers can engage with research evidence.  
3.2  How do we know what we know and how should we 
find things out in social sciences? Big-N, Small-N and 
the forgotten middle child. 
Arguments about the correct approach to political research are still anchored by 
deference to a hierarchy of methods (most succinctly summarised by Lijphart, 
1971). This well-known hierarchy descends from experiments, through statistics 
to the comparative method and on to the case-study. For some time now there 
has been a paradigmatic consensus
13 that has developed around this hierarchy. 
Of course much of the   more recent  railing  against this seeming consensus 
manifests itself vividly in work associated with the ‘Perestroika movement’ (c.f. 
Flybjerg 2001, Schram and Caterino 2006); and there are arguments that there 
is an on-going process of paradigm shift accommodating a position for a more 
‘critical realism’ (c.f. Marsh and Stoker 2006, Moses and Knutsen 2012).  
                                           
 
Systematic cross-caSe analySis) is a worldwide network for scholars interested in systematic cross-case 
comparative approaches to research www.compasss.org.  
13 I take consensus here in its loose sense, not meaning complete agreement.   
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Nevertheless with large-N surveys of individuals becoming easier to perform in 
the middle of the last century, the ‘behavioural revolution’ in political science, 
had a profound and lasting effect in shaping the current paradigm. Leaving aside 
the not insignificant increase in experimental work (Morton and Williams 2010, 
Green  and  Gerber  2012),  leaping  advances  in  technology,  and  practises  of 
surveying  and  parametric  statistical  analysis  made  it  easier  to  answer  the 
questions social scientists wanted to answer using statistical methods. As these 
methods,  with  their  position  in  the  hierarchy  above  small-N  comparisons, 
became more common, they became a yardstick for methodological rigour in 
both  the  mind  of  the  profession  and  end-users  of  political  research  (i.e. 
policymakers and all other agents who would wish to use social research to effect 
social change). The result was that one approach to addressing questions of 
causation dominated - the variable-oriented approach (c.f. Ragin 1988, 2000). 
King,  Keohane  and  Verba’s  (1994)  contribution  here  has  been  inordinately 
influential. Although they provide a plethora of thoughtful discussions on the 
scientific process in social enquiry, it has become popular to caricature their 
approach  as  boiling  down  to  a  simple  pithy  piece  of  advice  to  small-N 
researchers; ‘try to increase your N’. To give them fair dues, they further note 
that; 
combine(d) evidence from many observations…is always at least as good 
and  usually  better  than  the  analogy…As  long  as  these  additional 
observations have some features that are similar in some way, however 
small, to the event we are predicting and we are using this additional 
information in a reasonable way, they will help make for a more accurate 
and efficient prediction, (1994: 212-213). 
 
This reasoning has some resonance with QCA’s promise to develop a method 
that makes feasible medium-N research strategies. Ragin’s (2000: 25) plot of the 
relative  number  of  studies  against  the  number  of  cases  per  study  in  the 
discipline is worth reproducing here (see Fig 3.1 below). On face value, the U-
shaped pattern suggests that small-N researchers are indeed quite averse to 
accepting King, Keohane and Verba’s advice to look for any way to increase the 
number  of  observations  unless  N  can  be  radically  improved  (which  would 
probably require a significant change of research question).   
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Figure 3-1 Number of cases per study reproduced from Ragin (2000: 25). 
While some like King, Keohane and Verba have been able to show us the common 
scientific norms undergirding social research strategies; others have been able 
to clarify the distinct advantages and disadvantages of random-selection and 
information-oriented selection of cases (Flyvbjerg 2006). Lijphart enumerates 
many strategies for both single-case and comparative research. Even his list is 
far from exhaustive. To Lijphart’s list can for example be added ‘critical case’ 
and ‘maximum variation’ strategies (see Flyvbjerg idem). I need not discuss them 
at length here as the important point is that there are many well-thought out 
strategies  for  logical  contributions  to  knowledge  accumulation  in  small-N 
research. 
Traditional  statistical  methods  focus  on  isolating  the  net-effects  of  a  small 
number of variables over a large number of cases (Ragin, 2007: 177). They will 
struggle  to  adequately  deal  with  the  increasing  number  of  potential 
configurations  of  explanatory  variables  acting  in  distinct  directions.  Despite  
  41 
   
advances  in  Large-N  research  applications,  to  answer  many  of  the  question 
students of social phenomena would like to answer a large-N is often hard to 
come by (Lijphart 1970) or perhaps undesirable (Flyvbjerg 2006). This can be 
particularly true of public policy innovation,  where diffusion is common but 
rarely universal and intricate exemplars are valued by end-users of research. 
Small-N case-based research can be attentive to the complexity of phenomena 
allowing researchers to reflectively refine definitions of their elemental qualities 
within the process of undertaking research. However, the trade-off is a lack of 
generalizability  which  decreases  the  potential  for  social  research  to  justify 
actions and make an impact.  
There  may  be  good  arguments  for  avoiding  small-N  research  strategies. 
Lieberson (1994) is quick to point out that Mill himself, on whose lucidity the 
comparative method is grounded
14, was sceptical of using such method in the 
social sciences. Thoughtful critiques from this school have shot difficult charges 
at case-based research strategies; perhaps most convincingly when rounding on 
their perceived inability to distinguish random from real data and adeq uately 
consider measurement error. In a following section I will discuss Lieberson’s 
related but specific criticisms of QCA. I wish to show that such critiques of case-
based research have helped improve our understanding of their value immensely 
but that their dismissal of small-N strategies is based on misplaced focus on 
technique over approach. The lasting criticism of King, Keohane and Verba’s 
work is that it tries to impose variable-oriented thinking on case-based research 
strategies. Theirs is not an ignoble goal and their lessons provide a useful check 
on unreflective ‘small’ thinking. The contributions of Ragin, Flyvbjerg and others 
have however helped to clarify and elucidate the intrinsic value of case-based 
research strategies. 
That is not to say either that the approach itself is favourable or immune from 
critique. Certainly the approach can incentivise an over-reliance on no-variance 
designs and restrict itself quickly to claims of exceptionalism. Both ‘no-variance’ 
designs  and  case  studies  that  highlight  exceptionality  are  not  necessarily 
                                           
 
14 For a simple explanation of Mills methods see Savolainen (1994); for a connection to Boolean logic see 
Caramani (2009).  
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problematic and can be quite powerful; however they should not be the norm. 
The true explanation for avoidance of medium-N strategies is not difficult to 
imagine. Small-N approaches rely on a high quality of information about and 
familiarity with cases in a study. And it is simply very difficult for a researcher, 
possessed with only one brain to have a deep understanding of a large number 
of cases (see discussion next chapter).  
In  any  event,  even  if  “the  comparative  method  is  not  the  equivalent  of  the 
experimental method but only a very imperfect substitute..,” (Lijphart, 1970: 
685); still most of those committed to a hierarchical heuristic for thinking about 
values  in  methodological  approaches  might  say  that  “...awareness  of  the 
limitations of the comparative method is necessary but need not be disabling” 
(idem).  The question then becomes one of developing coping/enhancement 
strategies for small-N research; or at least applying the comparative method in 
a way that has potential to contribute to generalisation.  
Berg-Schlosser  and  Cronqvist  suggest  that  Qualitative  Comparative  Analysis 
(QCA) may offer a solution to this problem: 
Between the extremes of over-generalizing and “universalizing” macro-
quantitative approaches, on the one hand, and purely individualizing 
case-oriented approaches, on the other, a meaningful “medium-range” 
social  science  can  be  built  which,  at  the  same  time,  has  a  higher 
explanatory power and a greater social and political relevance, (2005: 
172). 
PB appears ripe for a medium-N study which aims to advance the goals of both 
functional population definition (of what PB is) and robust causal analyses (of 
the combinations of effects that produce more or less successful cases). The 
following  sections  further  elaborate  the  distinctiveness  of  case-based 
approaches and consider the application of the lessons of recent methodological 
debates to substantive investigations of democratic innovations. 
3.3  Contributing to knowledge on participation in public 
policymaking using QCA 
In the previous chapter I merely chronicled the development of a scientific sub-
discipline around a newly discovered phenomenon of investigation. I wanted to  
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elucidate the constraints and incentives that have led those interested in finding 
out about the phenomenon to particular research tactics and tools. It is always 
useful to review the literature to establish trajectories of scholarly developments 
thoroughly  before  contributing  to  it.  However,  I  also  aim  to  contribute 
substantively; but how? 
Many  researchers  working  together  and  apart  can  be  part  of  an  informal 
accumulation  of  knowledge  and  draw  on  one  another’s  communicated 
understandings of related phenomena. This is the express purpose of academic 
journals, conferences and collaboration. Yet especially in an emerging field, each 
individual research study  must deal  with the enduring analytical problem of 
many potential explanatory variables and few cases.  
Often, as we have seen, the primary remedy to this dilemma is to increase the 
number of observations as much as possible (Lijphart 1971: 686, King, Keohane 
and Verba, 1994). This tactic in the circumstances of PB research raises some 
significant but not insurmountable problems. Yet, in the build-up of rich case 
study literature and the development of a number of causal explanations for 
outcomes of a democratic innovation like PB, an opportunity now arises. There 
is potential for moderate generalisations in a larger-N systematic cross-case 
comparison of processes that have been institutionalised to differing degrees in 
different parts of the world.  Even if we take the classical hierarchical approach 
to selecting  methods,  at this  juncture,  a  comparison  based  on conventional 
statistical analysis is difficult to conceive for a number of reasons. First, it is not 
clear, should we aim to use ‘mainstream’ methods, that we have enough cases 
on which to draw statistical significance — and for those cases that are available, 
it is not yet clear that they should all be classified as forms of PB (see discussion 
of  casing  and  scope  below).  Second,  case-work  and  existing  small-N 
comparisons  suggest  that  causation  is  likely  to  be  complex.  Wampler,  for 
example,  suggests,  “successful  PB  cases  depend  on  a  series  of  factors 
converging  to  support  the  delegation  of  authority”  (2007a:  159).  Moreover, 
Peruzzotti has claimed that, “Democratic innovation is more likely to take place 
in a relatively grey area, where neither all of the significant variables promote 
change  nor  do  all  of  them  conspire  against  it”  (2009:  58).  A  configurative 
comparative analyst on assessing the lie of the land might put it thus: The 
existing  literature  tells  us  that  causation  is  likely  to  be  conjunctural, 
asymmetrical, multifinal and equifinal.   
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3.4  Configurative comparative and set-theoretic, case-
based methods: Explaining the mouthfuls and 
unpacking the potential
15 
As Ragin is often at pains to point out in his writing, the distinction between 
variable-oriented  and  case-based  research  is  itself  a  matter  of  degree  and 
variable-oriented  methods  will  continue  to  be  immensely  powerful  tools  for 
social science. This is not least because “QCA has not yet received the sustained 
evaluation of its inferential strengths and weaknesses that other techniques, 
such as regression analysis and comparative case study research, have benefited 
from,” (Seawright 2004: 14, see also 2005: 41). 
If  we agree to discount some relatively  marginal technical distinctions, then 
‘case-based’ (Byrne and Ragin 2009), ‘set-theoretic’ (Schneider and Wagemann 
2012) and ‘configurative comparative’ (Rihoux and Ragin 2009) methods can be 
seen as emerging placeholders for an expansive but palpable methodological 
approach that can be distinguished from the paradigmatic ‘variable-oriented’ 
approach. It should be neither seen as a replacement for, nor incompatible with, 
its variable-oriented cousin, and it has supporters in both those  who  would 
challenge and strongly uphold the aforementioned hierarchy (Byrne 2009). It is 
more  appropriate  to  place  it  at  the  forefront  of  a  wave  of  methodological 
reasoning which moves beyond unhelpful distinctions between, on the one hand 
qualitative and quantitative and the other theory and its practical application, 
which  have  hindered  the  advancement  of  social  research.  The  worth  of  the 
approach is that it has provided fresh markets for valuable old ideas, and with 
resulting innovation, some new and useful tools that help investigations that are 
too easily disregarded when one approach dominates. 
There are at least two important distinctions that characterise the approach. The 
first is the fuzzier of the two but no less important, as case-based methods are, 
                                           
 
15 This following sections introduce QCA and draw heavily on the work of Ragin (1988, 2000, 2008) and 
Schneider and Wagemann (2012) in particular. For book-length treatments of fsQCA methodology see 
Ragin  (2000,  2008)  Smithson  and  Verkuilen  (2006),  Rihoux  and  Ragin  (2007)  and  Schneider  and 
Wagemann (2011). Introducing vast new terminology to their audience is a particular dilemma for those 
writing on fuzzy sets.  
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put simply, a lot more disposed than their variable-oriented cousin to giving 
serious thought to problems of boundaries of cases (c.f. Ragin and Becker 1992, 
Byrne 2009). Case-based methods vary in the tools they employ and the number 
of cases they compare, but they hold in common an understanding of social 
research  that  is  sensitive  to  the  complexity  of  the  case  and  the  scope  of 
generalisations. To allow for generalisations  within a designated scope QCA 
requires sound theoretical specification of the population of cases and selection 
of  key  conditions  for  comparison.  This  means that  case-based  methods  are 
characterised by constant iteration between inductive and deductive strategies16 
(between evidence and theory), and by on-going problematisation of the scope 
of populations, causes and outcomes in a piece of comparative research (Ragin 
2000, Rihoux and Lobe 2009). This will become clearer as I describe the process 
of research I undertook using this approach. 
The second is the neater of the two distinctions; that configurative methods 
ascribe to an understanding of causality in the social world, in which outcomes 
are explained by configurations of cond itions (conjunctions). This is not the 
same as assuming interaction effects (c.f. Wagemann and Schneider 2012: 86 -
87). Causal effects are not deemed to be ‘additive’ where each potential cause 
is  assumed  to  have  a  meaningful  relationship  with  the  outcome  that  is 
independent of the presence and absence of the other causal conditions (Ragin 
1988 2000: 95). Rather, causes in different contexts are seen to have effects 
that do not ‘average out’ in a very meaningful way. As we shall see there are two 
contrasting base approaches to logic that we can distinguish; one formed on the 
operators  of  Boolean  algebra  and the  other  on  the  operators  of  elementary 
algebra. 
Logically if we take it that causation is conjunctural then causal explanations 
may  be  multifinal:  i.e.  the  same  conditions  can  contribute  to  different  and 
opposing  outcomes  depending  on  the  different  degrees  of  presence  and 
absence  of  other  conditions.  This  has  further  implications  for  the  practical 
                                           
 
16  I  take  induction  and  deduction  here  as  common  placeholders  for  strategies  towards  knowledge 
accumulation  that  prioritise  hypotheses  generated  from  empirical  investigation  and  from  theory 
respectively. For a more sophisticated discussion of the role of induction and deduction in scientific 
inference see Cohen and Nagel (1934: 273-277).  
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consequences of implementing our findings in the real world as causation is 
neither assumed to be unifinal nor ‘linear’. The importance of context decrees 
that to manipulate an outcome it will not do to merely reduce or increase the 
presence  or  absence  of  a  ‘strong,  significant’  explanatory  variable.  Rather 
causation is asymmetric in that the conditions that explain the presence of an 
outcome do not necessarily by their absence explain that outcome’s absence. 
Another  way  of  putting  this  is  that  the  logic  underlying  the  way  we  try  to 
understand the social world is often set-theoretic (c.f. Schneider and Wagemann 
2012: 5-6). This suggests first and foremost that social scientists tend to make 
causal statements that invoke relations of necessity and sufficiency. Theorists 
and case-researchers are particularly fond of claims of the nature ‘X is sufficient 
but  not  necessary  for  Y’.  Sufficient  conditions  (or  more  likely  sufficient 
conjunctions) are usually what most of us have in mind when we say out loud ‘x 
leads to y’.  These kinds of relationships among conditions can be identified 
analytically  in  subset-superset  relations  among  conditions  compared  across 
cases. 
Take the following abbreviated passage from Gret and Sintomer’s book on PB in 
Porto Alegre,   
A combination of a strong political culture in civil society and a strong 
political will in government represents the best context for initiating 
such an experiment. The process also requires a level of pragmatism in 
its  implementation…  formal  political  equality  is  not  sufficient…  true 
political will is required founded upon alternative action mechanisms… 
municipal action alone cannot hope to modify the relationship between 
social classes, (2005: 134). 
 
In the space of one half-page the authors suggest at least four hypotheses that 
are set-theoretic in nature. The hypotheses they are conceiving are based on 
combinatorial causation and notions of necessary (or ‘required’) and sufficient 
or insufficient (‘not alone’) conditions. The use of set-theoretic reasoning is 
ubiquitous in the social sciences and statements about necessity and sufficiency 
are rife within the PB literature. I will highlight further the set-theoretic nature of 
many of the causal claims made by PB scholars in Chapter 5.  
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3.5  The advantages of set-oriented thinking for social 
research: What to do with a medium-N? 
Case-based comparative approaches assume that there is an extent to which 
complex  phenomena  can  be  observed  and  described  in terms  of  both their 
elemental qualities and quantitative variations of the presence of these qualities. 
Then  qualitative  descriptions  when  compared  to  idealisations  and  to  other 
phenomena using the insights of theory can be usefully measured and mapped 
in terms of their set membership across cases. This lends itself to some new 
analytic techniques, in particular the use of Boolean algebraic operations and 
fuzzy logic, to provide parsimonious descriptions of causal relationships.  
Configurative  comparative  methods  have  been  advocated  as  stand-alone 
approaches to selection for case-studies and typological theorising (George and 
Bennett 2005: 233-262) and for the initial selection of relevant pairs of cases for 
in-depth comparison (see De Meur and other’s work on MDSO-MSDO designs, 
e.g.  De  Meur  and  Gottcheiner  2009).  Nevertheless  it  has  been  variants  of 
Qualitative  Comparative  Analysis  (QCA)  aimed  at  substantive  causal 
interpretation  that  have  popularised  the  use  of  configurative  methods.  A 
qualitative comparative analysis can be particularly useful in subfields of political 
research  which  have  benefited  from  early  and  constant  conceptual  work  in 
organising their scope. Therefore QCA has made a key contribution, for instance, 
to comparative welfare-state research (c.f. Skaaning et al, 2012). It is interesting 
to see then how it applies to work on democratic innovations that gradually 
approaches a more firm conceptual footing. 
Most introductions to using QCA in the social sciences are careful to point out 
the case-oriented nature of the method and emphasise its advantages for small-
to-medium N comparison (Ragin 1987, Berg-Schlosser et al 2009, Rihoux and 
Lobe 2009). Set-oriented thinking can help highlight relationships of necessary 
and  sufficient  causation  in  comparative  case  studies  by  observing  subset-
superset relationships. Necessary conditions are no less interesting but less 
common  (in  their  non-trivial  form)  than  sufficient  conditions.  Necessary 
conditions, by virtue of their presence being required in every instance of the 
outcome, impose more restrictions on where we might expect to observe an 
outcome in a way sufficient conditions do not. Any number of conditions or 
combinations of conditions may be sufficient for a given outcome in different  
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contexts. And it is so that causation can be equifinal; the same outcome can be 
reached in a number of different ways and although some of these conditions 
can be more or less likely to occur, none of them is any ‘better’ at predicting the 
outcome when they do
17.  
Both questions of correlational relationships and set -theoretic relationships 
among variables are important for social scientists.   While statistical analysis can 
measure the effect of  having  more or  less  of  one  variable on  another, 
configurational  analysis  investigates  what  combinations  of  conditions  are 
necessary or sufficient to produce an outcome. For necessity to be established 
the set of cases containing the outcome must be a subset of the set of cases 
displaying the cause. Similarly, for sufficiency to be established the set of cases 
containing the causal condition must be a subset of the cases displaying the 
outcome (c.f. Ragin, 2000: 214-217). These types of set-theoretic relations are 
often masked by correlation -focused analyses as patterns of subset -superset 
relations often appear to signal heteroscedasticity and may suggest associated 
error  in  model  specification  (Ragin  2007;  20 08).  Correlational-focused 
regression methods are not good tools for testing relationships of necessity and 
sufficiency.  
Conversely, Boolean algebra can be applied to set-theoretic statements in order 
to highlight conjunctural, alternative and asymmetric relationships. This is done 
by testing alternative combinations of conditions for relationships of necessity 
and sufficiency (supersets and subsets) using Boolean logical operations such as 
logical ‘AND’ (the intersection of sets), and logical ‘OR’ (the union of sets). It also 
allows us to use simple Boolean negation operations (logical ‘NOT’) to show 
whether and when the absence of a condition contributes to outcomes.  
From a practical point of view this opens up causal analysis to the tools and 
possibilities of Boolean logic. Savolainen has argued that the value of Mill’s 
methods  of  comparison  is  “in  their  capacity  to  eliminate  a  limited  set  of 
alternative causal statements,” (1994: 1218; see also Peters 2013). This element 
                                           
 
17 There are however arguments from QCA scholars that some sufficient conditions may be ‘empirically 
more important’ than others on the basis that we have more evidence of their occurrence. I will return to 
this debate below.  
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of  comparative  research  is  undervalued,  but  I  think  systematic  case-based 
comparison  can  have  an  even  more  subtle  crucial  advantage  that  is  often 
overlooked.  That  is  that  it  can  reduce  overdetermination  and 
underdetermination  in  an  apposite  manner.  A  set-theoretic  approach  avoids 
seeing  hypothesis  as  being  in  strict  competition  but  as  alternative  cloudy 
solutions  which  require  distillation.  Applications  of  Boolean  logic  to  causal 
analysis can be used to discard irrelevant conditions and identify and provide 
parsimonious  yet  robust  descriptions  of  causal  relations  over  more  than  a 
handful of cases. Using QCA we can test the types of causal claims and intuitions 
of the researchers whose case-studies and small-n comparisons have paved the 
way in studying democratic innovations. 
These  are  not  issues  that  have  been  ignored  by  the  methodologists  of 
‘mainstream’ social science. All of the issues highlighted have vexed concerned 
statisticians who have come up with many ingenious ways of handling these 
problems.  However,  the  qualitative  comparative  analysis  I  disclose  here  will 
provide a good exemplar for an approach that incorporates these concerns in a 
coherent and holistic manner that has much to recommend itself. 
3.6  How could QCA be applied to PB? 
Pratchett et al (2009) offer a first attempt at using crisp-set QCA (csQCA) — this 
is where membership in a set can be either 0 (out) or 1 (in) but no other value 
— to try and uncover patterns of causation in PB outcomes. It represents a first 
attempt  to  use  QCA  as  part  of  a  systematic  review  of  evidence  on  PB,  in 
particular, comparison of existing case materials. The strengths and weaknesses 
of crisp-set QCA lie in its simplicity and transparency. Where a case is a member 
of a set defined by the causal condition it is given the value 1 and where it is a 
non-member it is ascribed the value 0. An illustrative example of a crisp set truth 
table is shown below using imaginary data for four cases. Membership of cases 
(Porto Alegre, Rome, Belo Horizonte, Sevilla) in the sets of causal conditions 
(A,B,C,D) and outcome condition (Y) can be read easily. Moreover each row of 
the truth table can be read as a logical case (potential combination of causal 
conditions) for which we have an empirical case example. A full truth table would  
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include  all  possible  combinations  so  that  logical  remainders  (logical  cases 
without empirical examples) can be dealt with transparently.
18 
 
Cases  Causal conditions  Outcome 
  A  B  C  D  Y 
Porto Alegre  1  0  0  1  1 
Rome  0  1  0  1  0 
Belo 
Horizonte 
1  0  1  0  1 
Sevilla  1  0  1  1  1 
Table 3-1 Indicative truth table showing crisp membership in sets. 
Truth tables are useful not only as a visual aid but as the first step in collating 
data which can then be minimised to provide parsimonious explanations of 
relationships  across  the  data.  Minimisation  allows  us  to  systematically 
interrogate  the  explanatory  conditions,  reducing  them  to  the  simplest 
combinations possible. Let us take the last two cases (Belo Horizonte and Sevilla) 
in our truth table above. Here we have  a positive outcome with two different 
combinations of variables. We adopt the notation utilised by the fsQCA software 
programme
19 used later in this study for the sake of consistency, where the tilde 
‘~’  preceding the  letter denotes  absence of  a  condition  and the  asterisk  ‘*’ 
denotes intersection of sets (conjunction of conditions).
20 
   
                                           
 
18 Logical remainders are combinations of variables for which we do not have an empirical case, (we could 
call them counterfactuals). Even in large-N studies that take interaction of conditions into account we can 
expect many of the logical cases not to display any empirical examples. Large-N studies until relatively 
recently have paid little attention to the simplifying assumptions they make about these cases in their 
conclusions. QCA makes these assumptions transparent. See below. 
19 fsQCA 2.5 available as a freeware download from 
http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml 
20 Alternative notation used by Tosmana software which was a popular programme and useful for crisp -
set analysis and in some cases the R QC A package denotes presence of a condition by a capital letter; 
absence by lower case.  
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A*~B*C*~D (Belo Horizonte) 
A*~B*C*D (Sevilla) 
If two  cases  produce the  same outcome,  but  differ only  in one explanatory 
variable, then the variable that distinguishes the two cases can be considered 
irrelevant  and  removed  (Caramani  2009:  72).  This  produces  a  simpler 
explanatory combination, namely:   
A*~B*C (solution 1) 
We also see that the Porto Alegre case produces the outcome by the causal 
combination: 
A*~B*~C*D 
Given that we know the Sevilla case (A*~B*C*D) also produces the outcome we 
can minimise to the simple combination  
A*~B*D (solution 2) 
It is unnecessary to introduce too much Boolean notation here (for more see 
Ragin  1987;  Caramani  2009).  However,  if  these  were  to  be  the  only  two 
combinations of variables that produced the particular outcome (Y), then we can 
state that 
A*~B*C + A*~B*D →  Y 
or alternatively: 
  [A*~B](C + D) →  Y 
(where + denotes logical OR) 
We can then state here that Boolean minimisation has uncovered that A*~B (the 
presence of cause A and the absence of cause B in combination) is an insufficient 
but necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient combination of conditions  
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(an INUS condition
21) for the given outcome Y. It is present in both combinations, 
but on its own, not sufficient for Y: it requires the presence of either C or D.  
3.7  Introducing Fuzzy Sets 
CsQCA  has  been  criticised  for  using  a  crude  dichotomous  measurement. 
Dichotomisation of a variable is reasonable when there is a clear threshold of 
distinction between a score, which indicates the observation of an occurrence, 
and one that indicates its absence. But, PB is no different to many concepts in 
social sciences, in that although potential causes or outcomes can be observed 
in many cases of a given phenomenon, the degree to which they occur varies22. 
Fuzzy sets
23 suggest a more sophisticated analysis is possible.   
In a fuzzy set a case can be ascribed a value between 1 and 0 depending on its 
degree of membership in a set. This allows comparative researchers to describe 
degrees of variation. Fuzzy sets are in some ways simply an expansion in 
sophistication of the c risp dichotomisation. Each case will still display a 
membership score either side of the crossover point (0.5) which is closest to its 
crisp set membership. Table 3 -2 represents the conditions from our earlier 
example in the form of an imaginary fsQCA data matrix. 
   
                                           
 
21  For  more  on  INUS  conditions,  see  Mackie  (1988)  and  Wagemann  and  Schneider  (2007:  6).  This 
conjunction is an INUS conjunction and both the conditions A and ~B are themselves INUS conditions. 
22 The criticisms of dichotomisation are often lazy or overblown. It can be an advantage to require that 
research define the presence or absence of a phenomenon and can be useful for thinking through logical 
contradictions (where two cases appear to contain the same configuration of relevant causes but a 
different outcome) in a property space of cases. For an applied discussion see Olsen and Nomura (2009). 
In chapter 6 I show that the crisp truth table is of indispensable value even to a fuzzy analysis.   
23 Fuzzy sets were adapted to social sciences by Smithson (1988) and Ragin (2000). They were previously 
developed for use in computer sciences by Zadeh (1965).  
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Cases  Causal conditions  Outcome 
  A  B  C  D  Y 
Porto Alegre  0.8  0.4  0.3  0.6  0.7 
Rome  0.3  0.9  0.2  1  0.2 
Belo 
Horizonte 
0.6  0.1  0.9  0  0.6 
Sevilla  0.7  0.1  0.7  0.7  0.8 
Table 3-2 Indicative data matrix showing fuzzy membership in sets. 
Fuzzy-set scores begin to bridge the divide between qualitative and quantitative 
data. They allow variation in membership of a set but add qualitatively defined 
breakpoints that give conceptual meaning to set membership. This begins to 
bridge the gap  between formal and  verbal  logic  (Ragin,  2000: 160).  So,  for 
example,  if  the  outcome  condition  is  understood  as  ‘citizen  control  in 
participatory decision making’, fuzzy-set scores allow us to represent the degree 
of control. Using Arnstein’s seminal article on the ‘ladder of participation’ (1969) 
for illustrative purposes we can see how fsQCA analysis conceptualises a set of 
cases of ‘citizen control in participatory decision-making’. Cases that display full 
citizen control have full membership of the set, manipulatory designs are located 
fully out of the set, and a number of cases ranging up from consultation to 
partnership display partial membership in the set (see fig. 3-2 below).   
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Fuzzy set membership of citizen control.
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Figure 3-2 Mapping a fuzzy set based on Arnstein’s ‘ladder of participation’. 
This represents a considerable advance for those who would wish to compare 
variation  across  cases,  potentially  offering  one  way  of  bridging  the 
aforementioned ‘unhelpful divide’ between theory and practice in the study of 
democratic institutions (Smith 2009).  
There  is  no  conceptual  difference  in  the  way  the  Boolean  operation  (e.g. 
minimisation) described for crisp sets above are applied to fuzzy sets (Ragin 
2009: 88). But it does mean that more meaningful consistency and coverage 
scores can be calculated which give more nuanced explanations of the manner 
in which each causal formula explains the outcome and measures degrees of 
contradiction. These scores are roughly similar to measures of fit as understood 
in traditional research methods and will be explained further in the analysis that 
follows. 
3.8  The QCA approach as discipline: Making transparent 
choices    
The process of conducting a QCA involves both construction and deduction, 
allowing  constant  reflexive  iteration  between  theoretical  assumptions  and 
measurements. The method has an inimitable way of constituting clarity about  
  55 
   
theoretical assumptions involved in measurement, selections of cases, choices 
made  between  parsimony  and  complexity  in  description  of  empirical 
regularities, and interpretations of results (c.f. Rihoux and Lobe, 2009: 237). 
These are drawn out more vividly in their application in chapters 5 and 6. Much 
of the procedure I illustrate will seem familiar to practised small-N researchers. 
So what is the big deal they might ask? I want to show that applying the logic of 
case-based research beyond conventional boundaries in the number of cases 
that can be compared in one go can lead to unique insights. The value of a 
medium-range  social  science  is that  it  retains the transparent  conscientious 
reflexivity  of  the  case-researcher  (Flyvbjerg  2006:  235)  and  applies  this 
contemporaneously  with  the  expansive  lessons  derived  from  testing 
relationships  across  several  accumulated  instances  of  phenomena  or  a 
phenomenon. 
In case-based research, the addition of new cases one by one is challenging. This 
is intensified when dealing with a larger-N. New cases may have consequences 
for both population/sample definition and variable definition. They may present 
a variation in the unit of analysis significant enough to force the researcher to 
reconsider the  population. In other  words they  may  require re-evaluation  of 
distinctions between scope conditions and influencing conditions (See Walker 
and Cohen: 1985).
24 On the other hand the understanding of how conditions are 
observed  in  new  contexts  may  force  the  researcher  to  re -evaluate  the 
operationalisation  of  variables.  While  this  iteration  is  time -intensive,  its 
transparency in construction of the research is a key methodological advantage 
of fsQCA.  
3.9  Scope and population 
Ideally the first step of research involves defining a domain or population of 
cases. How do we recognise the phenomenon we are interested in explaining 
and  perhaps  predicting?  There  can  be  pressure  to  consider  a  relatively 
homogenous  population,  especially  where  observations  are  limited.  After  all 
                                           
 
24 Scope conditions might also be considered as control variables.  
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“universal propositions may be safely applied to an actual subject matter only in 
so far as we are thoroughly familiar with the type of object of which the actual 
case is a sample,” (Cohen and Nagel, 1934: 280-281, italics in original).  For the 
purposes  of  this  thesis  that  involves  defining  what  a  case  of  participatory 
budgeting is (and what it is not). A number of challenges present themselves at 
first  departure.  PB  is  a  relatively  young  concept.  It  may  be  that  it  has  not 
successfully distinguished itself from other democratic innovations or indeed 
traditional or ongoing methods of participation and/or governance.  
A variety of definitions of PB are to be found in the literature. Many of these list 
a number of features; e.g. the facilitation of regular meetings, the provision of 
information, direct participation, self-regulation etc.
25, and suggest the presence 
of all in combination is necessary for a case to be distinguished as participatory 
budgeting. Many others either explicitly or implicitly use a much lower number 
of conditions or take the simple line that any participation in budget matters by 
‘ordinary citizens’ constitutes participatory budgeting.  
The first approach is favoured in the main by Latin American scholars and those 
inspired by the design of the Porto Alegre case. Many activists-come-researchers 
may not wish to concede any ground on the attractiveness of what ‘Participatory 
Budgeting’ was before the concept migrated and developed. But the position of 
the Porto Alegre case as not just a poster case, but moreover the archetype of 
PB is a challenge in many aspects for a comparative research agenda. What value 
is  there  in  defining  the  population  based  on  the  best  or  first  case?  PB  has 
necessarily  been  implemented  in  different  ways  as  it  has  been  adapted  to 
different contexts. . Rocke holds that PB, 
…is  but  one  example  next  to  many  others  that  underlines  that  the 
transfer  or  diffusion  of  institutions,  ideas  or  practices  does  always 
necessitate  a  minimal  work  of  re-interpretation  with  regard  to 
characteristics  of  the  new  context  and  to  the  background  of  the 
‘transporting’ actors (Rocke, 2009: 65). 
 
                                           
 
25 For examples of these see Wampler (2007b) or Avritzer (2005).  
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The  question  is  whether  this  re-interpretation  should  represent  variation  in 
measurement or is such a variation in quality that the phenomenon is no longer 
recognisable.  
Moreover the success of PB has led to political opportunism and promotion of 
the concept but not necessarily any single model. It is difficult to know whether 
the adaptation of PB in new locations is a case of well thought out revision of a 
concept  incorporating  local  knowledge  or  the  muddled  end  product  of  a 
worldwide Chinese whisper. On the other end of the scale it could be equally 
foolish to define cases based on minimal criteria. The plethora of programmes 
now called PB may be PB in name only, based on the fame of the original case 
and the perceived desirability of being seen to implement it. This discussion 
highlights  the  challenge  within  such  a  comparative  study  of  distinguishing 
variations in quality from variations in kinds of phenomena. It also begs the 
question as to whether QCA is a good approach given the emerging nature of 
the phenomenon. But if the approach can help identify and separate differences 
in kind and in quality it should provide a development on previous efforts at 
cross  national  comparison  (e.g.  Sintomer  et  al.  2013).  The  approach  to 
population definition is discussed further in chapter 5. 
3.10  Casing, conditioning, calibrating 
If/once a population can be defined the selection of cases is the next logical 
step. While early monographs on QCA were keen to stress that populations could 
never be taken as ‘given’, they had a lot less to say about case selection. The 
unspoken  assumption  seemed  to  be  that  QCA  was  a  home  for  medium-N 
research which involved analysis of ‘full’ populations rather than samples of that 
population. This was to be the method for analysing populations of phenomena 
that  were  too  small  for  analysis  based  on  criteria  of  probability.  In  reality 
sampling  is  inherent  in  every  piece  of  research  and  samples  derive  from  a 
combination  of  population  definition  and  case  selection.  The  response  that 
populations are normally ‘full’ was one I received when I first broached some 
extremely helpful experienced QCA practitioners with my sampling problems 
early  on  in  my  research.  This  is  not  to  say  that  those  responses  were 
undermining  the  idea  that  populations  were  not  ‘given’  and  should  be 
problematised. The suggestion was that the work involved in problematizing,  
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scoping and redefining the population meant that moderate generalisations over 
that well-scoped universe could be made based on the findings from a medium-
N. This made sense when looking at populations such as advanced industrial 
welfare states or regional conflicts. However it remains that there is not much 
written to my knowledge about the decisions involved in information-oriented 
sampling from a much larger population and use of QCA as I attempt it in this 
thesis. 
Retaining  some  further  acumens  of  case-based  reasoning  QCA  generally 
employs information-oriented sampling. With a medium-N some familiarity with 
cases is important,  especially  for interpreting  causal  processes. It is normal 
though in comparative research to have dissimilar magnitudes of evidence on 
each case. Fuzzy-set measurement can be useful here by allowing different levels 
of  measurement  depending  on  a  researcher’s  knowledge  of  cases  (Ragin 
2009:90). A greater knowledge about a particular condition can allow for finer-
grained measurements across cases.  
In fsQCA, case selection is inextricably intertwined with condition selection and 
calibration  of  sets.  In  mainstream  social  scientific  language  conditions  and 
calibration  might  be  referred  to  as  variables  and  measurement  respectively. 
However,  although  related,  they  are  quite  different  concepts.    A  condition, 
similar to how we understand a variable, is an outcome explained by a factor or 
a factor used to explain an outcome. Although variation is important at some 
level  quantitative  variation  alone  is  not  the  defining  characteristic  of  both 
influencing  and outcome  conditions  in  set-theoretic  analysis.  Conditions  are 
demarcated  phenomena  with  meaningful  maxima  and  minima  for  set 
membership. Where the phenomenon is observed the case can be said to be a 
member of the set of that phenomenon. Cases can have degrees of membership 
in a set depending on the degree to which the condition is observed.  
Calibration is the scientific process of standardising a measurement against a 
known  quality.  This  gives  us  the  opportunity  to  connect  theory  and 
measurement  in  a  constructive  manner  as  the  example  of  the  ladder  of 
participation above shows. As Ragin puts it we connect formal and verbal logic 
(2000: 160). A condition set is formulated by clearly defining full membership, 
full non-membership and other degrees of membership. In Ragin’s words, “fuzzy 
logic offers a mathematical system that makes allowances for the pliable nature  
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of verbal concepts” (2000: 160). It is important to note that calibrated set scores 
are not a ranking. Each score is ‘pinpointing a qualitative state’ (Ragin 2009:90) 
that can be verbally described.   
3.11  QCA is an approach not a set of techniques 
Decisions on populations, cases, conditions and calibration are interwoven in 
QCA in a way that enforces discipline and transparency. QCA is very open to 
confronting  the  challenge  of  limited  diversity  of  empirical  instances  of  a 
phenomenon. That is researchers must be clear about the assumptions they 
make about counterfactuals. As we shall see an awareness of limited diversity 
can allow the researcher to make good transparent decisions about what key 
variables  should  be  tested  for  causal  relationships  across  cases.  QCA 
researchers cannot hide that adding an extra condition exponentially increases 
the number of logical cases and almost certainly increases the proportion of 
logical remainders. And yet knowledge of new cases may bring with it new ideas 
about influencing conditions. When should the researcher combine conditions 
and move up the ladder of abstraction? I will show how this decision can be 
approached logically and transparently. 
A  related  dilemma  for  fsQCA  is  that  the  incorporation  of  conditions  in  the 
definition  of  the  domain  or  universe  limits  the  scope  of  the  research  and 
influences  the  selection  of  variables  or  conditions.  Should  different 
circumstances be treated as conditions affecting outcomes or do they in fact 
signify that some cases are examples of different phenomena? This is essentially 
the fsQCA version of the difficult question common to all comparative research 
as to whether and when cases can be meaningfully compared.  
The discipline of calibration ensures the researcher still cannot escape tough 
decisions and theoretical justification of what is fully relevant, partially relevant 
or completely irrelevant variation. This will in turn be dictated by the richness of 
data and the number of cases. . QCA poses challenges and takes the analytical 
brain in a reflective direction.  
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3.12  It’s not all rosy in the garden - Critiques of QCA  
A recurring criticism of QCA is that it is too static. In a case study, researchers 
can trace a process, providing a mechanistic definition of causation where time 
and sequence are important conditions influencing outcomes. However fsQCA 
has little to say about the difference in time between conditions observed in 
cases. Its analytical moment focuses on conjunction and disjunction. There are 
some suggestions for remedying this. In particular TQCA as developed by Caren 
and  Panofsky  (2005),  and  later  by  Ragin  and  Strand  (2008)  introduces  a 
sequence as a causal condition in the analysis. In the case of PB for example we 
might have  a hypothesis that  when strong bureaucratic capacity  precedes a 
participatory governing party coming to power, citizen power in PB is difficult to 
achieve because the bureaucracy is strong enough to resist change. However 
when a participatory governing party improves bureaucratic capacity it may be 
able  to  inculcate  the  government  ideology  and  bureaucratic  capacity  may 
combine to produce good PB programmes. TQCA is useful as it allows a test for 
the outcome produced when one cause precedes another and vice-versa. The 
sequence can then be seen as an important part of the causal combination. 
However there is a pitfall in that we are adding a condition and thus increasing 
limits to diversity of logical case examples
26.  
Much work continues to be done in an attempt to improve the treatment of time 
in QCA (e.g. time-series QCA, see Hino 2009). However, QCA is still unfortunately 
rather unable to provide sophisticated understandings of causation that  trace 
process and feedback. This might be seen to be  a particular problem for the 
research of young,  burgeoning phenomena such as democratic innovations  
where it is often still unclear what direction causality is taking between 
conditions themselves and conditions and outcomes. I was very worried about 
this in the early part of my research journey as I felt the method would struggle 
to model path dependency of innovation. I later realised that this was not what 
my research was about. As I show in the practical examples of QCA in the next 
three chapters I learned that the static comparison was a strength of QCA, 
                                           
 
26 Adding k sequence conditions will increase the number of logical cases by 2k * k.    
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especially once seen as part of a symbiotic relationship with case knowledge in 
a  process  of  cumulation.  Looking  at  what  conditions  consistently  occur  in 
combinations can force a researcher to re-problematise ‘accepted’ sequential 
inferences. 
The most prevalent critiques of QCA until very recently had not come from the 
‘smaller’ side of the argument however but from some who have favoured large-
N or ‘mainstream’ statistical approaches. There has been an increasing trend 
among QCA enthusiasts to apply the method to large-N datasets in an attempt 
to clearly show the differences between set-theoretic and correlational claims 
(for a vivid example see Vis 2012). This is a welcome development and it is no 
doubt true that the decision on whether to apply set-theoretic or other methods 
should hinge on the hypothesised nature of causal complexity and not be based 
on the number of cases (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 318).  
While in places the agenda has moved on, some pertinent debates are outlined 
in a now well-forgotten issue of the Newsletter of the American Political Science 
Association Organized Section on Qualitative Methods (2004, Vo. 2(2)) that QCA 
enthusiasts might do well to return to. Lieberson’s (2004) critiques mirror his 
critiques of small-N research elsewhere (1994). He suggests that QCA is unable 
to distinguish random from real data and that it is not useful for producing 
general accounts. Seawright’s (2004) criticism is that causality derived from QCA 
requires  the  same  problematic  assumptions  about  omitted  variables  and 
association as do regression analyses and the latter are better equipped with 
more established procedures for estimating error. Further expansions on these 
critiques have appeared in the years since (most recently Hug 2013) but they are 
more often than not nuanced variations on these two critiques. 
QCA researchers have in the meantime responded by introducing and improving 
measures of consistency and coverage of sets27 (Ragin 2008, Thiem 2010). But 
some of the rebuttals that were produced ten years are worth repeating as they 
still seem pertinent now. The overriding issue is that critiques tend to compare 
technique  with  technique  within  the  mainstream  approach  rather  than 
                                           
 
27 These measures are somewhat similar to measures of fit in correlational research and are explained in 
more depth below.  
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considering  the  case-based  approach  to  social  science.  Mahoney  is  worth 
quoting at length here:  
Too  much  work  has  been  concerned  with  employing  the  technical 
apparatus of fs/QCA without clearly linking variable measurement and 
model  specification  to  detailed  case  knowledge…,  the  problem  of 
correctly  specifying  a  causal  model,  including  the  issue  of  omitted 
variable bias, can be mitigated if the researcher engages in the close 
qualitative analysis of cases. Analysts are simply  much less likely to 
exclude key variables if they know a great deal about the cases and 
phenomena under investigation… Insofar as the overall methodology of 
fs/QCA  is  designed  to  encompass  precisely  this  kind  of  qualitative 
appraisal, whereas regression analysis is not, fs/QCA would seem to be 
much better equipped to identify causation. However, capitalizing on 
this advantage requires employing the case-oriented side of fs/ QCA as 
much as its technical side, (2004: 20).  
 
And for Ragin and Rihoux  “QCA  was developed as a way to formalize case-
oriented analysis and thereby provide tools to help case-oriented researchers 
improve their research. In the end, the goal of the application of QCA proper 
(i.e., the truth table algorithm) is to help researchers represent what they have 
learned about their cases,” (2004: 22).  
There is rebuttal here to critiques but also stern and good advice that enthusiasts 
would do well to heed. If QCA is applied unreflectively to large-N datasets it 
serves us no better than unreflective correlational analysis of similar data. In the 
next chapter I wish to show that QCA as an approach and a tool has value even 
for small-N researchers. 
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Chapter 4:   Comparing Participatory 
Budgeting in Urban Brazil: Wampler’s 8-
case comparison 
The incessant use of “it is a matter of degree” phraseology and of the 
“continuum” image leave us with qualitative-impressionistic statements 
which do not advance us by a hair’s breadth toward quantification. In a 
similar  vein  we  speak  more  and  more  of  “variables”  which  are  not 
variables  in  any  proper  sense,  for they  are not attributes  permitting 
gradations and implying measurability, Sartori (1970: 1036). 
4.1  Small-N sampling and replication 
Scoping the population of cases and conditions of interest is not an easy task in 
emerging  subfields  of  research.  Yet  by  its  nature,  a  newly-emerging 
phenomenon will be limited in its scope for comparison to a small to medium-
N.  This  is  certainly  true  of  participatory  democratic  innovations  such  as 
participatory  budgeting  which  I  compare  across  countries  (Ryan  and  Smith 
2012
28, see also Chapter 6 of this thesis ). The field is  (over)loaded with good 
case-studies and small -N comparisons  which rely on in -depth ethnography-
based methodologies. This has led to a call for more systemati c cross-case 
comparisons (Smith  2009). Despite this the rapid diffusion of participatory 
budgeting has led to increased probl ematisation and contestation of its core 
conditions. How then can a researcher adequately scope their population of 
cases for a valuable systematic comparison enabling modest generalisation? 
One obvious strategy employed in small-N case-comparative research is to limit 
cases by keeping key variables constant to control extraneous variance. This 
logic is often applied in  the area studies approach or by limiting comparative 
                                           
 
28 That article presents a pilot-QCA of participatory budgeting in anticipation of a larger-N QCA to come in 
this thesis. It discusses some of the issues involved in performing QCA with emerging phenomena. Other 
innovative attempts to handle comparison of participatory budgets have involved the use of Weberian 
ideal types (c.f. Herzberg, 2011).  
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designs within one country or system of government (Lijphart 1971: 688). Brian 
Wampler applies this approach in his distinguished comparison of eight cases 
of participatory budgeting in Urban Brazil (2007a). Yet such small-N research 
based on researchers’ in depth case-studies is often criticised still because of its 
subjective bias. Moreover cumulation of small-N research for comparison across 
studies  can  be  difficult  because  of  researchers’  particular  and  differing 
intentions. In Peters’ words sometimes it is argued that ‘the researcher is the 
major independent variable’ (2013: 169, see also 153, 171).  
Notwithstanding  Flyvbjerg’s  assertion  that  admonitions  on  subjectivity 
essentially misunderstand the reflexive nature of case-based research (2006), in 
this  chapter  I  wish  to  replicate  Wampler’s  comparative  case  selection  (a 
replication controlling even for the researcher’s case choices) but testing the 
added value of a QCA approach. Developing on increasing calls for transparency 
of  data  sources  for  replicability  from  case-researchers  (Moravscik  2010, 
Lieberman 2010)29, I implore that a QCA approach can also recover transparency 
for replicability at the analytic moment of smaller-N research. I try to show that 
fsQCA can at the v ery least provide clarity when  selecting the best trade-off 
between  parsimony  and  explanatory  power  in  small  to  mediu m-N  case 
comparisons. The chapter therefore directly addresses some of the possibilities 
of QCA as a deductive tool that aids interpretation where the case -researcher 
may have his/her  eyes  too close to the field or data. In the  next section  I 
introduce Wampler’s analysis and provide a fuzzy-set QCA analysis of the most 
parsimonious typology he presents in summarising his work.  
4.2  Applying QCA to examine existing comparisons 
Brian Wampler’s analysis of eight participatory budgets in urban Brazil has been 
a particularly useful contribution for scholars who wish to explain the emergence 
of emancipatory participatory governance through democratic innovation. It has 
been commended not only for its attentive and detailed narrative of processes 
                                           
 
29 In the following chapter and in the appendices I show how I have sought to implement and make modest 
improvements to best-practices in transparent qualitative data interpretation and calibration in QCA.  
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within cases but also its comparative design which moved beyond best-case 
examples to include variations in outcome and explanatory conditions to explain 
causation more systematically.  Yet, in common  with other examples in the 
emerging field of research on participatory democratic innovations, comparative 
work up to now has relied on first-hand ethnographic methods of data collection 
combined with more traditional small-N comparative designs30.  
The researcher’s task in presenting research is to distil excessive complexity and 
explain social phenomena with appropriate levels of parsimony. To this end 
researchers will often construct typologies, and make claims about necessary 
and sufficient conditions based on their observations. It is important to note that 
Wampler’s arguments are set-theoretic: “To produce a strong PB programme, it 
is necessary to have high levels of mayoral support, a civil society that can 
engage in both cooperation and contestation, and rules that delegate specific 
types  of  direct  authority  to  citizens,”  (2007a:  35)
31.  To test these claims in 
Wampler’s  work,  I  apply  QCA’s  systematic  approach,  calibrating  conditions 
based on the same qualitative descriptions used in the existing comparative 
study and the same population of cases.  
The  table  on  the  next  page  is  adapted  from  Wampler’s  concluding  chapter 
(2007a: 258). It is typical of the kinds of parsimonious typological tables often 
presented in the findings of small-N comparative work. These tables are often 
used (imperfectly) as methodological heuristics to make set-theoretic claims of 
necessity and sufficiency. 
   
                                           
 
30 Wampler’s work does include some surveys and quantitative data analysis at the individual level within 
cases in order to inform some of his key explanatory conditions. 
31 Note also that Wampler follows this quot e directly with a correlational claim  - “as Mayoral support 
drops, as CSOs are unable to engage in both forms of political behaviour, and as the rules fail to delegate 
authority, PB outcomes will weaken” (ibid). These two claims are not necessarily incompatible; what is 
important is that they require a different test as explained in the previous chapter.   
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Analysis
32  
 
 
 
 
 
Mayoral 
support for 
delegation of  
authority to 
citizens 
CSO’s willingness to use contentious politics 
  High  Low 
High  Porto  Alegre97-
2004, Ipatinga 
No case 
Medium  Recife,  Belo 
Horizonte,  Porto 
Alegre  89-96, 
Porto  Alegre 
2004- 
 
Santo  Andre,  Sao 
Paulo 2001-4 
Low  No case  Blumenau, Rio Claro 
 
Table 4-1 Types and causes adapted from Wampler 2007a p. 258. 
 
Wampler here, in his concluding chapter, places particular emphasis on two 
explanatory conditions and suggests that Mayoral support interacts with civil 
society organisations’ (CSO) willingness to use contentious politics to give four 
very  different  types  of  outcomes:  institutionalised  participatory  democracy 
(green),  informal  and  contested  participatory  democracy  (yellow),  co-opted 
participatory democracy (blue) and emasculated participatory democracy (red). 
This type of diagram will be familiar to small-N case researchers. This is because 
the major advantage of small-N research is underlying familiarity with cases. This 
allows Wampler to verbally define (what we might call labelling a set) each box 
in the diagram where we have an empirical example of a case (a member of the 
                                           
 
32 There are in fact ten cases in this table as Wampler suggests a qualitative distinction between cases in 
Porto Alegre over time. He does not include the cases representing the earlier and latter PBs in his table 
that I have adapted but I include them here as he suggests elsewhere in the book that they would fit the 
informal and contested category.  
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set). This is a useful process that adds plausibility and clarity to the argument: 
For  example  it  makes  intuitive  sense  that  co-optation  in  participatory 
programmes can be traced back to low use of contentious politics by CSOs as in 
the 2x3 table above. The researcher here has helped the reader to comprehend, 
and prima facie, it would seem fair to conclude that the institutionalisation of 
deep democracy can only occur where both these conditions are high and that 
both are necessary conditions for this outcome. A simple correlation between 
each variable and the outcome deep democracy would be positive. 
So what can fsQCA add? 
In  the  table  immediately  below  high  presence  of  a  condition  according  to 
Wampler’s  description  is  coded  as  full  membership  in  the  set  (fuzzy  set 
membership score of 1), low as full nonmbership (set score of 0) and medium 
as 0.51. Readers familiar with fsQCA will be aware of the logical mathematical 
property of fuzzy sets whereby 0.5 memberships create analytical difficulties. 
This is because it places the case in a logical limbo where verbal and formal logic 
are difficult to reconcile – the case is at the point of ‘maximum ambiguity’ and 
‘neither more in nor more out of the set’. One might in any case observe that 
the use of the word ‘medium’ by Wampler does not necessarily indicate halfway. 
Equally the word ‘low’ is hardly commensurate with the idea of complete non-
membership of a set. However for the purposes of this example we can say that 
the researcher has made a qualitative distinction of an ordinal kind which can 
be represented by a fuzzy set33. Therefore small changes in the membership 
value  will  not  fundamentally  affect  the  subse t/superset  relations  in  QCA 
analysis. As a robustness test marginal changes in value can be tested and will 
be found to have an insubstantial effect on the outcome.  
 
   
                                           
 
33 Fuzzy sets should not be confused with ordinal variables – see discussion of Arnstein’s ladder in 
preceding chapter and also infra note 55. In order to undertake set-theoretic analysis however an ordinal 
variable needs to be converted to a fuzzy set.  
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Table 4-2a 
Case  Mayoral 
Support 
Citizen 
willingness to 
Support 
Contentious 
Politics 
Deepened 
democracy A 
Deepened 
democracy B 
Deepened 
democracy C 
Belo Horizonte  0.51  1  0.51  0.33  0.67 
Blumeanau  0  0  0  0  0 
Ipatinga  1  1  1  1  1 
Porto Alegre i  0.51  1  0.51  0.33  0.67 
Porto Alegre ii  1  1  1  1  1 
Porto Alegre iii  0.51  1  0.51  0.33  0.67 
Recife  0.51  1  0.51  0.33  0.67 
Rio Claro  0  0  0  0  0 
Santo Andre  0.51  0  0.51  0.67  0.33 
Sao Paulo  0.51  0  0.51  0.67  0.33 
 
Table 4-2 10-case fuzzy set membership scores. 
 
 
I  now  show  the  effect  of  more  significant  differences  in  interpretation   by 
applying fuzzy calibration and logic in the discussion of this table. In table 4.2 
the  outcome  condition  ‘deepened  democracy  A’  is  coded  as  1  for 
institutionalised  participatory  democracy  (green),  0.51  for  informal  and 
contested  participatory  democracy  (yellow)  and  co-opted  participatory 
democracy (blue), and 0 for emasculated participatory democracy (red).  It is 
important to note that for the outcome at least I am calibrating a set score that 
Wampler has not explicitly derived. Wampler is clear that Porto Alegre 97-2004 
and Ipatinga achieve the quality of empowered participatory democracy and that 
there  is  no  empowerment  of  note  in  Rio  Claro  and  Blumenau  (emasculated 
participatory democracy). He never quite makes a distinction as to whether his 
two  qualitative  descriptions  of  ‘informal  and  contested’  and  ‘co-opted’ 
participatory  democracy  display  measurable  differences  as  to  how  far  they 
achieve the outcome of empowered participatory democracy - only to say that 
the cases form a “wide spectrum of outcomes” (2007a: 257). The above matrix 
table 4-2 shows potential calibration of both as more or less halfway in the set  
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of ‘deepened democracy A’; ‘Deepened democracy B’ shows co-opted as more 
in while informal and contested is ‘more out’; and for ‘Deepened democracy C’ 
informal and contested is ‘more in’ while co-opted is more out. We might also 
include a model where all are fully out but I do not here. In this chapter I am 
focused on pointing out what is at stake in measurement moreso than accurately 
measuring  outcomes,  and  showing  that  QCA  can  be  used  iteratively  and 
transparently to elucidate and match measurement and theory. 
As  before  Ragin  has  shown  that  relationships  of  necessity  and  sufficiency 
between causal conditions and outcomes are set-theoretic. For necessity to be 
established the set of cases containing the outcome must be a subset of the set 
of cases displaying the cause. Similarly, for sufficiency to be established the set 
of cases containing the causal condition must be a subset of the cases displaying 
the outcome (c.f. Ragin, 2000: 214-217).When we run an analysis for necessary 
conditions on the cases as coded in 4.2 with the outcome ‘Deepened democracy 
A’ we get the output contained in table 4-3 below. 
We see that in a necessity analysis of these 10 cases so operationalised, mayoral 
support is fully consistent with the necessity super/sub-set relation across the 
cases,  indicating  that  it  is  a  necessary  condition  for  deepening  democracy. 
Moreover the negation of mayoral support would seem equally necessary to 
negate the deepening of democracy (this result is logical because their values 
are equal in every case). Nevertheless CSO willingness to use contentious politics 
does not seem to be necessary for deepened democracy. When we examine the 
cases we see that this is because in both Santo Andre and Sao Paulo there is 
some degree of deepening democracy (Wampler acknowledges this when he 
makes the qualitative distinction between co-opted and emasculated democracy) 
yet low or no evidence of CSO willingness to use contentious politics.  
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Analysis of Necessary Conditions 
Outcome variable: Deepened Democracy 
Conditions tested  Consistency
34  Coverage 
Mayoral Support  1.000000  1.000000 
~mayoral support  0.581028  0.595142 
Citizen willingness to 
use contentious 
politics 
0.798418  0.673333 
~ Citizen willingness 
to use contentious 
politics 
0.201581  0.255000 
 
 
Analysis of Necessary Conditions 
Outcome variable: ~deepened democracy 
Conditions tested  Consistency  Coverage 
Mayoral Support  0.595142  0.581028 
~mayoral support  1.000000  1.000000 
Citizen willingness to 
use contentious 
politics 
0.396761  0.326667 
~ Citizen willingness 
to use contentious 
politics 
0.603239  0.745000 
Table 4-3 Analysis of necessary conditions for 10 cases. 
                                           
 
34 Consistency is a measure of how constant the subset-superset relationship which indicates logical 
necessity (or in the case of sufficiency analysis logical sufficiency) is across the cases observed. See Ryan 
and Smith 2012 for further explanation.  
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It is important to note that the result is to a certain extent a consequence of the 
levels of measurement Wampler sees as appropriate for distinguishing variance 
across his cases. A QCA approach and analytic test can provide a useful logical 
check  on  the  congruence  between  evidence,  intuition  and  measurement. 
Wampler’s approach, and most approaches in social science, are not content 
with stopping at the level of describing categories – their goal is to infer. If 
concepts  (descriptions  of  qualities)  are  sets  of  which  empirical  cases  have 
degrees of observed membership (fuzzy membership or quantitative variation), 
the relative degree of membership matters greatly if we want to engage in causal 
analysis of necessity and sufficiency. QCA maps the distance between the theory 
and the evidence and allows transparent iteration and re-evaluation as we shall 
see.  
When we analyse for sufficiency again for (A) we get the result contained in Table 
4-4 below
35. 
Mayoral support alone and no other combination of conditions is sufficient to 
produce deepened democracy. In other words here the QCA analysis highlights 
that given the measures Wampler employs and the evidence he presents, the 
argument he could or perhaps should be making is that mayoral support alone 
is both necessary and sufficient for deepening democracy through participatory 
democracy.  
The absence of mayoral support is necessary for the absence of deep democracy  
as we saw but no conditions tested can yet be deemed sufficient to negate deep 
democracy. The absence of contentious politics turns up in the solution because 
when combined with both presence and absence of mayoral support it appears 
consistent,  but  when  we  try  to  eliminate  mayoral  support  by  Boolean 
minimisation on this basis, acting alone contentious politics is   not highly 
consistent with a sufficiency subset relationship for ten cases at 0.745. Logically 
any increase in the number of conditions making up a sufficient conjunction will 
increase its sufficiency consistency. This makes sense as the more  conditions 
                                           
 
35 The solutions presented in this section are ‘complex solutions’ where I do not take into account logical 
remainders (i.e. make assumptions about counterfactuals and add them to the model). This will be 
explained further in later sections.   
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we add to any explanation (the more complexity we introduce), the more likely 
it is to be a sufficient conjunction. What this suggests is that we do not have 
enough conditions in the model to accurately explain the absence of deepened 
democracy. There is something in this hunch but there is a missing part to the 
story and we will return to this momentarily. We may conclude though that QCA 
has added some value to the analysis in the first instance and forces us to think 
about what substantive conclusions on causation of the phenomena are suitable. 
 
Outcome 
tested 
Causal 
conditions 
Raw 
Coverage 
Unique 
Coverage 
Consistency  Solution 
Deepened 
democracy 
Mayoral 
support 
1.000000  1.000000  1.000000 
1.000 
(Cov.) 
1.000 
(Con.) 
 
   
Outcome 
tested 
Causal 
conditions 
Raw 
Coverage 
Unique 
Coverage 
Consistency  Solution 
~deepened 
democracy 
~citizen 
willingness 
to support 
contentious 
politics 
0.603239      0.603239      0.745000 
0.603 
(Cov.) 
0.745 
(Con.) 
Table 4-4 Analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome and its negation 
across 10 cases
36. 
 
What about alternative calibrations of the outcome? If we want to try to explain 
deepened democracy using the calibration for ‘Deepened democracy B’ we would 
                                           
 
36 There is no difference in this analysis between parsimonious and complex solutions. Consistency 
threshold is 1 for the outcome and 0.96 for the negation.  
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find  a  less  clear  picture  if  we  are  looking  for  a  single  necessary  condition. 
Mayoral support now has consistency score of 0.93. This is because the cases of 
Santo Andre and Sao Paolo have medium degrees of mayoral support as outlined 
by Wampler - and if they are more in the set of deep democracy as they are in 
(B)  this  challenges  to  a  certain  extent  the  finding  that  mayoral  support  is 
necessary for deep democracy (0.51 ≤ 0.67). Again a social scientist might be 
happy with a relatively low level of inconsistency (0.07) across all the cases and 
make generalisations with transparent reflection on this interval of confidence.  
We also would find in the B analysis that the intersection (conjunction) of mayoral 
support  and  citizen  willingness  to  support  contentious  politics  is  entirely 
consistent  with  sufficiency  super/sub-set  relation  across  the  cases.  Even  if 
neither is necessary or alone sufficient, across the cases their combination is 
sufficient to produce deepened democracy. Armed with this knowledge the case-
researcher may want to revisit their raw data and think whether it is justifiable 
conceptually and based on evidence to add this more nuanced measurement on 
the  outcome  to  their  parsimonious  presentation  of  results  and  make  this 
argument about sufficiency transparently. 
What if, as is for ‘Deepened democracy C’, contested democracy is more in and 
co-opted democracy more out of the set of deep democracy? Here the argument 
for  any  necessary  conditions  becomes  less  plausible.  We  see  that  for  both 
conditions we have cases that contradict the necessity relationship (consistency 
for mayoral support = 0.88, citizen willingness to support contentious politics = 
0.88). As Ragin has argued, necessary conditions set a particularly high standard 
for causal explanation and 0.9 may be seen as a minimum consistency threshold 
for claims to necessary causation (Mendel and Ragin 2011). Nevertheless, on 
this  reading,  the  conjunction  of  the  two  explanatory  conditions  in  the 
parsimonious  model  remains  consistently  sufficient  to  produce  deepened 
democracy. Neither is alone necessary but both together are sufficient. Both are 
INUS conditions. 
It is crucial to note that the result is a function of the measurement Wampler 
chooses. If he had observed that some of the cases were medium rather than 
merely low or high in terms of the observance of contentious politics the result 
would be much different. However, he may have been confident that the degree 
of difference could be captured parsimoniously in terms of a simple high or low  
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distinction; otherwise one imagines he would have offered a greater range in 
describing the variance in the condition.  
A variable-oriented critic might now observe that this only goes to show the 
perils  of  inferring  with  a  small-N,  but  as  I  have  previously  argued,  this 
misunderstands  the  approach  which  rests  on  exploiting  the  advantages  of 
intense  engagement  with  conceptual  clarity  and  closeness  to  the  cases. 
Transparency about what is at stake can be liberating rather than debilatiting. 
At another extreme, with all this method and math, should we now expect to 
have lost the sympathies of Sartori who would pour scorn on the overconscious 
thinker “who refuses to discuss heat unless he is given a thermometer” and is 
paralysed by “logical perfectionism,” (1970: 1033). I hope not. Sartori famously 
champions the ‘conscious thinker’ who “manages to say a great deal simply by 
saying hot and cold, warmer and cooler” (idem). I wish to argue that despite the 
value of numerical reasoning to QCA it is more a tool for the latter than the 
former. A QCA approach can highlight in a relatively transparent way what is at 
stake in comparisons of the hotter, more hot and cooler or more cool nature. 
One  might  contend  that  the  measures  taken  here  for  the  outcome  set  are 
simplistic. The point I want to make though is that it may only be the undertaking 
of this analysis which highlights this state of affairs. Rihoux and Lobe have 
shown  that  a  stepwise  QCA  approach  properly  applied  allows  an  iteration 
between  maximal  parsimony  and  complexity  which  arrives  at  a  greater 
explanatory power (2008: 238). What this analysis of Wampler’s typology shows 
is that applying QCA tools to existing research and its conclusions can highlight 
an overly parsimonious conclusion. 
4.3  Part 2: Extending the analysis - Bringing complexity 
back in. 
The  above  discussion  is  based  on  analysing  Wampler’s  most  parsimonious 
conclusions only and not explicitly delving fully into his richer descriptions of 
the cases. While small-N research may often conclude by extracting what the 
researcher feels are the two or three most important explanatory conditions, it 
can also claim advantage in its rich case description; elucidating the trail of 
relations and processes involving other or secondary conditions. In some large-
N  statistical  analysis these details of  interactions  may  be overlooked  as the  
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compound variable represented by the interaction term is often unrecognisable 
from  its  elemental  beginnings.  Wampler  details  any  number  of  potential 
influencing conditions or variables from which other hypothesis may be formed 
and tested to investigate causal chains relating to deepening democracy. These 
include  population  size,  social  backgrounds  of  PB  delegates,  higher  human 
development index (HDI) scores, etc. (at one point he actually suggests cities 
with greater HDI are more likely to be left-leaning, have broad-based CSO activity 
and a firmer financial base on which to administer PB, advising that it may play 
a role as a result of mediating variables). In his chapters describing each case 
however he highlights and details, in particular, mayor-legislative relations, the 
financial basis for implementation of the programme, and the rules of the game 
as influential in determining the depth of democracy coming out of PB processes. 
He, in fact, affords rules of the game the same primacy as CSO activity and 
Mayoral support, although as we shall see operationalising it as a variable in 
comparative analysis is a little trickier than the others, which is possibly why he 
does not highlight it as much as the latter two in the table we have discussed 
above.  In  short  though,  although  he  rightly  searches  for  an  appropriate 
parsimony he takes the likely complexity of causality seriously. 
The key strength of traditional qualitative small-N research approaches vis-a-vis 
cross-sections or QCA is that it is not bound by a ‘static’ analytic moment and 
allows fluidity in causal tracing - though surely this is also at once its weakness. 
A case-researcher submerged in subjective determination of causal processes is 
in  some  important  ways  less  well-placed  to  make  hands-off,  ‘deductive’ 
judgements about how variables combine. While Wampler in his fine study of 
PBs may suggest that based on his case-knowledge the other three conditions 
are  important  but  secondary  in  the  story  to  the  two  first  discussed  in  the 
previous  section,  in  a  QCA  we  can  transparently  analyse  all  possible 
combinations of the five conditions (including logical remainders) on an equal 
footing and examine the causal paths sufficient for the outcome based on logical 
combinations of set relations across cases. The rest of the chapter is dedicated 
to this task.  
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4.4  Defining conditions and calibrating sets. 
In this section I briefly explain Wampler’s conditions and provide details of how 
sets of conditions are calibrated for the ensuing analysis. The section draws 
heavily on his theoretical justifications for highlighting these conditions. For set-
theoretic  analysis  of  necessary  and  sufficient  causation,  sets  require  proper 
names. Therefore we can speak firstly of the outcome, the set of empowered 
participatory governance or ‘Deepened democracy’. Deep democracy is seen 
where PB programmes result in open, equal and meaningful participation of 
large  numbers  of  ‘ordinary  citizens’,  and  where  the  PB  overtakes  previous 
clientelistic  practices  as  the  main  method  for  citizens  and  civil  society  to 
negotiate and realise budget priorities. 
In explaining how PB programmes can achieve deep democracy Wampler puts 
forward five key causal conditions. The first is ‘High Mayoral support for PB’. 
Mayoral  support  is  vital  because  decision-makers  “must  be  willing to  spend 
scarce resources” (Wampler, 2007a: 36). There may be instrumental reasons for 
high mayoral support of PB programmes (as a signalling device to gauge citizen 
preferences,  or  as  a  political  party  support-building  measure)  as  well  as 
ideological.  In  the  Brazilian  context  mayoral  support  is  taken  to  be  key  to 
outcomes  because  strong  mayoral  support  can  lead  to  implementation  of 
projects allowing demonstration effects (c.f. Abers 1998; Gret and Sintomer, 
2005: 87). The argument goes that when governments are seen to be taking the 
process  seriously  by  implementing  the  decisions  of  the  participants  in  a 
participatory process (in particular building capital infrastructure projects), the 
institutionalisation of PB increases and it can give greater scope to governments 
to reorganise the bureaucracy to administer PB constructively. 
The second explanatory condition set is that of ‘Strong civil society’. Strong civil 
society  can  cooperate  with  other  actors  in  deliberative  forums  but  contest 
information  and  vigorously  defend  their  rights  using  contentious  forms  of 
political action where required (Wampler, 2007a: 38). The types of activities 
CSOs are willing to engage in can often be explained by the historical density of 
CSO organisations in a municipality (idem). Note: this condition is in reality itself 
a  conjunction;  a  ‘logical  AND’  combination  of  contentious  politics  and 
cooperative politics in CSOs. The condition representing the combination could 
be constructed by calibrating separately both conditions and calculating the  
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intersection of both sets but here I do this implicitly (i.e. in calibrating I do not 
compromise high contentious politics for low cooperation and vice-versa). 
For various situational and political reasons rules vary from one PB programme 
to another. We can talk of the set of ‘Rules that delegate authority’ where rules 
allow  citizens  accountable  and  direct  decision-making  which  can  incentivise 
greater  and  more  meaningful  participation.  According  to  Wampler  “the 
unintended consequence of unclear rules is a limited delegation of authority” 
(idem: 39). Combining rules in an explanatory model with the role of actors 
using QCA (which explicitly investigates conjunctural causation) is important if 
we believe that institutions influence actors and actors influence institutions. 
Wampler  emphasises  throughout  his  book  the  combinatorial  effects  of 
conditions  and  how  one  condition  may  limit  the  degree  to  which  any 
combination can be effective in deepening democracy through participation. 
This is another reason why the analysis may suit itself to QCA and fuzzy sets. 
One example is the extent to which a Mayor’s strategy is conditioned by the 
existence of a ‘Positive legislative environment’. The legislative environment is 
less  favourable  to  an  outcome  of  deeply  democratic  PB  when  the  mayor 
implementing the programme does not have a broad base of support and must 
spend political capital shoring this up (idem: 40). Wampler suggests that this 
positive  environment  is  a  necessary  but  not  sufficient  condition  for  deeply 
democratic PB - the mayor may still not wish to delegate authority even with 
legislative  support  but  will  find  it  difficult  to  delegate  without.  Wampler’s 
descriptions  also  suggest  that  this  condition  could  highlight  asymmetric 
causation and multifinality
37 when he outlines that in the case of Santo Andre, a 
highly supportive legislature can actually incentivise the Mayor to engage in 
many other projects, undermining the importance of PB (idem: 209).  
Finally, the ‘financial basis for spending’ i.e. the availability of significant funds 
for new capital investment is also, he holds, necessary but not sufficient for PB 
                                           
 
37  As  explained  above  asymmetric  causation  (the  negation  of  an  outcome  must  be  explained 
independently and cannot be explained by a decrease in the independent variable that explains that 
outcome) and multifinality (that the same condition can lead to alternative and sometimes contradictory 
outcomes) are causal assumptions in QCA. These assumptions can often be restricted or removed by the 
tools employed in traditional large-N correlational studies (c.f. Wagemann and Schneider 2012).  
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to work effectively. This is because limited spending ability limits the power of 
programmes where authority is delegated to citizens.  
After enumerating these conditions Wampler contends that his explanations of 
cases will show that “it is necessary for a PB program to have positive results in 
each area to produce a successful PB program” (idem: 41, my emphasis). Note 
that these claims differ quite markedly from the parsimonious claims that make 
up the typology discussed earlier. I aim to test Wampler’s more complex claim, 
basing our calibration of conditions on the narrative he provides, and using 
fsQCA. 
First we need to calibrate sets and ascribe case membership in each case. A good 
starting point is to outline the verbal meanings we ascribe to set membership. 
In this case the following 7-value fuzzy set is used. 
1.0  - ‘Fully in’ (the set)  
0.83 - ‘mostly but not fully in’ 
0.67 - ‘more or less in’ 
0.52 - ‘marginally more in’ 
0.48 - ‘marginally more out’ 
0.33 - ‘more or less out’ 
0.17 - ‘mostly but not fully out’ 
0  - ‘fully out’ 
This seems a feasible level of nuance to justifiably extract from the qualitative 
information in Wampler’s book. He provides at least a few hundred words (and 
often a lot more) of descriptive information on each condition for each case. This 
rich description is necessary for an epistemologically sound QCA. Wampler’s 
evidence  is  particularly  useful  because  he  often  triangulates  evidence  from 
interviews  (i.e.  subjective  determinations  of  say,  mayoral  support)  with 
symptomatic indicators of degrees to which a condition is observed (e.g. in the 
case  of  mayoral  support,  implementation  rates  of  PB  projects  and  their 
prioritisation vis-à-vis projects decided on through other channels).  
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The following data matrix provides a picture of my efforts to calibrate these 
conditions as rigorously and objectively as possible given my reading of the 
evidence presented in Wampler’s book
38.  
The abbreviated conditions contained in the table below are mayoral support 
(ms), civil society  using contentious and cooperative politics (ccp), a positive 
legislative environment (ple), the financial basis for spending (fbs) rules that 
encourage participation (rep) and deepened democracy (deepd). 
Case  ms  ccp  ple  fbs  rep  deepd 
Belo 
Horizonte 
0.33  1  0.52  0.83  0.48  0.52 
Blumenau  0.17  0.33  0.17  0.67  0.67  0 
Ipatinga  0.83  0.33  0.67  1  0.52  1 
Porto 
Alegre i 
1  1  0.52  0.33  1  0.52 
Porto 
Alegre ii 
1  1  0.83  1  1  1 
Porto 
Alegre iii 
0.48  1  0.67  1  1  0.52 
Recife  0.67  1  0.52  0.17  0.33  0.52 
Rio Claro  0.17  0.17  0.17  0.67  0.17  0 
Santo 
Andre 
0.67  0.52  0.83  0.33  0.33  0.48 
Sao Paulo  0.33  0.67  0.33  0.33  0.48  0.48 
Table 4-5 Fuzzy membership as calibrated for more complex analysis of ten 
cases.  
 
                                           
 
38 At this point I should make clear that while I claim to ‘control for the researcher’ in my application of 
QCA to Wampler’s cases as selected and not others, I cannot make any exceptional claims to being able 
to control the ever-present problems for researchers interpreting one another’s descriptions and findings.  
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I make some changes (which can be openly debated) from the earlier calibration 
based on my reading of the ‘thicker’ case descriptions. For instance, Sao Paulo 
and Ipatinga’s ccp scores are on opposite sides of the crossover point to the 
truth table in the first analysis (4.2) described above. In calibrating the outcome, 
deep participatory democracy (deepd) I argue that it is conceptually sound that 
Wampler’s ‘co-opted PB’ is marginally more out of the set of deep democracy 
while ‘contested PB’, which at least has democratic inputs if the outcomes are 
not always implemented, is marginally more in the set. This leads these cases to 
fall  either  side  of  the  crossover  point  in  the  outcome  set  based  on  their 
correspondence with the verbal logical statements outlined above.  Building on 
the first part of the chapter which aimed to show what is at stake in different 
calibrations  and  selecting  levels  of  measurement,  this  latter  part  aims  to 
investigate what is at stake in more parsimonious or complex causal modelling 
when employing case-based comparative logic. 
The first thing we notice is that cases do not group together in the same logical 
combinations of presence and absence of conditions as they do in Wampler’s 
more  parsimonious  table,  so  we  will  expect  a  more  nuanced  explanation 
involving alternative causal paths.  
As these measures are based on my interpretation of text and not on a ranking 
systematised by Wampler as in the earlier analysis, it is also pertinent to make 
some comments on the difficulties involved in calibrating conditions to allow for 
transparency for those wishing to repeat the analysis. The rules-based condition 
was  particularly  difficult  to  calibrate  because  it  requires  some  subjective 
interpretation of how even small changes in basic rules may affect participant 
strategies. This is often tricky to separate from outcomes in the process of PB. 
As rules are, in the Brazilian case, often set by the mayor, they may be better 
conceived of as a symptom of that support. The financial basis condition also 
requires  decisions  on  how  to  weigh  absolute  and  relative  financial  strength 
which could be open to challenge. By presenting these as a data matrix in this 
way they can be opened up to scrutiny by others with knowledge of the case. 
Approaches  to  including  this  kind  of  knowledge  are  discussed  further  in 
chapters 5 and 6.  
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4.5  Analysis 
The penultimate section of the chapter now presents the analysis of necessity 
and sufficiency and discusses some of the implications of using QCA where case 
selection is limited by other researchers’ comparative design. An interesting 
consequence of the high controls involved in a case-researcher’s comparative 
design can be high levels of necessity consistency which can lead to a variety of 
difficult questions surrounding the interpretation of necessary conditions and 
their consequent impact on sufficiency analysis. With notable exceptions (c.f., 
Goertz: 2003, Mendel and Ragin: 2011, Bol and Luppi: 2013), QCA scholars have 
been less keen to provide guidance for others on how to interpret some of these 
issues. 
We  are  particularly  interested  in  Wampler’s  claim  that  all  five  conditions 
identified  are  necessary  for  the  outcome  and  that  a  positive  legislative 
environment  and  financial  basis  for  support  of  PB  are  necessary  but  not 
sufficient. This implies that he believes the other three causal conditions are 
both sufficient and necessary. On my reading this kind of conclusion would set 
alarm bells ringing for researchers trained in QCA, because if all five conditions 
are necessary the idea that two or three could be of themselves sufficient seems 
illogical.  Without  any  tool  to  analyse  the  consistency  of  this  claim,  case-
researchers  are  disincentivised  from  problematising  the  combinatorial 
relationships between variables. Moreover, the analysis shows QCA approaches 
can at the very least force researchers to think of the consequences of such 
conclusions  and  the  combinatorial  logic  of  necessary  and  sufficient  claims.  
Following this discussion, I conclude by drawing attention to issues surrounding 
the use of traditional case-selection logic to limit populations in QCA. 
4.6  Interpreting Necessity 
I begin with the analysis of necessity as is best practice. The output of the 
analysis  of  single  necessary  conditions  based  on  the  fuzzy  truth  table  is 
presented in table 4-6 below 
As no condition in the analysis of the negation of the outcome (absence of 
deepened  democracy)  is  highly  consistent  with  a  necessity  subset/superset  
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relation, I only discuss the analysis of the outcome (deepened democracy) in this 
section. 
Analysis of Necessary Conditions 
Outcome variable: Deepened democracy 
Conditions tested  Consistency  Coverage 
Mayoral Support  0.890873  0.794690 
~mayoral Support  0.466270  0.540230 
Civil society using contentious 
and cooperative politics 
0.867063  0.622507 
~civil society using 
contentious and cooperative 
politics 
0.293651  0.496644 
A positive legislative 
environment 
0.871032  0.839388 
~ a positive legislative 
environment 
0.579365  0.612159 
The financial basis to spend  0.833333  0.663507 
~the financial basis to spend  0.430556  0.591281 
Rules encouraging 
participation 
0.829365  0.698997 
~rules encouraging 
participation 
0.492063  0.616915 
 
Analysis of Necessary Conditions 
Outcome variable: ~deepened democracy 
Conditions tested  Consistency  Coverage 
Mayoral Support  0.596774  0.523894 
~mayoral Support  0.766129  0.873563 
Civil society using contentious 
and cooperative politics 
0.697581  0.492877 
~civil society using 
contentious and cooperative 
politics 
0.465726  0.775168 
A positive legislative 
environment 
0.627016  0.594646 
~a positive legislative 
environment 
0.830645  0.863732 
The financial basis to spend  0.697581  0.546603 
~the financial basis to spend  0.570565  0.771117 
Rules encouraging 
participation 
0.689516  0.571906 
~rules encouraging 
participation 
0.637097  0.786070 
Table 4-6 Ten-case Analysis of single necessary conditions in more complex 
model. 
Necessary consistency for each individual condition ranges in value for each of 
the  five  causal  conditions  from  0.83  to  0.89.  In  other  words  each  of  these 
conditions comes close to the criteria for construing causal necessity (an almost  
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always necessary condition) but all suffer from some inconsistencies. With only 
ten cases a high threshold of consistency to make claims about necessity is 
advisable (at least 0.9). However, as Ragin among others repeatedly stresses, 
the most important test is whether it ‘makes sense’ as a necessary condition 
(Mendel and Ragin 2011, Ragin 2000). There are a number of strategies the 
researcher now has open, the consequences of which s/he chooses will affect 
the interpretations not just of necessity but also of sufficient conditions. 
As any of these conditions could be seen as ‘almost’ necessary it is best practice 
to  revisit  each  condition  and  investigate  how  the  subset  relationship  is 
contravened. One contravening fuzzy membership value in a case may require 
reconsideration.  For  example,  the  condition  relating  to  civil  society  only 
contravenes the necessity super/sub-set relationship in Ipatinga. The case might 
be argued to be unique in this population of cases as it is a mid-sized city which 
is not a provincial capital and this is likely to affect the nature of civil society in 
the case. Therefore, one could make the argument, revisiting the case-data, that 
for  the  purposes  of  modest  generalisation  we  could  drop  the  case  and  re-
condition the population as defined by ‘large provincial capitals’. That is we can 
limit the scope of the research and then make a claim of necessity within those 
parameters.  
The trade off to this is that it would require removing the case from the analysis. 
In other words one narrows the scope of the argument. This is challenging for 
two reasons. Firstly it incentivises the researcher to move away from the logic of 
the initial case selection strategy which sought to select most different cases 
within established area controls. Secondly, there is a question as to what to do 
with this case, jettisoned from the necessity analysis, in the sufficiency analysis? 
Any  necessary  condition  must  logically  be  a  part  of  any  combination  of 
conditions that are sufficient to produce and outcome. Can we make this claim 
and then continue with a ‘lopsided’ sufficiency analysis including once again the 
case that we remove from the analysis of necessity?
39 I return to disc uss this 
                                           
 
39 In essence this would involve testing two separate models one with and without the case, but the 
question remains as to which one should be emphasised.  
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question in the conclusion to this chapter. Again using QCA we bring these 
debates to the foreground. 
A second option would be to use a procedure similar to that put forward by Bol 
and Luppi (2013) which they call ‘maximisation’. This is a considerable advance 
for analysis of necessary conditions. With fuzzy membership data of the kind we 
have above, this is likely to at least reveal something about substitutability of 
necessary conditions. This requires asking which unions of two or more sets 
(disjunctions) are consistent with a necessity subset/superset relation. The table 
below shows that for all the unions of two conditions necessity consistency 
ranges from 0.905 to 1. So for example, we can deduce from the table below 
that either a civil society willing to engage in both contentious and cooperative 
politics OR a secure financial basis for spending are present when we observe 
deepened democracy in PB programmes (consistency of 1). Either one or the 
other  is  necessary.  These  are  often  called  SUIN  conditions;  a  sufficient  but 
unnecessary part of a factor that is insufficient but necessary for an outcome 
(Mahoney, Kimball, & Koivu 2009). 
Key: ms – mayoral support, ccp – citizens using contentious and cooperative 
politics, ple – a positive legislative environment, fbs – a financial basis to 
spend, rep – rules encouraging participation. 
Boolean Expression  Necessity consistency  Necessity Coverage 
ms + ccp  .96  .635 
ms + ple  .937  .763 
ms + fbs  .97  .624 
ms + rep  .985  .693 
ccp + ple  .935  .614 
ccp + fbs  1  .591 
ccp + rep  .905  .604 
ple + fbs  .97  .664 
ple +rep  .935  .687 
fbs + rep  .933  .643 
Table 4-7 Ten-case necessity consistency for Boolean sum expressions.
40. 
                                           
 
40 In QCA notation ‘+’ signifies logical OR (the substitutability of two conditions) while ‘*’ signifies logical 
AND (the combination of two conditions).  
  85 
   
In the table above ‘+’ denotes logical ‘OR’ Although 0.9 is of course an arbitrary 
cut-off for consistency it is fair to say that a number of these expressions recount 
disjunctions that are necessary or almost always necessary for deep democracy. 
One could and possibly should also go on to calculate consistency of further 
Boolean sums. Table 4-7 shows only SUIN conditions that combine presence and 
not absence of conditions in our model. There are in fact 18 disjunctions that 
are consistent at the 0.9 consistency level when we include these. 
If we wanted to restrict the analysis to a consistency threshold of 1 (all fully 
consistent subsets) we still have a number of disjunctions that would require 
interpretation as seen in table 4-8 below. 
Key: ms – mayoral support, ccp – citizens using contentious and cooperative 
politics, ple – a positive legislative environment, fbs – a financial basis to 
spend, rep – rules encouraging participation. 
Boolean Expression  Necessity consistency  Necessity Coverage 
ccp+fbs  1  .591 
ple + fbs + ~rep  1  .640 
ple + fbs + rep  1  .630 
~ms + ple + fbs  1  .628 
ms + fbs + ~rep  1  .615 
ms + fbs + rep  1  .631 
ms + ~ple + fbs  1  .593 
Table 4-8 Necessity consistency for Boolean sum expressions with a 
consistency threshold of 1. 
I will not discuss this further here as an in-depth analysis of interpreting set-
union to uncover necessary causation is beyond the scope of this thesis. The 
crucial point for now is that there are a plethora of potential interpretations of 
necessity and the trade-offs in choices are not immediately precise or clear. 
A third, and essential procedure, is to analyse the data to check if the results are 
a  consequence  of  its  peculiarities  and  to  assess  triviality  and  relevance  of 
necessary conditions. In particular in a small-N study of ten cases or less, results 
may be dependent on a low mean fuzzy membership in the outcome (Mendel 
and Ragin 2011: 24) or collinearity of influencing condition and outcome, for 
example. The former would suggest we have too many negative cases and not 
enough clear examples of the outcome we aim to explain in our dataset (the 
outcome is closer to a constant than a variable). The latter would suggest that  
  86 
one of the independent variables may not be very independent of the dependent 
variable (‘lurking’ variable problem). Using truth tables/data matrices in this way 
can be a useful way to check if variables are in fact constants in small-to-medium-
N  research  that  is  theory-led.  This  can  be  used  to  disregard  variables  as 
important to the outcome or see them as trivial41 necessary conditions. 
It is essential to calculate coverage scores of any potential necessary condition 
to evaluate  its relevance or triviality  (Ragin  2008, see also  Goertz  2003).  
Necessity coverage is an expression of how much smaller the outcome set is in 
relation to the conditions set (how much of Y covers X). Low necessity coverage 
can indicate trivialness of necessary conditions (X is quite big relative to Y) and 
high coverage can indicate a relevant necessary condition, provided X is not a 
constant (see Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 232 -237). In the data used for 
this study only the possibility of relatively low mean fuzzy membership in the 
outcome may raise concern about the findings. Yet even then it is not clear-cut 
with six out of ten cases more in than out of the outcome set,  and coverage 
scores for the expressions with high consi stency suggest that they are non - 
trivial. 
Once again it might be suggested that embarking on such exhaustive analysis 
may introduce unnecessary complexity, and is a terrific example of the dangers 
of over-conscious thinking and methodological fetishism. But my goal here is to 
show just what is at stake in the underlying assumptions when researchers state 
that x is a necessary condition for y, and as has been shown,  where there are 
many  necessary  conditions  this  will  have  strong  implications  for  the 
interpretation of the sufficiency analysis. 
Holding these issues aside, in terms of added-value, we can at the very least say 
that the necessity analysis here has cast some doubt over Wampler’s general 
contention  (within  the  scope  of  his  population)  that  all  five  conditions  are 
necessary for deep democracy. However it is clear that many can in combination 
be  considered  substitutable  necessary  conditions.  This  adds  nuance  to  the 
general claim. A researcher can say with a greater degree of certainty based on 
                                           
 
41 To use an example often called upon, air to breathe is a necessary condition for humans to engage in 
war but it is a trivial one in the context of explaining the conditions that cause or negate wars.  
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the QCA necessity analysis above that deep democracy cannot be achieved in PB 
programmes without at the very least a financial basis to spend OR civil society 
willingness to both struggle and cooperate with government.   
4.7  Sufficiency 
Results  for  the  analysis  of  sufficiency  are  summarised  below.  For  the 
intermediate  solution
42  we assume that the presence of all conditions in 
counterfactual cases with the exception of the positive legislative environment 
(for which we make no directional assumptions), are causally linked with  the 
outcome (deepd). 
Key: ms – mayoral support, ccp – citizens using contentious and cooperative 
politics, ple – a positive legislative environment, fbs – a financial basis to spend, 
rep – rules encouraging participation, cov – coverage, con - consistency. 
  Causal Paths  Raw 
Coverage 
Unique 
Coverage  Consistency  Solution 
Complex 
~ms*ccp*ple*fbs  0.404762  0.045635  0.857143  0.736 
(Cov) 
0.916 
(Con) 
ms*ccp*ple*rep  0.690476  0.331349  0.910995 
Parsimonious 
ccp*fbs  0.700397  0.007936  0.732365  0.78 
(Cov) 
0.695 
(Con) 
ccp*rep  0.791667  0.099206  0.732110 
Intermediate 
fbs*ple*ccp  0.666667  0.045635  0.872727  0.736 
(Cov) 
0.883 
(Con) 
rep*ple*ccp*ms  0.690476  0.069444  0.910995 
Table 4-9 Results of sufficiency analysis for outcome (deepened democracy). 
                                           
 
42 In QCA the complex solution makes no assumptions about logical combinations of conditions for which 
we have no empirical assumptions (counterfactual cases). The parsimonious solution makes whatever 
assumptions lead to the most parsimonious solution. In the Intermediate solution the researcher holds 
some theoretical expectations constant in the counterfactual analyses.  
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We take a consistency threshold of 0.81 in this analysis. A lower consistency 
threshold can be seen as acceptable for sufficiency analysis especially where a 
large number of cases are present (Mendel and Ragin 2011). Essentially we are 
making the claim that these conditions are ‘almost always’ sufficient for the 
outcome. The complex solution will be a logical subset of the intermediate, in 
turn  a  subset  of  the  parsimonious  solution.  The  parsimonious  solution  is 
interesting as it is often said to contain the ‘core’ conditions (Ragin 2007; Fiss 
2011). While not on their own necessary conditions, these conditions cannot be 
absent from any sufficient combination based on our empirical evidence. They 
cannot  be  eliminated  and  dismissed  as  irrelevant  by  applying  the  Quine-
Mccluskey  algorithm  as  explained  in  the  previous  chapter,  even  taking  into 
account counterfactual analysis. However we cannot be as confident that they 
are sufficient as we can with the complex solution. The complex solution takes 
into account only logical cases for which we have empirical evidence (real cases). 
It is important to note the logical property that more INUS conditions in any one 
‘path’ to the outcome will tend to increase consistency by lowering the value of 
case membership in a conjunction (lowering the value of x). The intermediate 
solution makes transparent our simplifying assumptions based on consulting 
theories about how counterfactuals would play out. 
Each  of  the  three  solutions,  more  complex,  more  parsimonious  and 
intermediate, has two different paths to the outcome. These can be factored. 
The intermediate solution, for example, can be written as follows to allow a 
(fairly) parsimonious statement which is consistent at the 0.88 level with the 
sufficiency superset/subset relationship.         
ple*ccp*    
 

 
 

  fbs+
rep*ms       →       deepd            
In words, when a positive legislative environment AND civil society willing to use 
contentious and cooperative politics combine; this conjunction when combined 
further with either a financial basis for spending on projects OR the combination 
of mayoral support AND rules that enable participation is sufficient to produce 
deepening of democracy. That sentence is somewhat a mouthful but the short 
formula  contains  an  accessible  parsimonious  description  of  the  analysis  of 
conjunctions sufficient for the outcome.  
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Envisage the case researcher re-examining their conclusions in light of this QCA 
analysis. The first interesting result, reading from the most complex solution, is 
that in a couple of cases the absence of mayoral support has been an INUS
 
condition for deep democracy. This is counterintuitive. If we look at the cases 
having strong membership in this solution (Belo Horizonte and Porto Alegre iii) 
we  see  that  these  were  key  cases  in  the  type  of  ‘informal  and  contested 
participatory  democracy’  that  Wampler  intuitively  conceived,  represented  in 
table 4-1 earlier. Perhaps this type he assumed does indeed exist; however, it 
required  the  use  of  a  more  complex  QCA  to  identify  or  describe  its  key 
combinatorial components. This may be too much of a jump to make, but it 
points at the way in which QCA at least can aid a more systematic articulation of 
the key conditions where a case researcher has already identified important 
similarities. This suggests that QCA can make a valuable contribution to small-
N research and that equally, case researchers could better specify their models 
by engaging with QCA. 
The intermediate solution also can provide both comfort and food for thought 
for Wampler. One of the causal paths, rep*ple*ccp*ms →  deepd, which displays 
strong values of consistency and raw coverage (0.91, 0.69), contains all three of 
the conditions he desired to say were sufficient for the outcome. Importantly 
though  these  are  only  sufficient  in  combination  when  combined  with  one 
another, and the positive legislative environment. So QCA adds some nuance to 
the case-researcher’s conclusion. 
Finally, we see that the willingness of CSOs to use cooperative and contentious 
politics is present in all solutions. This is commensurate with the idea that it is 
at the very least a substitutable necessary condition. 
4.8  Negation of the outcome 
One straightforward piece of added-value that QCA can provide to most previous 
analyses in the social sciences is its ability to test for causal relationships with 
the negation of the outcome. This is rarely considered in small-N comparative 
research.  Given  our  data,  what  may  be  seen  as  necessary  and/or  sufficient 
combinations of conditions to negate deepening of democracy?  
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For the intermediate sufficiency analysis solution of the negation we assume that 
the absence of all conditions will be linked causally with the outcome (~deepd). 
The parsimonious and intermediate solutions are then the same. 
Key: ms – mayoral support, ccp – citizens using contentious and cooperative 
politics, ple – a positive legislative environment, fbs – a financial basis to spend, 
rep – rules encouraging participation, cov – coverage, con/consist – consistency, 
sol - solution. 
    Causal Paths    Raw 
Cov. 
  Unique 
Cov.  Consist.  Sol. 
Complex 
 
  ~ms*~ccp*~ple*fbs    0.37098    0.16935  0.915423 
0.867 
(Cov) 
0.929 
(Con) 
    ms*ccp*ple*~fbs    0.46772    0.16533  0.966667 
  ~ms*ccp*ple*fbs    0.42945    0.15924  0.894958 
  ~ms*ccp*~ple*~fbs*~rep    0.34076    0.03836  1.000000 
Parsimonio
us 
/Intermedia
te 
 
~ms 
 
0.76619 
 
0.36087  0.873563 
0.931 
(Cov) 
0.79 
(Con) 
  ~fbs 
 
0.57055 
 
0.16533  0.771117 
Table 4-10 Results of sufficiency analysis for negation of outcome (~deepd).43 
In this analysis the consistency threshold is  0 .88. The finding, based on the 
intermediate solution, is that the absence of mayoral support for participatory 
budgeting OR the absence of a firm financial base to spend on  projects alone 
are core conditions in any sufficient conjunction to negate deep democracy. This 
could be of great importance for policymakers or political strategists interested 
in understanding the conditions which can undermine participatory democracy. 
If the absence of mayoral support at municipal level, a core element of sufficient 
conjunctions for the absence of deep democracy in participatory programmes, 
sponsoring organisations such as NGOs and the World Bank may want to 
combine their focus on civil   society capacity with greater attention to local 
politicians and/or raising revenue. Perhaps this is why donor organisations have 
moved in the direction of identifying  investment areas where they have local 
‘participatory champions’44. It also stands to reason that even when the best 
                                           
 
43 Consistency is explained in more depth in section 6.5 below. 
44 Thanks to Brian Wampler for this suggestion (personal correspondence).  
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designs combine with the best will of many actors; inability to raise or re-direct 
funds  for  capital  infrastructure  projects  will  undermine  the  success  of  any 
governance process, as it will struggle to achieve demonstrable results. These 
insights are sometimes not possible without the mindset and procedure of QCA, 
and  elsewhere  it  can  help  confirm  the  grounds  on  which  a  certain  level  of 
parsimony or complexity can be assumed when drawing conclusions in small-to-
medium-N studies. 
It would appear then that fsQCA has added some value. We might argue that 10 
cases is a medium-N and in such a scenario, the researcher may have their face 
too close to the data to be able to systematically consider all permutations and 
summarise them effectively. There may be just too much complexity for one 
researcher to hold all comparative information in their head. Researchers like 
Wampler  could  have  gained  an  advantage  by  using  QCA  –  a  tool  for  more 
complex,  larger-than-small-N  analysis.  We  could  suggest  QCA  is  an 
indispensable complimentary tool to in-depth qualitative case comparison. We 
should not forget one of the advantages of traditional qualitative research which 
compliments  QCA  is  the  ability  to  make  reference  to  case-specific  causal 
explanations which can qualify results and point to the need for further cross-
case analysis including other variables. For example, we could turn to investigate 
now,  the  combination  of  HDI  and  financial  situation  conditions  in  a  more 
sophisticated analysis across cases. Or based on the evidence of the necessity 
analysis  we might wish to investigate the impact of alternative participatory 
forums on PB such as Future City in Santo Andre which Wampler mentions as 
having influential effects within his richer case descriptions. What comes out of 
a QCA on that reading is a clearer indication of where one needs to make more 
detailed explanatory arguments. Carsten Schneider and Ingo Rohlfing have made 
recent contributions that detail exactly how researchers can use QCA to make 
decisions about which cases should be selected for within-case analysis and 
where QCA is best combined with process-tracing (2013, 2014).  
4.9  Small-N QCA: On replication and cumulation 
I wish to make some observations and pose some questions at this juncture. To 
be sure, I do not claim to be the first to revisit previously used data using QCA! 
Nevertheless, the relationships between QCA and small-N case-comparison are  
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often assumed to be simple, and less often teased out. While many textbooks 
are  keen  to  position  QCA  in  its  context  as  a  medium-N  strategy  and  by 
comparing and contrasting with Large-N strategies (Ragin 2000, Schneider and 
Wagemann 2012), the differences/ similarities with small-N research are less 
often discussed and I have only begun to touch on them here. 
Therefore it is a worthwhile endeavour to stop and ask what the added-value of 
applying QCA to small-N is by providing a good exemplar. The approach outlined 
above was not to replicate an analysis in a scientifically positivistic sense but to 
apply the QCA approach and tools to a good and well-respected example of 
small-to-medium-N case-comparison and investigate the added-value. I was able 
to show that QCA confirmed the interpretations of the case-researcher in some 
instances and added caveats in others.  
The  first  observation  is  that  an  fsQCA  approach  can  complement  more 
traditional small-N methods for typology construction and uncovering causal 
relationships. The chapter shows that QCA can often and effectively uncover 
relationships overlooked by researchers trained in traditional methods of small-
N comparison. This makes it a particularly useful tool in an emerging field where 
ethnographic methods and single-case studies tend to dominate, populations 
are not easily delineated and theory is often playing catch up to practice. 
Yet we should also ask when and where in the process of systematising tests for 
relationships of necessity and sufficiency, we lose out in terms of the strength 
in the interpretive narrative efforts of the ethnographer. Despite retaining a case-
based foundation, these variants on ontologically familial methods have trade-
offs and the selection of one method over another is not a zero-sum game. Each 
tells us something interesting about the phenomenon under investigation and 
their simultaneous employment can lead to a more fruitful and open discussion 
about populations, condition selection and measurement as well as opening up 
the black box between theory and methods in explaining social phenomena.  
We have seen that the employment of QCA tools can improve understanding of 
what  degree  of  parsimony  or  complexity  is  warranted  in  explanation.  In 
particular  I  can  caution  against  the  unsystematic  derivation  of  the  kinds  of 
parsimonious tables used in the first analysis above. I am not trying to suggest 
that QCA can be used as a magic formula to precisely pinpoint the place where 
parsimony and complexity meet. This will always require theoretical justification  
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and the benefits of cumulation within and across fields of research. What it may 
provide is a transparent account of what is at stake in these decisions which can 
encourage discussion across and within these fields.  
A second observation refers to case selection. The issue of case selection in QCA 
is  sometimes  treated  vaguely,  because  authors  wish  to  emphasise  the 
advantages  of  iteration  and  adding  and  subtracting  cases  throughout  the 
process rather than the crucial question of defining a population and relating a 
sample  to  it  in  the  first  instance.  It  is  also  often  implicitly  assumed  that  a 
population of cases in QCA is a ‘full’ one, carefully scoped, and not based on 
sampling  (even  information-oriented).  This  poses  a  particular  difficulty  in 
emerging fields of research where populations are hard to pin down, like for 
instance democratic innovation. And yet as we have seen QCA can be most 
beneficial  at  these  moments  for  various  reasons.  One  strategy  to  address 
problems of population definition is to rely more explicitly on the information-
oriented sampling of small-N researchers, applying QCA to their samples.   
However this approach brings its own problems. In particular using another 
researcher’s  population  and  cases  can  lead  to  high  levels  of  necessity 
consistency. The field researcher may have spent a lot of time looking for these 
relationships  already  and  eliminated  superfluous  information,  or,  their 
subjective interpretations may skew data in the direction of uncovering many 
‘almost’ necessary conditions. Without being able to make clear decisions about 
what the necessary analysis of a QCA has revealed it makes interpreting the 
sufficiency analysis more difficult. The analysis in the latter part of this chapter 
suggests that the  relationship  between interpreting necessary  and  sufficient 
conditions when there are a number of potentially valid necessary conditions 
and combinations has not been adequately theorised by QCA scholars. As much 
as  systematic  comparisons  of  participatory  and  deliberative  democratic 
institutions are in the ‘emerging’ stage so is QCA. 
Notwithstanding this a QCA mind-set can be invaluable for the development of 
theory  and  research  in  a  field  such  as ours. While  established  but  far  from 
matured, it is an exciting and yet precarious time for the subfield of research on 
participatory and deliberative democracy. It is encouraging that new theories 
and critique continue to emerge, often questioning our most basic assumptions. 
These theories require testing by means of systematic comparison of cases. QCA  
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may not quite allow bold assertions of which emperors of theory and hypotheses 
have no clothes, but application of even the most basic set-theoretic methods 
and  Boolean  logic  to  existing  knowledge  could  more  modestly  provide  the 
necessary nuance to the scope of our theories. 
So what about cumulation of the work of many different researchers? This is the 
task I laid out for myself at the beginning of this thesis. Cumulating research 
using QCA is difficult and requires more time. Let us now turn to the process of 
cumulating, coding and calibrating qualitative data from a range of sources in 
anticipation of a more ecumenical larger-N analysis. 
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Chapter 5:   FsQCA of PB worldwide: Scoping 
the population and calibrating conditions 
… we seem to embark more and more in comparative endeavours with-
out  comparative  method,  i.e.,  with  inadequate  methodological 
awareness and less than adequate logical skills. That is to say, we seem 
to be particularly naive vis-a-vis the logical requirements of a world-wide 
comparative treatment of political science issues,” Sartori (1970: 1052). 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 present further empirical contributions and a first attempt to 
cumulate findings of world-wide case-based research in the field of PB using 
QCA. This Chapter will deal mostly with the process of case-selection, population 
definition, condition selection & definition and calibration. The next chapter will 
deal with the analysis procedure and discuss the results. In reality, as we have 
seen,  these  processes  are  not  separable.  QCA  is  a  fundamentally  iterative 
method. QCA remains a part of the family of case-based methods and in many 
ways the logic we apply here to case-selection and condition specification is that 
wrought from years of scholarship on appropriate approaches to case-based 
comparisons. However QCA holds some promise to bring these approaches into 
new unexplored territory. In the next sections I will show how I used QCA to 
harness  the  knowledge  provided  by  existing  ethnographies  and  small-N 
comparative  work  to  cumulate  knowledge  of  causes  and  outcomes  in  PB 
programmes worldwide in a systematic but case-sensitive way. 
5.1  Constituting the research 
In the second part of chapter 4 I hinted at some of the intertwined decisions that 
form the constructive element of the QCA approach. One of the advantages of 
QCA is that it is an iterative process and one that allows for additions and 
subtractions from a population of cases as part of a transparent journey of model 
specification. As Ragin likes to put it populations are not ‘given’. He alleges that 
many variable-oriented researchers fail to problematise their populations (see 
especially 2000: Ch.2). Ragin also reminds us that this process of boundary 
revision and (re)-constitution of populations as researchers compare the quality 
of potential cases is common in small-N comparative work, (idem: 58). What is  
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not  common  is  expanding  this  careful,  time-consuming  approach  with  the 
ultimate goal of finally comparing more than a handful of cases. The danger is 
that a first-time buyer can approach the QCA with little guidance on how to carry 
out  this  process.  This  becomes  even  more  difficult  when  the  field  under 
investigation itself is quickly evolving as described of democratic innovations in 
chapter  2  of  this  thesis.  Despite  the  perceived  advantages  that  have  been 
outlined, the rapid diffusion of democratic innovations, especially PB, and the 
rapid increase and refinement in QCA techniques both provide moving targets 
for a research project of the kind undertaken here.  
To  draw  out  the  implications  of  this  novel  methodological  approach  for 
understanding  the  conditions  for  effective  institutionalisation  of  democratic 
innovations, I began by applying fsQCA to a small sample of contrasting cases 
of  participatory  budgeting  (PB)  across  different  continents  and  gradually 
increased my dataset of cases using criteria that I expand on below. Over the 
course  of  this  study  iteration  between  analysis,  population  refinement  and 
conceptualisation was regularity. This can be seen, for example, in an earlier 
comparison of six cases (Ryan and Smith 2012). While six is a relatively small 
number of cases for even modest worldwide generalisation, the primary aim of 
that study was to ascertain whether QCA could be applied effectively to the 
analysis  of  democratic  innovations.  In  particular,  it  allowed  me  to  explore 
important  elements  of  fsQCA,  including  population  definition,  calibration  of 
conditions and presentation and interpretation of outputs. In this way, that study 
can be understood as laying the groundwork for the larger medium-N analysis 
of PB that I present here.  
If we take fsQCA to be a promising method for a “medium-range” social science 
programme of research on PB, we are faced with a number of questions. First, 
what counts as a case of PB? Second, can we adequately define conditions – both 
causal  and  outcome?  And  third  (and  more  practically),  is  the  case  material 
available  suitable  to  provide  enough  insight  to  describe  these  conditions 
qualitatively and quantitatively?  
5.2  Defining a universe  
For this study, defining a universe of cases involves defining what a case of 
participatory budgeting is – and what it is not. A number of challenges present  
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themselves at this point. The diffusion of PB beyond Porto Alegre and Brazil has 
been a highly differentiated process (Sintomer et al. 2008, 2010; Rocke 2014). 
Moreover  there  is  plenty  of  debate  as  to  whether  programmes  which  call 
themselves PB in fact are PB, and whether analogous processes which prefer not 
to use the label are equally comparable. Sintomer et al. who have been to the 
forefront in reviewing the field explain things thus, 
…Once invented in a very specific context, participatory budgeting has 
subsequently been hybridised in contrasting ways. This makes it clear 
that  a  one-size-fits-all  approach  is  not  appropriate…  [PB’s]  make-up 
depends to a considerable extent on the national context. There is not 
yet  a  generally  recognised  definition,  be  it  political  or  scientific, 
concerning what minimum criteria they must satisfy. Certain procedures 
are listed in some places as participatory budgets even though they 
would not be called that in other countries. For that very reason, the 
attempt to lay down such minimum criteria is absolutely necessary for 
classification and evaluation (2013: 2). 
 
When contrasting Asia and Europe they go on to say that “there is no uniform 
model in either continent to which the others could be compared,” (idem: 20). 
This is probably why these researchers have been more engaged for the time 
being in compiling rough descriptions of similarities and differences among 
cases; aiming to begin with inductive categorisation, rather than aiming towards 
more systematic, methodical cumulation of causal analyses. This approach is 
similarly seen in the work of Cabannes (2004), Allegretti and Herzberg (2004) 
and contributors to Shah’s edited collection (2007).  
As outlined previously work in the field has very gradually tended towards more 
systematic forms of comparison. Earlier work by Sintomer et al. involving a slight 
variation in collaborators (2009, 2010) tried to map PBs in Europe by plotting 
their distance to six differentiated, Weberian ideal types of PB. Here the types 
were  categorised  according  to  different  features  of  respectively;  origin, 
organisation,  deliberation  and the  role  of  civil  society.  This  is  an  important 
contribution  but  it  cannot  alone  achieve  everything  we  would  want  for  a 
systematic  research  agenda  on  PB.  The  touchstone  for  these  comparisons 
remains the ideal type. Beginning from those ideals relative distances from the 
types can be roughly approximated and conveniently visualised. But the method  
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doesn’t  allow  for  systematic  or  transparent  robustness  checking  of 
measurement and is difficult to replicate. And cases tend to cluster near these 
types according to their national context, so there is a danger that typecasting 
of cases according to their national backgrounds occurs using such an approach. 
To my knowledge no one has yet expanded on a full typological theory based 
on  evaluation  of  a  property  space  in the  manner  suggested  by  George  and 
Bennett (2005: 257).  
We can also see that where comparisons have been more systematic they have 
tended  to  stay  within  continental  bounds.  Remembering  Peters,  despite 
unquestionably useful contributions, most comparative work on PB has found 
ways to find solace in the unique and unusual. This can come in the form of 
stressing  the  uniqueness  of  the  Brazilian  spoils  system  (Wampler),  warning 
against  the  ‘cultural  trap’  (Avritzer),  focusing  on  national  framing  in  cross-
national  comparisons (Rocke)  or  employing  methods that are  more  likely to 
uncover subtle differences than uncover similarities (Herzberg/Sintomer et al.). 
I contend that the field can benefit from making fewer assumptions about the 
differences  in  PBs  that  take  place  in  different  macro-comparative  units  of 
political organisation (or at least testing these assumptions systematically across 
cases). Remembering also Mill, to be clear on what is at stake in defining PB for 
comparative research – and this is very important if actors capable of having 
political  impact  will  understand  the  scope  of  research  findings  –  we  must 
systematically compare the key elements of phenomena in order to define the 
concept in the first instance. Only by seriously attempting systematic cross-
continental comparisons will greater insight be gained into what specificity is 
lost in abstraction for comparability. As we shall see we can also challenge the 
assumption that processes in one part of the world are different to another (at 
least in terms of key causal characteristics). 
In any case some definition is an important starting point in conceiving of a 
universe of cases. We saw earlier that definitions of PB tend to round on a list of 
key fundamental characteristics. Those provided by Wampler and Avritzer (listed 
on p.14 above) are good and evoke some of the key design features that have 
contributed to distinguishing PB as an innovation in participatory governance; 
but  the  latter’s  are  slightly  abstract  and  the  former’s  tend  to  favour  the 
conditions of Brazilian designs. Not surprisingly the best version for worldwide  
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comparison  comes  from  Sintomer  et  al.  who  consider  the  following  criteria 
minimal in order to recognise a process as PB: 
[The process]…allows the participation of non-elected citizens in the 
conception and/or allocation of public finances and… 
 
6)  The  financial  and/or  budgetary  dimension  must  be  discussed; 
participatory budgeting deals with scarce resources. 
7)  The municipal level must be involved or a (decentralised) district with 
an  elected  body  and  some  power  over  administration  (the 
neighbourhood level is not enough). 
8)  It must be a repeated process (one meeting or one referendum on 
financial issues are not examples of participatory budgeting). 
9)  The process must include some form of public deliberation within 
the  framework  of  specific  meetings/forums  (the  opening  up  of 
administrative  meetings  or  traditional  representative  instances  to 
‘ordinary’ citizens is not participatory budgeting). 
10)  Some accountability with regard to output is required. 
Sintomer et al. (2008: 168; 2014: 3). 
 
Of course we might debate with our ‘fuzzy’ hats on whether these conditions 
are more or less crisp dichotomies but I believe these are very sensible criteria 
for  distinguishing  a  process  as  PB  -  differentiating  it  from  more  common, 
‘traditional’ participatory consultations.  
5.3  Differentiating Participatory Budgeting from 
Participatory Grant-making processes – what PB is 
not 
These criteria would work to exclude from the population many of the cases 
named ‘participatory budgeting’ in the UK
45, and similar examples elsewhere, 
which tend to involve participation in the distribution of ad hoc small grants over 
                                           
 
45 For a more in-depth discussion of PB in the UK see Hall and Rocke (2013).  
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administrative jurisdictions which are not governed by a specific representative 
political body (e.g. neighbourhoods, highways).  
To  give  an  illustration,  Thornhill,  a  suburb  of  Southampton  has  held  a  ‘PB’ 
process since 2008. Thornhill was identified in 1999 as one of 39 exceptionally 
deprived  areas  of  the  UK  granted  approximately  50  million  GBP  worth  of 
government investment each, over a ten-year period as part of New Labour’s 
New Deal for Communities (NDC) regeneration programme (Fordham 2010: 12). 
As  part  of  a  deal  struck  with  the  board  controlling  NDC  funding  allocation 
(Thornhill Plus You), the local Primary Care Trust agreed to make a recurring 
financial  contribution to the  area  distributed  via  a  PB  process  (Bonaduce  de 
Negris 2010: 4). Support for the process is also provided by the City Council. 
The process involves local residents creating projects and bidding for money 
from a single pot of some tens but no more than one hundred thousand pounds. 
These  projects  are  presented  at  a  public  meeting  in  the  local  school  and 
residents vote on which ones they would like to receive funding. Their votes are 
tallied and project funding is allocated accordingly. This is typical of many small 
projects inspired by PB in the UK (PB Unit 2009) and is similar to many described 
in other parts of the world (see for example Shah 2007)
46. 
I do not wish to suggest that these processes do not have value. From my 
observations the  process  in  Thornhill incentivised  creative  communit y-led 
projects, improved community cohesion, gave some decision-making control to 
residents, and gave participants some sense of the trade -offs involved in making 
decisions to allocate scarce resources. But when we try to compare this process 
with PB in Porto Alegre we are comparing apples with peanuts rather than apples 
with apples. The process in Thornhill fails to reach at least 4 of Sintomer et al.’s 
criteria  above.  The  process  is  based  on  a  small  suburb  of  roughly  10,000 
inhabitants; it is no more than a portion of a local city council ward. The amount 
of money was set by funding schemes that ordinary citizens had no control over. 
Projects were limited to those aimed at improving health and wellbeing, so the 
agenda was set narrowly elsewhere (by the constraints of the funding stream). 
                                           
 
46 A short, previously unpublished review of PB in the UK prepared by the author for a related research 
project in late 2009 is provided in Appendices.  
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There was no public deliberation – in fact officers felt that “Q&A sessions would 
be difficult to manage, especially as contentious questions might be asked and 
issues of fairness might arise,” (Bonaduce de Negris 2010: 17). There is only one 
public meeting a year and the continuation of the programme is completely 
dependent on the goodwill and fiscal priorities of funders. 
5.4  Casing: What is a non-case and what is a negative 
case? 
Other processes come closer to satisfying the criteria but still fall short. For 
example in the London borough of Tower Hamlets in 2009 and 2010 a ‘PB’ 
process allocated 5.04 million GBP of council services by asking local residents 
to come together, deliberate and vote on priorities in their neighbourhoods (U-
decide  2009).  Despite  constraining  its  agenda  to  bids  for  ‘additional  public 
services’ it opens up a far more significant amount of public funds to local 
decisions than the grant-making process described above. However the process 
was  discontinued  after  2010  on  grounds  that  such  funds  were  no  longer 
available in a meaningful way in a financial downturn. Although Tower Hamlets 
PB spend was drawn from a mainstream budget not based on ad-hoc ‘funny-
money’  as  is  often  the  case  in  UK  PBs  (see  Rocke  and  Hall  2013:  195),  its 
foundation was still insecure. This also invokes another important criterion for 
definition of the PB universe I use in this study. I am interested in explaining how 
citizen control becomes institutionalised in a participatory budgeting process. 
In  the  case  of  Tower  Hamlets  a  key  reason  why  control  could  not  become 
institutionalised was that the programme was discontinued after two years. Is 
this a negative case - a case of the phenomenon where the outcome is absent, 
or a non-case of PB? Should a threshold of continuous years in operation be a 
scope condition or is it a potential necessary condition that we would want to 
test for? Open discussion of these questions and decisions is a key feature of 
case-based research.  
Of course one way out of this would be to test membership in a set calibrated 
from such a variable against our outcome.  If cases that took place over, say, at 
least four years were 1) a consistent superset of cases of citizen control of PB, 
and 2) that outcome ‘covered’ the cause (x is more or less equal to Y), it would 
suggest that X (in this case a regular and repeated process) is a trivial necessary  
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condition for Y. But it would be a time-consuming process to do this kind of 
analytical test for every potential condition. This is why a good command of 
theory and knowledge of the nature of cases in the field is a key tool in case-
based research. In any event there are other reasons why the Tower Hamlets 
case would be excluded from the cases for comparison here. The institutional 
design of this process might mean that it is better defined as a 21
st Century Town 
Meeting  with  a  focus  on  local  budgeting.  Meetings  were  not  regular  and 
continuous over a year-long period and the process did not allow in its structure 
the  development  of  vertical  and  horizontal  accountability  across  budget 
delegates  at  neighbourhood,  region  and  city/borough  level.  I  will  return  to 
discussing categorisation of, and comparison across and within different types 
of democratic innovation (PB, 21
st Century Town Meetings, Citizen’s Assemblies 
etc.) in the concluding chapters. For this analysis I present here I scope the 
population of the research to include only cases where PB took place for at least 
three years.  
5.5  Cases for a worldwide medium-N comparison of PB 
The  task  at  the  outset  was  to  build  a  dataset  with  enough  cases  to  make 
meaningful comparisons beyond a small-N incorporating substantial variety. I 
also wanted to apply fsQCA which meant I needed to be confident that I could 
obtain a requisite quality of data on important conditions I wanted to test and 
explain for each case. When I first approached this project with some knowledge 
of the rapidly emerging literature I had a sense that the field was just ripening 
for such a task. As participatory budgeting began in Latin America and has taken 
hold in all corners of the globe much of the literature appears in a variety of 
languages. I was limited practically to English language sources and the research 
was undertaken with the premise that this ‘ripening’ was occurring as a certain 
quantity and quality of knowledge on PB was becoming available across English 
language sources. Peters has warned of the consequences for generalisation 
given the tendency for Americans or Britons to select cases for ease of language 
use (2013: 171). Bearing this in mind some important questions are raised - 
where exactly are the cases I need, how can I access the data, and what does it 
represent?  
For an innovation which is not a mere technical fix or upgrade, the diffusion and 
increase in the number of cases of PB across the globe has been staggering.  
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There are at time of writing nearly 2800 cases of PB around the world (see 
Oliveira 2014). It has been recognised that it is close to impossible for a group 
of even coordinated academics using traditional means of data-gathering, to 
keep so much as a rough track of all the cases of democratic innovations as they 
diffuse and diversify throughout the world (Smith 2009). For a start classification 
of something as an innovation by definition requires ignorance on the part of 
many toward it and I will return to debates about whether a field of study can be 
sustainable  when  organised  around  ‘innovation’  in  the  concluding  chapter.  
Projects like participedia.net
47 have attempted to modernise data gathering in 
response to these problems by crowd-sourcing cases online and systematically 
recording data uploaded by users familiar with cases. Despite the help of such 
tools it is difficult to imagine a ‘full’ population of PBs in a way that had been 
common in earlier QCAs. 
Deciding  which  potential  cases  to  include  and  exclude,  and  collecting  the 
necessary data to perform calibration and analysis then, is difficult for a number 
of reasons. First, it is extremely time-intensive. Retaining the virtues of intimacy 
with cases in a medium-N comparative study is the qualitative strength of QCA. 
However,  it could take a  lifetime of  work  for  any  researcher to do in-depth 
qualitative research with a medium-N (see Bryan 2004 for the effort involved in 
a ‘lighter’ large-N study of town meetings). As a matter of course, in order to 
find cases I repeatedly scoured online sources at regular intervals and gradually 
built up contacts across networks of PB scholarship and activism to access new 
information,  recording  sources  and  data  as  I  went  along.  The  quality  of 
information available about cases runs the gamut from in-depth sophisticated 
pieces of  social  science through  variances of  more grey  literature.  Types  of 
potential sources of secondary data range from book-length treatments pf PB, 
including  PhD  theses,  by  social  scientists  (e.g.  Abers  2000,  Baiocchi  2005; 
Wampler  2007a),  peer-reviewed  journal  articles  (e.g.  Rodgers  2010;  Bassoli 
2012) and many single book chapters (e.g. Blakely 2010, Uran 2010); through 
reports or parts of reports by academics for Governments, IGOs, or NGOs/Think-
                                           
 
47 Participedia.net (PP) is an ongoing collaboration involving academics and practitioners across the world 
in an attempt to crowd-source, share and systematically compare participatory practices. The author has 
been a project collaborator with PP since 2011.  
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tanks (e.g. Allegretti and Herzberg 2004; Sintomer et al; 2010, Pratchett et al. 
2009);  unpublished  working  papers  and  MA  theses  (e.g.  Nieuwland  2003; 
Droualt  2006);  books  by  activists/journalists  (e.g.  Bruce  2004)  and  self-
evaluations  of  processes  by  organisers  and  stakeholders  (e.g.  Lent  2006; 
Brennan 2009).  
If that axis is an indicator of quality or scientific robustness across sources, a 
further axis would organise cases with reference to how much information was 
available about the particular case – contributions ranged from treatments of a 
single case (e.g. Abers 2000) or a handful of cases in comparison (e.g. Talpin 
2011;  Rocke  2014)  to  snapshots.  Time  is  not  infinite  and  I  would  want  to 
compare as many cases as possible, while retaining some level of familiarity with 
the cases in my dataset. Therefore it does not make sense to make an attempt 
to add new cases by gathering primary data on new or understudied cases. That 
is not the remit of this thesis. Therefore I rely mostly on secondary sources in 
an fsQCA of this type. The difficulty here is that the literature will often, for 
reasons of space or intentions of a study, document the quirks of a particular 
case and not all its basic elements. This makes a simple review of case materials 
for  the  necessary  information  on  all  the  conditions  for  an  fsQCA  difficult. 
Therefore  I  have  sought  to  complement  existing  secondary  material  with 
interviews  with  field  researchers  who  carried  out  studies.  This  has  three 
advantages for cumulative research of this type. First, it enables us to access 
information  on  the  specific  conditions  of  interest  when  they  are  not  in  the 
original literature. Second,  we can check our interpretation of the nature of 
conditions with a researcher familiar with the case – and with some knowledge 
of how it compares with other cases. Third, we are able to engage the field 
researcher in the iterative process of refining our causal and outcome conditions 
– as well as the scope and population.  
Much of what was written on PB may allude to many cases at once and give some 
details of broad similarities and differences among cases, (e.g. Alegretti and 
Herzberg 2004; Goldfrank 2007; Shall 2007; Folscher 2007a, 2007b; Sintomer 
et al. 2010). Many cases appear in these articles as cameos more-so than in-
depth case-studies. One might be able to glean good information on a couple of 
their characteristics but not several at once. I began (and continue) to record and 
categorise all evidence that contains some description of a particular quality of 
a particular condition for any case I came across. This means that the list of  
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cases and conditions of interest grew quickly but also the empty cells in my 
dataset  grew  even  more  rapidly.  As  a  result  a  long  process  ensued  of 
identification  of  key  conditions  of  interest  (see  discussion  below)  and 
identification of cases which would have the required quality, or close to the 
required quality of information to be able to reliably measure membership in 
sets representing these conditions. Essentially the property space was narrowed 
to provide a full typological theory as well as empirical cases without missing 
data or non-robust data on key variables
48. I discuss the key features of this 
process in a QCA approach in the sections on conditions and calibration below. 
For the task of identifying cases for the study, the cameo accounts on their own 
even when compiled across a number of different sources, do not give enough 
depth to be able to make meaningful comparisons based on an analysis of data 
from a secondary position.  While these sources are useful for confirmation of 
research and robustness checks, I chose to limit my analysis to cases which had 
been treated at length (at least a dedicated article or chapter) by a trained social 
scientist that had identified the case for analytic value.  
Some cases could not be included in my analysis for reasons already outlined 
earlier; PB was abandoned too soon. There is a welcome new departure in PB 
studies that tries to explain the ‘death’/abandonment and/or reincarnation of 
PBs  (Lopez  Alves  and  Allegretti  2012;  Spada  forthcoming).  Paolo  Spada  has 
shown that PB is unusual as an innovation in that, in Brazil, rates of adoption 
have  not  always  outstripped  rates  of  abandonment  (idem).  Explaining  that 
particular phenomenon is beyond the scope of this thesis. In my study, cases 
that are abandoned after a short number of years are considered non-cases. I 
am  more  interested  in  explaining  how  citizen  control  comes  to  be 
institutionalised  vis-à-vis  the  institutionalisation  or  continuation  of  a  more 
negative  arrangement  in  ostensibly  participatory  processes  –  what  Wampler 
might call ‘emasculated’ participatory democracy or Arnstein might call degrees 
of ‘nonparticipation’ and ‘tokenism’. 
                                           
 
48 A small snapshot of  data being collected and categorised for one of the conditions mid-way through 
the collection process is reproduced in Appendices in order to give a visual appreciation of the raw data 
extraction and categorisation procedure.  
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Still, the 18 cases selected for this study represent some of the sheer variety of 
cases and sources that any comparative study of this type must work with
49. 
Although I am limited in the main to English language sources, the cases are not 
biased towards the English-speaking world. The data contains 10 Brazilian cases 
where the innovation was strongest in its early waves but these cases are 
compared with 2 in France, and 1 each from Argentina, Canada, Italy, Germany, 
Spain and Uruguay. The cases   and some of the main sources from which 
information was garnered are:  
-  Belo Horizonte (Wampler 2007a, Avritzer 2009, interview with Wampler 
16/03/2011). 
-  Betim (Nylen 2003a, 2003b). 
-  Blumenau (Wampler 2007a). 
-  Berlin-Lichtenberg  (Rocke  2009,  2014,  Herzberg  2013,  interview  with 
Rocke 13/12/2010). 
-  Buenos Aires (Peruzzotti 2009, Rodgers 2010, interview  with Rodgers 
08/06/2012). 
-  Ipatinga (Wampler 2007a). 
-  João Monlevade (Nylen 2003a, Baiocchi, Heller and Silva 2011) 
-  Montevideo (Goldfrank 2011). 
-  Morsang-Sur-Orge  (Talpin,  2007,  2011,  interview  with  Talpin 
26/01/2011). 
-  Poitou-Charentes (Rocke 2009, 2014, interview with Rocke 13/12/2010). 
-  Porto Alegre (Abers 2000, Baiocchi 2005, Santos 2005, Gret and Sintomer 
2005, Wampler 2007a, Avritzer 2009, Goldfrank 2011). 
                                           
 
49 Two recent publications at time of writing which provide some in-depth treatments of potential cases 
include Sintomer et al. (2013) and Dias (2014). Unfortunately as outlined PB provides a moving target and 
these pieces appeared too late for cases to be included on that basis alone in systematic comparisons at 
this stage.  
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-  Recife (Wampler 2007a). 
-  Rio Claro (Wampler 2007a). 
-  Rome  municipio  XI  (Talpin,  2007,  2011,  interview  with  Talpin 
26/01/2011). 
-  Santo André (Wampler 2007a).  
-  São Paulo (Wampler 2007a, Avritzer 2009). 
-  Sevilla (Talpin, 2007, 2011, interview with Talpin 26/01/2011). 
-  Toronto Community Housing (Lerner and Van Wagner 2006, interview 
with Lerner 18/01/2011). 
The references above far from exhaust the sources used to glean information on 
these cases but I want to provide a snapshot of the main sources for each case. 
Where there was missing information among the case material I tried where 
possible to interview the case-researcher to get this information. A copy of the 
interview schedule used and an example of a partially transcribed interview can 
be found in appendix A. Interviews were not possible in all cases and in some, 
but not all cases, I was able to receive clarifications and information by email. 
The cases selected vary in the quality of information available but they all pass 
the minimum requirements set out previously. In any case, uneven amounts of 
knowledge relating to each case is an accepted (if not desirable) characteristic 
of case-based comparative research (Newton 2006: 851).  
Two cases are notable in that the affected population is not only constituted by 
geographic jurisdictional borders - i.e. social housing tenants in the case of 
Toronto Community Housing and stakeholders in high schools in the case of 
Poitou-Charentes. However, these sub-populations are larger in number than 
populations in many other cases. Also two of the cases (Lichtenberg and Rome 
Municipio XI) are subdivisions of a larger city. All cases satisfy the criteria for our 
study and the importance of, as well as potential disadvantages of, comparing 
across different political arrangements are discussed later in this chapter and in 
the next. A number of cases just fell short of being included due to missing 
information on one or a few important conditions. One of the advantages of QCA 
is it allows addition of cases in such a way that analysis can be revisited over 
time in a transparent manner. That is a new case will not carry the fear of a  
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potential ‘outlier’ in the way a traditional analysis might assume but will allow 
more nuanced findings and or prompt discussion about whether it is a different 
‘type’ or ‘kind’ of case. Therefore a group of researchers working together or 
apart may contribute and refine such an analysis. 
5.6  Comparing Porto Alegre – ‘Necessary good or 
necessary evil’  
I have already discussed some of the considerations involved in the unusual case 
of Porto Alegre with respect to this data in chapter 3. As the archetype of PB it 
has been seen to have much influence on other cases and models of PB and is 
still often seen as a yardstick for many other programmes to aspire to. In many 
ways the success of Porto Alegre is a necessary condition for all the successes 
of other cases in the dataset. The question we must keep in mind here is whether 
this influence is an enduring significant factor affecting outcomes that does vary 
across cases. Using QCA we can try to evaluate to what extent Porto Alegre 
compares  with  other  cases  –  whether  other  cases  are  similar  in  key 
characteristics; and in the end we can return to the case and examine whether it 
differs to similar cases on the outcome and whether the findings make sense in 
light of our knowledge about it and other cases. 
5.7  Problematising ‘success’ and specifying the 
outcome(s) I want to explain. 
Policymakers, activists, participants and citizens are all desperate to know what 
makes  political  participation  ‘successful’.  Where  are the  ‘good’  examples  of 
participation? What do we need in order to do successful participation? How and 
when do we do what? When do we know that it won’t work? This thesis cannot 
answer all these questions but it would like to help by identifying the drivers of 
success  and  failure  in  participatory  budgets.  Yet,  success  and  failure  are 
contested concepts. If we are interested in identifying combinations of drivers 
for success then what defines success?  While most actors have some vague 
common  notions  of  what  makes  a  PB  successful  they  emphasise  different 
elements according to their concerns. How can we operationalise and test this 
so we can return useful information for end-users of political research? There 
are age-old concerns in this undertaking also – how can we be sure that our  
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causal/explanatory conditions (independent variables) are independent of the 
outcome  (dependant variable). How the outcome is defined  will significantly 
affect the casual hypotheses we would like to, and can investigate.  
Many scholars have been attracted to PB to help them try to understand its 
potential to achieve a number of outcomes. These include the redistribution of 
wealth,  increases  in  education,  efficiency  of  government  spending  and 
increasing vote share for the parties implementing PB to name a few. While many 
of these goals may be complimentary or even conditional on one another, this 
study is primarily concerned with PB as a democratic innovation that effectively 
institutionalises democratic participation. The aim of the comparative research 
in this thesis is to explain how ownership of budget decisions by masses of 
‘ordinary people’ becomes a convention and what leads to this being negated. 
The key research question outlined in the first breath of this thesis is ‘when and 
how  do  ordinary  citizens  gain  substantial  control  over  important  collective 
decisions?’ Is this the most noteworthy contribution we can hope for in PB or is 
something  more  important  being  overlooked?  Alternative  interpretations  of 
success in PB worth considering include the following: 
Reduction in clientelist or corrupt practices: For some PB can be seen primarily 
as having been introduced in Brazil as a specific measure whose primary aim 
was to reduce patronage and shady practices in allocation of capital spending in 
the city. An inherited culture of clientelism has plagued (and in some places 
continues to plague) Brazilian politics since the foundation of the state. In this 
context PB can be seen as emblematic of the institutional turn taken by civil 
society and social movements striking back against military authoritarianism in 
the  late  nineteen-seventies  and  nineteen-eighties  (c.f.  Wampler  and  Avritzer 
2004: 292). Abers paints a very vivid picture of the ways in which the big patrons 
in  some  of  Porto  Alegre’s  neighbourhoods  were  supplanted  by  cooperation 
among citizens through the first years of PB (1998b). Is this what PB is about 
and is it comparable across cases?  
Certainly PB varied in its successes in this regard with sustained presence of 
‘cabo  eletoiras’  (electoral  ward  bosses)  at  meetings  in  some  PBs  (Wampler 
2007a:  250),  and  prevalence  of  ‘inchaco’-type  practices  whereby  a  patron’s 
supporters who do not participate regularly would ‘swell’ assemblies to game 
outcomes elsewhere (Abers 1998b). Clientelism is not unique to Brazilian politics  
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and  even  in  traditionally  non-clientelist  representative  systems  citizens  and 
activists have called for more control over, or transparency in, budget spending. 
A  number  of  newer  cases  of  PB  cite  responses  to  some  fiscal  management 
scandals as an influence in their initiation especially in the fallout from global 
economic  contractions.  If  many  of  these  programmes  consider  fighting 
corruption  and  making  budgets  transparent  a  key  aim  of  PB  perhaps  the 
outcome we should be most interested in testing requires some measure of a 
reduction in corruption indicators and patronage.  
Nevertheless, PB is more than just a tool for budget transparency and openness. 
Budget regulation and transparency has been shown to be successful in reducing 
incentives for politicians to benefit from information asymmetry in traditional 
representative  political  systems  too  (Benito  and  Bastida  2009).  PB  sets  a 
somewhat higher standard than this. Abers shows that as citizens over time 
began to deliberate with one another they moved from attending PB meetings in 
order to campaign for narrow localised goals, to organising collectively to gain 
more control over shared concerns (1998b). Reductions in clientelism may be a 
symptom of and a good indicator for successful PB. But for many, PB aims not 
just for a better relationship between decision-makers and those affected by 
decisions but for a fundamental change in the nature of who decisions are made 
by and for. 
Substantive Learning and Education: One lauded outcome of PB in Porto Alegre 
and Belo Horizonte that has been picked upon by the World Bank and others 
seeking to  diffuse the  process has been  its  apparent ability to increase the 
‘budget  literacy’  of  ordinary  citizens.  Budgets,  despite  being  arguably  the 
legislative act with most effect on an average citizen’s day-to-day lives have 
traditionally been less open to considered debate among ordinary citizens than, 
for example, moral or constitutional issues. Budgets are often referred to as the 
‘black box’ of government; best understood and administered by economists, 
planners,  other  technocrats  and  -  perhaps  only  if  necessary  -  professional 
politicians. A level of budget literacy among members of an active society can 
be an important component of good governance. By familiarising themselves 
with the jargon and technical procedures of public budgeting citizens can come 
to understand the constraints and procedures faced in political decision-making 
with limited resources. This, it is argued, can lead them to make more rational 
demands  from  the  state.  Similarly,  when  citizens  can  communicate  with  
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technocrats in a language they both recognise, those operating within the black 
box can overcome information deficits in regard to citizen’s needs and wants. 
They may find that citizen’s priorities are different to what they believed they 
were as in Porto Alegre (Abers 2000), or they may gain information to be able to 
anticipate policy failures before they are implemented.  
Again good governance is often an aim of PB and one that is desirable of any 
arrangement involving collective-decision making, but this only captures some 
of  what  PB  sets  out  to  achieve.  Improvements  in  cognition,  individual  or 
collective, seen in adaptive preferences and public reason-giving are only one 
good that democratic theorists hope for from participation in democratic politics 
(Talpin 2011: 15; see also Smith 2009). Practices of making public arguments 
and changing preferences can be important in their own right but could be far 
more powerful as part of a broader process of taking control of making collective 
decisions  and  even  collectively  (re-)shaping  institutions  of  governance  (c.f. 
Talpin 2007, see also Pateman 1970). 
Representation of Presence and Voice: Critiques of the inclusion concept within 
democratic  theory  have  developed  to  specify  in  particular  the  need  to  be 
sensitive to the role of presence (Phillips 1995) and voice (Young 2000) where 
important affected constituencies may be underrepresented. We might want to 
evaluate  the  success  of  PB  by  simply  looking  at  the  diversity  and 
representativeness of participants or discourses that are brought to the fore by 
the process. If unequal representation remains democracies unresolved dilemma 
(Lijphart 1997) then a political process that achieves more equal representation 
involving more than just the ‘usual suspects’ is a successful one.  
Also we may want to measure the extent to which inclusive deliberation takes 
place or ask whether we can measure some shared sense of identity that results 
from the process. The latter kinds of outcomes have been of particular interest 
to deliberative democratic theorists and sophisticated, innovative attempts to 
measure such outcomes resulting from participation in new institutional designs 
can be seen in the work of Fishkin (2009; 1996) and Niemeyer (2011). Those 
analyses have mainly focused on specific institutions designed for more narrow 
purposes  (mini-publics)  than  participatory  budgets.  And  even  where  these 
outcomes have been measured outside of mini-publics (e.g., Bryan 2004; Steiner  
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et al. 2004) the focus tends to be on the collection of individual actions rather 
than collective outcomes as a whole.  
Following  Smith  (2009)  different  institutions  may  achieve  these  goods  in 
different ways but they are only elements of successful democratic innovation, 
which  also  requires  degrees  of  popular  control  over  decisions,  as  well  as 
accountability and effective implementation of such decisions. It makes more 
sense therefore at this stage of scholarship on PB to test whether inclusion and 
voice are associated with successful outcomes, data-permitting, than to assume 
that they constitute those outcomes. 
Redistribution (‘Inversion of priorities’) – PB has not only interested those whose 
primary  concern  is  the  minutiae  of  democratic  procedures  or  those  who 
intrinsically value a vibrancy of political participation. Its popularity has often 
been driven by its promise of a more just distribution of collective resources. In 
the context of Brazil with its exceptionally rapid urbanisation and consequential 
plethora  of  unplanned  settlements,  PB  was  very  much  envisioned  as  an 
instrument  for  ‘inverting  priorities’.  Capital  infrastructure  spending  was 
refocused away from the haves in gentrified suburbs and gated communities to 
the have-nots in the favelas. It is no accident that Porto Alegre became a beacon 
for the alter-globalisation movement, the cradle for the World Social Forum, and 
a ‘Mecca of the Left’. In Europe too, early cases were initiated by Leftist and often 
Communist parties. As Julien Talpin explains, these parties, reeling from the 
ideological consequences of the fall of the Soviet empire, saw in participatory 
democracy  a  modern  idea  with  which  to  build  a  new  positive  identity  and 
reconnect with their constituents (2011: 35).  
Some recent studies have compared PB and non-PB cities to show that PBs in 
general lead to improvements in the circumstances of vulnerable citizens over 
time. Gonçalves (2014) shows that PB cities prioritised health and sanitation 
spending leading to significant reduction in infant-mortality rates; and Touchton 
and  Wampler  confirm  that  PB  increases  health-care  spending  and  decreases 
infant-mortality rates in a similar study (2013).  
Looking at cases where PB has occurred only (as in my population) the level of 
redistribution and transformative justice achieved certainly could be expected 
to vary across cases. There may be many variables which could explain these 
outcomes worthy of an empirical test. For example the motives of initiators may  
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differ - as PB has diffused it has been accepted and implemented by parties and 
actors from different political backgrounds. In the UK a strong localism agenda 
among conservatives saw PB amalgamated into the new coalition government’s 
‘Big Society’ initiative in 2010 - however the overall initiative was ill-received and 
PB was marginalised and allowed to fall off the central government’s policy-map. 
In Brazil many non-PT and even non-Leftist parties may have taken up PB in order 
to try and mimic the electoral rewards it saw the PT acquiring. However Spada 
(forthcoming) shows that despite abandonment of PB by PT parties after Lula’s 
presidential victory, the number of non-PT-led PBs has remained stable.  
I chose not to attempt to explain redistributive outcomes in this thesis. A causal 
hypothesis that might explain high levels of redistributions seems difficult to 
test using QCA with the data at our disposal. The redistributive effect of PB is 
likely  to  be  influenced  by  channels  of  diffusion  and  may  require  tracing  of 
diffusion processes to understand better whether models that emphasise such 
outcomes are universal. It would also require sophisticated controls to ensure 
spending decisions were comparable across cases. When such data becomes 
available  we  may  be  able  to  engage  in  set-theoretic  causal  analysis  and 
modelling to this end.  
But there is a second more important reason that redistributive outcomes are 
not the primary concern here. Even if the creators of PB had the ultimate goal of 
redistributing  wealth, what makes them stand out from others  who tried to 
achieve that goal through various means is that they trusted in an innovation in 
democratic institutional design. Dissecting the relationship between democracy 
and equality of outcomes is far beyond the scope of this thesis, but democratic 
institutions should not be judged on their ability to realise substantive outcomes 
that are defined as desirable a priori to the democratic decision-making process. 
We should be more interested in what conditions lead to procedures that as 
Invernizzi Accetti puts it “… [enable] citizens to govern themselves equally and 
freely within a context of normative indeterminacy,” (2013: 1). 
The outcome condition - Citizen  Control of Popular Decisions: The ultimate aim 
of this study is to draw on a range of cases to explain the conditions under which 
citizen control of budget spending decision is effectively institutionalised: That 
is  where  democratic  participation  and  ownership  of  budget  decisions  by 
‘ordinary  people’  becomes  a  convention.  The  outcome  condition  (or  in  
  114 
traditional  statistical  language  –  the  dependent  variable)  we  are  aiming  to 
evaluate is citizen control of budgetary decision making. This takes place when 
both agenda-setting and decision-making power in budget decisions is directed 
by, and open to, all citizens. I separately collected data on citizens ability to set 
agendas and ability to make decisions and combined them as explained in the 
section  on  calibration  below  (in  Boolean terms,  the  set  of  citizen  control  is 
created by the conjunction – logical ‘AND’ - of these two conditions).  
There are different factors that can contribute to check decision-making and/or 
agenda-setting power. On the surface these powers were easy to code by looking 
at the rules of the process – e.g. citizen control may be affected by whether de 
jure vetoes are in place. I was interested in measuring de facto citizen control, 
however.  This  meant  collecting  and  synthesising  a  variety  of  qualitative 
information that signalled different degrees of power. For example, asking what 
level  of  co-optation  took  place  in  both  setting-agendas  and  making  final 
decisions. Wampler shows for instance that despite the strong rhetoric of co-
governance  in  Santo  André,  government  officials  and  the  mayor’s  office 
benefited in controlling the process by having far more access to important 
information and the apparatus of the state. Despite a de jure veto for both sides 
according to the rules the only de facto veto was exercised by the administration 
(2007a: 178-179). Also decisions need to be made with the knowledge that they 
will be accounted for and enforced. Some system of monitoring of outcomes was 
more  or  less  a  constant  rather  than  a  variable  across  cases  but  in  reality 
implementation  of  projects  differs  across  cases.  More  details  on 
operationalisation and measurement is provided in the section on calibration 
below. 
I  continue  to  collect  relevant  data  on  other  potential  outcomes  including 
redistribution of wealth, individual and group inclusion, education and budget 
literacy,  and  in  time  may  have  means  to  create  more  complex  outcome 
conditions that incorporates these conditions – or run separate analyses focused 
on  these  particular  outcome  conditions.  However  for this  study  attention  is 
focused  on  how  de  facto  citizen  control  of  budgetary  decision-making  is 
established, institutionalised and sustained.  
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5.8  Influencing Conditions   
As previously explained QCA is an excellent method for testing the combinations 
of a number of conditions (independent variables) that are associated by set-
theoretic relationships with an outcome. QCA analysis can examine complexity, 
and uncover and describe multiple conjunctural causation. It can be a more 
useful method than traditional interaction models when used with a medium-N, 
for  interpreting  such  relationships  of  association  across  cases  (See  further 
discussion in Braumoller 2003; also Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 88-89). 
However although QCA may be able to handle one or two more conditions than 
a regression to answer these kinds of questions, it is no magic bullet that allows 
independent variables to be thrown at a causal model like leftovers to a stew. 
Careful and skilful recourse to political theory and hypothesis-formation is more 
important  than  ever  here  and  in  fact  QCA  provides  a  method  for  dealing 
transparently with logical remainders.  
QCA is transparent about the empirical relevance of the data in the property 
space that has been created by the conditions to be tested. For each k number 
of  conditions  tested  in  any  QCA  model  there  will  be  2
k  logical  cases 
(combinations of conditions that are logically possible – see Ragin 2007: 24). 
Thus an increase in one explanatory condition will increase the logical cases 
exponentially and also increase the number of empty cells in the property space. 
With a small-to-medium number of cases, the number of logical remainders 
(logical cases for which we do not have empirical examples) will usually begin to 
outweigh the number of logical cases for which we have empirical cases as soon 
as there are  more than  3 or  4  conditions in the  model.  Therefore  a robust 
medium-N QCA requires the theoretical skills to select and define three to five 
key  explanatory  conditions  to  be  examined  with  the  outcome  condition 
conceptualised above. What follows in this section will discuss and describe this 
process. 
As outlined in the comprehensive review in chapter 2, the growing literature on 
PB provides ample candidates for key conditions that could explain successful 
outcomes. Many of the types of claims that Wampler (2007a); Avritzer (2008); 
Talpin (2011); Baiocchi, Heller and Silva (2011); Goldfrank (2011) and others 
make about causal processes in PB are in fact either explicitly or implicitly claims 
about set-theoretic relationships of necessity and sufficiency. For example, as  
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we  saw  in  the  previous  chapter,  Wampler  suggests  that  the  explanatory 
conditions,  strong  mayoral  support  combined  with  an  active  civil  society  is 
necessary  for  the  achievement  of  most  successful  participatory  budgeting 
programmes (2007a: 258). A myriad of the conditions that are suggested to 
explain a  deepening of  democracy  as  a  result of  PB  imply  necessity  and/or 
sufficiency.  Plausible  hypotheses  include  combinations  of,  the  fiscal 
independence of a polity, the governing ideology of the political leadership, the 
health of civil society, the quality of deliberation at meetings, the role of the 
bureaucracy,  the  degree  of  partisanship  across  the  political  spectrum, 
constitutional provisions for participatory governance etc. Remember with 18 
cases the analysis needs optimise the number of conditions we can examine 
across cases but take into account the limited diversity of social phenomena. 
Therefore in the analysis produced here we consider four important conditions 
which  have  been  considered  key  to  explaining  citizen  control  of  budgetary 
decision-making in the literature: 
The set of government leaders committed to a participatory governing 
philosophy 
People who have power rarely give it away. Debates about the role of citizens in 
governance or the state have raged for centuries and are the staple of much 
political theory. We standardly indoctrinate undergraduate students by exposing 
them to a canon that reads from Plato through Aristotle, Machiavelli, the modern 
social contract theorists, Madison and laterally Schumpeter, Pateman, Dahl and 
many more in between to try to comprehend what the ideal role of the individual 
is in making collective decisions. In some case they have inspired or guided 
revolution but throughout that history what has been rare is for a state or other 
locus of power to decide to give up that power without a fight. Even where 
leaders talk of decentralising power this is often met with cynicism as very few 
‘walk  the  walk’.  Yet  it  seems  that  cynicism  would  be  misplaced  taking  into 
account some cases of PB. Why?  
If  there  is  one  issue  that  unites  concern  among  political  scholars  of  many 
methodological and ideological hues it is that we seem to be experiencing a 
legitimacy crisis in established representative democracies (Stoker 2006, Saward 
2010, Mair 2013). As explained in the introduction what is most interesting 
about  the  participatory  fora  and  innovative  institutional  designs  that  have  
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emerged in the last thirty to forty year is that democratisation in these instance 
is governance-driven (Warren 2009). Both studies in Latin America and Europe 
(see especially Röcke 2014) emphasise the importance of the leadership strategy 
in  putting  PB  on  the  agenda  in  the  first  instance  and  then  influencing  the 
model/rules of PB and its success in practice.  
This  condition  connects  concerns about the  extent to  which participation is 
ideologically central to governing parties, the degree of support for participation 
across the party  and  political  spectrum,  and the instrumental  incentives  for 
government to engage citizens in decision-making. All those three elements and 
others  might  be  operationalised  separately  and  then  combined  or 
operationalised together as discussed in the next section but it is important to 
be clear that in this analysis we are interested in the higher-order construct 
which takes all into account. 
In some cases commitment to participatory ideals can be signalled in the rhetoric 
of speeches and policy programmes promoted publicly. In the case of Poitou-
Charentes, Ségelène Royal followed a fairly radical discourse in her defence of 
and  promise  for  participatory  democracy,  at  least  prior  to  her  selection  as 
presidential  candidate  in  2006/2007  (Röcke  2014:  66-67).  However,  despite 
being  influenced  by  the  World  Social  Forum,  it  was  also  clear  that  Royal 
recognised the strategic benefits of participation and tempered her rhetoric in 
national  campaigns  (idem:  24).  Therefore  this  condition  takes  into  account 
commitment  to  participation  across  political  society  as  a  whole.  High  set 
membership values on this condition can be seen where participatory measures 
were sustained by leaders in the face of challenges from opposition leaders; but 
also where challenges were not forthcoming because there was broad support 
across the political spectrum and challenges were not strong or publicised
50. A 
further important indicator is whether leaders actively attempted to improve the 
circumstances for participation. Though circumstances such as financial security 
of a municipality and bureaucratic capacity themselves have independent effects 
                                           
 
50 Descriptions of the verbal logic that defines membership in the set for each condition is more clearly 
elaborated in the section on calibration that follows.  
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on  the outcome ideological commitment to participation can be observed when 
leaders took political risks to try and channel funds and/or human resources or 
other state capital to advantage participatory budgeting
51. 
Bureaucratic Support for PB 
The inclusion of this condition recognises a further source of the exercise of 
power that can act as a brake or catalyst for participatory reforms. Bureaucrats 
or other contracted staff play an important role in guaranteeing or negating the 
outcomes of policies. This role is conditioned by but not explained only by their 
physical capacities and competences to do the work (Lipsky 1980). For example, 
their actions both direct and indirect can be key to mobilising p articipants. As 
we shall see in some cases bureaucrats exercised discretion in ways that 
benefited PB. 
There are important differences across polities in the extent to which political 
leaders are able to restructure the administration (including the appointment of 
senior bureaucrats) to enable PB (Abers 2000; Baiocchi 2005). It is a little ironic 
that in some cases leaders were able to take advantage of the ‘spoils systems’ 
of patronage to reorganise bureaucracies such that key strategic positions as 
well as street-level ones were held by those who were committed to participation. 
As Abers points out in the case of Porto Alegre two organisations, GAPLAN
52 (a 
reorganised planning department) and CRC
53 (community relations department) 
were initiated in this way in order to support the PB (2000: 77-78). Bureaucrats 
were brought close to ordinary citizens, working with them towards common 
aims. In other cases sympathetic bureaucrats may have been removed where 
leaders lost interest in participation. Rodgers gives a good account of this in his 
description of the latter years of the Buenos Aires case (2010). Therefore this 
                                           
 
51 When I first approached this research with the mind-set of a classically trained social scientist I was 
concerned  that  these  relations  between  explanatory  conditions  question  the  independence  of  the 
variables. QCA however is built for uncovering conjunctural causation rather than additive aggregate 
correlations. Therefore it is important to consider the independence of variables as usual to anticipate 
endogeneity and explain any collinearity. However it is perhaps most important to return to the cases 
after the analysis and if necessary employ process-tracing techniques in order to investigate causal 
interdependence among influencing condition or the possibility of feedback loops etc. These concerns are 
further elaborated on in the closing chapters. 
52 Gabinete de Planejamento. 
53 Coordenação de Relações com a Comunidade.  
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condition takes into account the freedom that bureaucrats have to support PB as 
well as their intentions and actions. 
In other cases bureaucratic support varied where politicians had either little 
control or little influence over which staff were involved in the project and even 
what  they  did.  Lerner  and  Van  Wagner  (2006)  show  that  in  Toronto  it  was 
committed staff in the social housing sector that had been made aware of PB 
through diffusion channels which bypassed politicians, who, recognising they 
had the capacity, took it upon themselves to implement a PB process. Given that 
support  also  varied  where  such  reorganisation  as  had  been  taken  in  South 
America  was  not  possible  at  the  municipal  level,  we  can  see  this  condition 
suggests a number of combinatorial hypotheses which may alternate in their 
effect on the outcome depending on the presence of other conditions. It will be 
interesting to see in the final analysis whether a combination of support from 
both  politicians  and  bureaucrats  is  sufficient  on  its  own  to  produce  real 
democratic outcomes in a PB process; or perhaps whether one without the other 
is sufficient across cases in conjunction with, for example, the work of civil 
society actors. 
Active Civil Society Demand for PB 
Claims to the necessity of an active civil-society for truly democratic outcomes 
in  PB  are  common  to  much  of  the  literature  (see  especially  Wampler  2007, 
Avritzer 2009). Many PB scholars are sceptical of the ability of a PB to become 
institutionalised and flourish where it is implemented only from the top-down. 
There remains a tension within democratic theory between radical democrats 
and participatory institutionalists as to whether democracy can be governance-
driven (Warren 2009, Smith 2009), or whether this only reifies existing relations 
of dominance and pacifies the resistance to hegemony that is necessary for 
democracy (Blaug 2002). Both Baiocchi (2005) and Wampler (2007a) elaborate 
mechanisms whereby a vibrancy and activism within civil society can generate 
organised pressure for PB from the bottom-up. In Porto Alegre, civil society 
activists lobbied successfully not to have the participatory budgeting procedures 
enshrined legally precisely because they wanted the space to remain vibrant and 
contested.  So  is this  bottom-up  demand  necessary  for  citizen  control  of  PB 
outcomes or are there alternative paths?   
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Raw data collected for this condition include details on whether civil society was 
able to make organised and consistently strong demands invoking their rights 
to participation as a source of legitimating democratic decisions. This condition 
also takes into account not just demand but capacity of civil society within a 
municipality or region. It tries to capture information on the extent to which 
CSOs were able to organise independent of government across cases. We have 
already seen in the previous chapter that across Brazilian cases it was CSOs 
willingness and ability to use contentious politics to hold government to account 
on implementing PB projects that stood out for Wampler in ensuring the relative 
success of programmes. 
A Financial Basis to Spend 
What spending freedom does the body organising and implementing PB have 
and is it steered or constrained by external forces beyond its control? Where 
diffusion  has  occurred  across  vastly  different  political  units  with  different 
capacities  and  functions,  the  question  of  the  degree  of  fiscal  independence 
available to the instigators of participatory processes arises. The fourth and final 
condition tested for the model presented in this thesis, assesses whether PB 
programmes have or can raise sufficient funds to administer the project and 
implement outcomes of PB decisions. Where politicians, bureaucrats and/or civil 
society are committed to political reform financial constraints may negate their 
ability to achieve their goals.  
The PBs in our dataset take place in different countries with different levels of 
decentralisation and tax-raising powers among local governments and other 
subsidiary regulatory bodies. These bodies may also have different roles and 
freedoms with different welfare state models across the population of cases. In 
the early  work on Brazilian cases, the fiscal autonomy of municipal mayors, 
including especially their relative power to vary taxation, was frequently part of 
the explanation  of  successful  implementation  (Abers  2000,  Goldrank  2012). 
However formal powers do not tell the whole story here. In some cases actors 
are constrained by historical or macro-economic problems e.g. in the Brazilian 
context Recife suffered from a lack of infrastructure and resources such that it 
struggled  to  implement  infrastructure  projects  decided  on  by  the  budget 
(Wampler  2007a:  238-239).  Where  governments  have  to  constantly  commit 
funding to firefighting emergencies they are likely to suffer more pressure to  
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avoid rowing in with participatory decisions that are seen as risky; or they may 
be simply unable altogether to fund the demands of citizens. In other cases 
subsidiary bodies may have a relatively greater ability to negotiate changes in 
these circumstances. As will be explained this condition was carefully calibrated 
to allow comparison across units of different size and competence. 
5.9  Why favour these conditions over others? 
As we have seen above different researchers choose and approach cases with 
different purposes in mind. While this gives us a rich and diverse set of findings 
it can make coherent cumulation difficult but no less important. What very few 
researchers  on  PB  have  yet  come  close  to  producing  is  a  fully  specified 
typological theory for any combination of conditions of interest. That is very few 
writers discuss all of the logical combinations of their selected key conditions 
that influence or shape a PB. As I have pointed out comparison is an eternally 
ongoing process which aids conceptualisation. At this stage of development of 
scholarship  on  PB  a  transparently  constructed,  communicated  and  analysed 
property space, I suggest, can be very useful in aiding debates about what PB is, 
and when PBs are comparable.  
When  comparing  rich  data  across  a  larger  number  of  cases  some  level  of 
abstraction from the conditions used in small-N research is often (though not 
always)  required.  This  is  why  larger-N  research  can  never  replace  small-N 
research.  Nevertheless,  cumulation  has  been  undervalued.  Guided  by  the 
literature, I have specified key conditions which have been cited across studies 
as  particularly  important  in  explaining  citizen  control  or  its  absence  in 
participatory budgets. I am confident that the four conditions selected represent 
the most significant causal claims made within the general literature on PB and 
reflect field knowledge from the cases we include in the analysis. We also limit 
the  analysis  to  four  conditions  to  reduce  logical  remainders  as  much  as  is 
possible for a medium-N study.  
There are many other conditions which were considered and might be included 
in future iterations or other studies that try to cumulate knowledge to explain 
successful  participatory  processes.  The  inclusion  of  further  cases  in  the 
population would no doubt lead to further revisions and addition of conditions. 
For  the  sake  of  a  vivid  sense  of  other  candidates  I  list  some:  Size  of  a  
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municipality,  weakness  of  opposition,  relative  poverty  in  a  municipality, 
democratic performance, level of decentralisation in design, presence/absence 
of other avenues of participation, rules on monitoring of projects, partisanship 
(left or right-leaning municipality/civil society), and variances in privileges of 
organised interests.  
In at least three instances quite convincing arguments have been made in the 
case literature that suggest these variables play an important role in explaining 
PB cases but either data is currently  unavailable across a range of cases or 
conditions were not included to avoid the problem of limited diversity. First, 
Avritzer makes the case that in São Paulo, PB suffered because its decisions 
sometimes overlapped with decisions made in other power-sharing bodies such 
as Health Councils (2009: 100). While no scholar explicitly looks at the effect of 
other decision-making fora in a municipality on the success of PB other than 
perhaps Avritzer, many hint at it in different ways. Unfortunately discussion of 
this phenomenon is not rich and data on the way different bodies involved in 
governance work in practice is difficult to collect and verify without conducting 
many interviews with people on the ground. This condition also may be a good 
example  of  alternative  causation  -  the  existence  of  other  participatory 
institutions may signal experiential learning of how to do participation (‘schools 
of  democracy’)  in  municipalities  that  increases  the  chances  that  PB  will  be 
successful.  
Secondly, my construction of the participatory leadership condition takes into 
account the support for participation across the political spectrum. An important 
finding for Goldfrank was that the participatory programme in Porto Alegre was 
more successful where opposition was weakly institutionalised vis-à-vis his other 
two cases because “community organisation in Caracas and Montevideo were 
linked to either the opposition or incumbent parties, and they did not push for 
power in the new participation programmes,” (2012: 7). Nylen also considers 
partisanship  within  a  municipality  as  an  important  barrier  to  PB’s  success 
(2003b)  and  Wampler  similarly  includes  the  condition  of  ‘mayor-legislative 
relations’ as central to his comparisons. Nylen shows that even in Betim where 
the  PT  tried  to  reach  out  across  political  divides  the  result  was  relatively 
unsuccessful.   
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Opposition and partisanship on their own may be important conditions that 
explain  success  of  PBs.  These  conditions  come  close  to  satisfying  data 
availability requirements across cases.  It would not be difficult to construct a 
proxy  measure  by  investigating the historical  and  contemporary  strength of 
opposition parties in each municipality, which even without rich description of 
how this operates in practice could be powerful as a predictor of outcomes.  
Nevertheless,  these  conditions  are  not  operationalised  separately  and 
considered in this analysis.  Including a fifth condition overcomplicates and will 
induce further problems of limited diversity, and the four conditions we include 
are slightly more prevalent as explanations of outcomes across cases, especially 
outside  South  America.  It  is  sometimes  difficult  to  distinguish  the  separate 
effects of opposition, partisanship and participatory leadership in qualitative 
accounts as the leader can adapt messages to circumstances. This is why overall 
support for participation across political society is included in the calibration of 
the participatory leadership condition here. Essentially I do not conduct a strong 
test for weakness of opposition but include it as part of a higher-order construct. 
It is important to keep these factors in mind when interpreting the results of 
comparative analysis 
Thirdly and relatedly some might argue that size of a municipality and/or overall 
levels of development/poverty could mediate results of PB. In particular Pateman 
has thrown doubt over whether there is an appetite for participatory reform in 
wealthy established democracies (2012: 15). This is an important question and 
such conditions could provide ‘easy wins’ in terms of data availability given 
quantitative  measures  available.  However,  as  before  these  are  not  the  key 
concerns in the literature and may be more appropriately looked it in a larger-N 
study. 
In the end we have to cut our cloth. Avenues for expanding this analysis as a 
mode of cumulation to enable an enlarged research agenda are discussed in the 
conclusion to this thesis. 
5.10  A note on Comparison and Time 
The  final  important  factor  in  casing  and  hypothesis-formation  I  have  yet  to 
discuss is time. It is important to be clear about the time range for each case. PB 
is still an evolving phenomenon. The earliest cases began in 1989.  The cases in  
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the dataset generally represent older, more established cases of PB (at least 
where they have remained established). They are cases that were selected by 
researchers for in-depth investigation because they recognised their analytic 
value. In this dataset the time-range for each case is set by the source material. 
Some of these accounts were written some years ago, others are more recent. 
On the whole they provide enough information for a robust comparison and we 
may  want  to  make  some  modest  generalisations  from  our  findings  in  the 
direction of younger cases for which information is emerging. In some cases we 
have accounts that cover fifteen years of a practice and in others the accounts 
may cover as little as 4 years of a PB programme. Are such cases comparable in 
this format and is time a confounding factor?  
We saw in the previous chapter that Wampler highlights differences in the case 
of Porto Alegre over time. Baierle considers PB to be a very different beast after 
the 2004 elections which left the city without a PT mayor (2008). We might also 
note that in Recife, for example PB has been governed by a number of different 
mayors  from  different  parties over the  years. Not only  might there  be both 
adverse and positive effects of change but also continuity may affect PB either 
positively  or  negatively.  For  instance,  it  might  be  argued  that  participatory 
learning takes place over time allowing improvements in outcomes.  
One way to test for this effect would be to include a condition that measures 
whether a significant change in the PB took place or not. This can be interesting 
but runs into the same problems of increasing the number of conditions in the 
model  we  have  seen before.  One  might  also  consider  separating  cases  into 
different  time  periods  for  sake  of  comparability,  perhaps  by  length  of 
government terms. This is similar to the approach taken by Benoit Rihoux in 
comparing  Green  parties  in  Europe  (2006).  This  second  approach  is  also 
attractive  of  course  because  it  would  increase  the  number  of  cases  in  our 
database. The trade-off here is that casing in this way involves building in some 
prior  assumption  that  important  changes  take  place  only  at  these  times  of 
electoral change. It would be silly to say that the electoral cycle does not often 
play a role in change of, for example, political leader’s strategies but those 
changes might be equally incentivised or constrained by other forces. As we shall 
see in any case, using QCA we can return to the cases with these considerations 
in  mind  to  assess  whether  we  are  missing  a  crucial  condition  from  the 
explanation and an alternative reading of individual cases is desirable.  
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A final alternative would be to look only at the first few years of each case (e.g. 
not to consider data on influencing conditions outside the first four years). The 
question at that point becomes more one of what are the initial conditions that 
lead to successful outcomes in PBs. In reality the kinds of changes described in 
the literature are too gradual and vary in their character to allow for such strict 
cut off points. In any case many of these influencing conditions do not change 
very much over time and their initial value is sustained. However in some cases 
there can be a relative change of values over time which affects outcomes (e.g. 
leadership changes, bureaucrats becoming more sympathetic to participatory 
practices,  civil  society  focusing  its  energies  elsewhere).  Where  there  are 
significant changes over time this can lower or raise a cases membership value 
in a set. Thus it is important to take a longer-term measure of a programme 
where possible. I now go on to discuss the process of calibration that decides 
how membership values in sets are allocated. 
5.11  Calibration 
These conditions  were selected because they are some of those most often 
invoked as having an important causal relationship with the outcome in previous 
casework. Many of these conditions can be considered higher-order constructs 
of a group of less abstract conditions which are logically combined. Using fuzzy 
logic, fuzzy set memberships of higher-order constructs can be calculated with 
reference to the relationship between their base memberships – see discussion 
of calibrating ‘fiscal basis for spending’ condition below. The presence/absence 
of  conditions  in  each  case  was  evaluated  by  the  researcher  first  by  coding 
following examination of case descriptions and where possible by interviews 
with the field researcher(s) who carried out the analysis to provide robustness 
checks on the quality of the coding. Of course concepts in the social world are 
rarely crisp, they are in fact fuzzy (while they can be observed to be present or 
absent, they can also be not fully present but present to a degree). Following the 
survey of the PB literature, interviews with experienced field researchers, and an 
iterative  process  of  reflection  on  populations  and  existing  theories  of 
participatory governance, conditions are operationalised. In fsQCA this involves 
calibration. To create a measure for comparison that is conceptually valid we 
need to link the quantitative values of membership in a set with the qualitative 
standard we have of what membership of a case in that set means.  
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Calibration involves relating verbal and numerical data. Ideally calibration should 
be done after cases and conditions are selected. Calibration naturally follows 
condition selection in particular and is linked to the definition of sets. There are 
different approaches to calibration and the approach taken for calibrating each 
set will depend on the nature of data and the confidence the researcher has of 
being  accurately  able  to  attribute  qualitative  changes  in  states  to  recognise 
different levels of set membership. Nevertheless in each case we define the 
degrees  of  membership  within  the  set  in  particular  in  relation to  three  key 
breakpoints: full membership in the set (score of 1), non-membership of the set 
(score of 0) and neither more in nor more out of the set (score of 0.5, also known 
as the ‘crossover point’). Depending on how confident  we are that  we have 
detailed enough knowledge to recognise different degrees of membership we 
can  define  other  breakpoints  for  calibration  which  are  linked  to  verbal 
statements, e.g. ‘more out than in’ (0.25) and ‘more in than out’ of a set (0.75) 
(Ragin 2000: 156). 
Three  broad approaches to  calibration  are typically  used  in fsQCA.  In  many 
recent studies, conditions are defined by converting a continuous variable into 
a fuzzy set. This has become more common as quantitative researchers have 
become familiar with fsQCA techniques. The most commonly used technique for 
this is known as the ‘direct’ method of calibration. None of the four conditions 
selected in this analysis use this form of calibrating directly from an indicator 
variable but it is useful to elaborate on to understand how a fuzzy set relates to 
a variable. We might imagine also the use of this method were a future analysis 
of  this  data  to  incorporate  poverty  and/or  democratic  performance 
measurements  as  we  would  have  readymade  indicator  variables  for  such  a 
conversion. 
To give an example
54, if we had preferred to look at whether PB successes or 
failures could be explained in different ways in big or small cities we might have 
wanted to include the set of ‘Large municipalities’ as an influencing condition in 
our analysis. In this case it would make sense to take the raw ratio variable 
                                           
 
54 Ragin (2008: 89) provides a more in-depth introduction to this method of calibration than the example 
I provide here.  
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‘population’ and choose three qualitative breakpoints to convert this variable 
into a set that describes qualities of ‘large’ and ‘small’ rather than population 
figures.  
The lower threshold we choose (say population of 100,000) would signify non-
membership in the set of large cities - variation in populations below this number 
of citizens is deemed irrelevant and no case with any total population of citizens 
lower than this number could be considered in any way a large municipality. All 
such  cases  have  a  set  membership  of  0.  The  higher  threshold  (let’s  say 
population of 500,000) indicates full membership in the set. All populations of 
this number and above are large municipalities (set membership score of 1). 
Variation above the line is irrelevant to the concept we are measuring. Finally we 
would define the point of maximum ambiguity (set score of 0.5) in increasing 
population as to when a population indicates more of a small city or a large city 
(let’s say 200,000). The set membership scores for the cases whose population 
lies  between  the  three  breakpoints  can  then  be  calculated  by  various 
mathematical conversion techniques. Ragin for instance uses estimates of log 
odds of full membership as an in intermediate step in converting raw values to 
fine-grained  fuzzy  membership  (2007:  87).  However,  other  functional  forms 
could be used for this purpose and there is no clear reason why logistic ones are 
best despite their prevalence in QCA programmes (Thiem 2010). Yet the effect 
of changes of functional transformation mechanisms while measurable remains 
marginal in most scenarios – it is the qualitative definition of breakpoints that 
matters substantively (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 37). These authors also 
point to an important critique in this approach to calibration, in that it leads to 
“very fine-grained fuzzy scales, thus suggesting a level of precision that usually 
goes well beyond the available empirical information and the conceptual level of 
differentiation that is possible,” (idem). 
In contrast the method of calibration I employ, and most straightforward in 
terms  of  understanding  and  conceptual  clarity  (but  not  necessarily 
implementation), involves drawing candidly on rich qualitative descriptions in 
already  existing  casework.  Data  is  assessed  and  cases  are  ascribed  fuzzy 
membership values in the sets ‘by hand’ (membership in each set represents 
observed degree of presence of a condition). In my analysis, membership in sets  
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takes one of only eight values corresponding to the following logical verbal 
statements
55: 
1.0  - ‘Fully in’ the set  
0.83 - ‘ mostly but not fully in’ 
0.67 - ‘more or less in’ 
0.52 - ‘marginally more in’ 
0.48 - ‘marginally more out’ 
0.33 - ‘more or less out’ 
0.17 - ‘mostly but not fully out’ 
0  - ‘fully out’ 
Calibrating (coding) cases is an informative, inductive process. There is constant 
interplay  here  between  case-knowledge  and  theoretical  understanding.  On 
assessing the data and engaging in iterations of calibration it became clear that 
this 8-value set was an appropriate level of nuance in measurement given the 
data available. As I will shortly elaborate, I also devised ways of engaging field 
researchers in checking the robustness of my data.  
The first and most critical step is to define what constitutes full membership in 
the  set,  full  non-membership,  and  the  point  of  maximum  ambiguity  in 
membership
56. What does this process look like? Let us take the example of a set 
‘participatory leadership strategy’. We can start off with the concept that full 
membership  in  this  set  is  observed  where  the  instigator/overseer  of  PB  is 
                                           
 
55 It is a tempting mistake to consider this as the same process as constructing an ordinal variable. An 
ordinal variable is a ranking and not the same as a fuzzy set which is tied explicitly to at least three detailed 
statements of set membership (Ragin 2009: 126). A clear example of the difference between a fuzzy set 
and an ordinal variable is seen in the discussion of the ladder of participation in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
56 There are in fact nine gradations in each set, but the crossover point (value 0.5) is the point of maximum 
ambiguity of membership in a set. A tempting error would be to assume for convenience that a ‘hard’ 
case could have a membership score ‘halfway’ in the set. The verbal logic which ascribes to a membership 
of 0.5 in a set would be that a case is ‘neither more in nor more out’ of the set. Ascribing a case such a 
score places it in a logical limbo and removes it from the analysis. As a solution to this I have included the 
two ‘marginal’ conditions (0.48 and 0.52) to create the 7-value set, c.f. Ragin (2000: 156).  
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ideologically committed to participatory politics and to implementing PB. Thus 
full non-membership is where the instigator/overseer of PB is not ideologically 
committed to participatory politics AND is actively trying to derail or revoke 
participatory  practices.  We  have  a  number  of  cases  which  we  know  lie 
somewhere  in  between  these  points  –  when  does  a  case  look  more  like  a 
committed participatory leader and when does it look more like an uncommitted 
one? We might say to the best of our ability that the point of maximum ambiguity 
(or  crossover  point)  is  represented  when  the  instigator/overseer  of  PB  is 
committed to participatory politics only to the extent that it fits in with other 
ideological or material goals - Support for PB is present but limited and extremely 
fragmented across the governing ranks. Cases closer to the maximum from this 
point are more in and cases closer to the minimum are more out of the set. We 
can then evaluate gradations of more in or more out where appropriate given 
our knowledge of cases and data available. We might feel that there is enough 
evidence in the secondary literature and from interviews with field researchers 
to warrant relatively fine-grained fuzzy sets for the purposes of a more nuanced 
analysis or we might make do with say a 4-value set. It is important to note that 
sets may have different levels of gradation in the same analysis. For example we 
may  have  enough  information  to  make  relatively  fine-grained  distinctions 
between financial constraints by looking at spending available, but only be able 
to  make  a  crisp  dichotomous  distinction  (set  membership  value  of  1  or  0) 
between, for example, existence or non-existence of alternative participatory 
institutions if we had chosen to include that condition in our analysis. This has 
no conceptual bearing on relationships of inclusion between sets. Conjunctions 
and disjunctions are arithmetically calculated using min and max functions to 
ascertain their set membership values. 
We  then  calibrate  our  case  knowledge  to  the  comparison  we  have  defined 
conceptually. We can say that Porto Alegre would achieve a fuzzy membership 
of 1 in this set as PB was the flagship of an explicit participatory philosophy of 
the instigating party. The PT proposed a programme specifically designed to 
involve lower socio-economic groups in public policy-making venues (Wampler, 
2007a: 5); to give civil society organisations an input in making the rules of PB; 
and to increase budget transparency (idem: 126). In comparison, we know that 
in Berlin we have a mayor committed to participation at the district level but 
there is a question as to whether this justifies similar membership given that the  
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district mayor is not the only driving force in such a federal system (Rocke: 
2009). In Buenos Aires there was brief enthusiasm from those in power but this 
was  linked  to  the  political  opportunity  structure  and  the  contingent 
circumstances of the Argentine economy rather than participatory ideals only 
(Peruzotti  2009  Rodgers:  2010).  Can  we  measure  these  cases  using  the 
measurement device we have constructed? 
For the purpose I found it useful to visualise the cases on what I term fuzzy-
maps (see fig. 5-1 below).  
 
Figure 5-1 An example of a ‘fuzzy-map’ for case membership in the condition 
‘participatory leadership strategy’. 
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Researchers can be presented with the above information and asked to comment 
and critique it. This helps in the direction of confident judgements that the 
numerical values we ascribe cases make sense both in relation to the verbal 
definitions of key breakpoints in set membership, and more tacit knowledge of 
the cases themselves and how they relate.  Interplay then takes place where the 
researcher must refine the definitions of the contours of the set in light of the 
information thrown up by the cases as the difficult process of coding takes place. 
Where cases known to have important differences on the degree to which they 
display the condition are found to have proximate fuzzy membership scores, 
this may signal a need to consider redefining membership. In our example, we 
could do this, for instance, by adding the caveat that for full membership the 
instigator/overseer of PB is ideologically committed to participatory politics AND 
to implementing PB AND is willing to take risky political decisions to uphold this 
commitment; then recode cases like Berlin and Buenos Aires accordingly. What 
we seek is that the definitions of membership values will eventually make sense 
such that membership in the set is clearly calibrated to the theoretical meaning 
of the condition which we wish to test.  
I have found that these fuzzy-maps and similarly truth tables are particularly 
useful for guiding discussions with field researchers in attempting to clarify the 
conditions  of  particular  cases  with  which  they  are  familiar.  These  relatively 
simple tools hold particular promise for aiding cumulation of knowledge from 
small-N case research. Case researchers will not of course have knowledge of all 
cases that exist, and will have varying partial knowledge of some cases outside 
of their own field-research. For example most researchers who work on PB are 
au fait with the history and nuances of the Porto Alegre case. By looking at the 
cases for which they have degrees of knowledge in relation to one another and 
in relation to an operationalization of a concept itself they can engage in a 
dialogue  with  other  researchers,  bringing  together  theory  and  comparative 
knowledge at once. They can be stimulated to provide further information to 
help improve and refine the definitions that delineate the condition-set
57, and 
                                           
 
57 I was worried initially that case-researchers might react guardedly to this invitation, but I need not have 
been. It was clear that in almost all cases they saw an opportunity for their research to be extended in an 
important way. On occasions field-researchers contacted me unprompted to recommend changes, and  
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where they think there are errors with coding they can make arguments for 
change.  
This process of calibration highlights the extent to which iteration is central to 
QCA in seeking both theoretical clarity and robust measurement for comparison. 
Measurements, scales and populations are not ‘given’ as they are often seen to 
be in traditional quantitative research strategies (Ragin 2000). Yet measures can 
still be constructed which are comparable across cases and conditions, allowing 
the use of Boolean algebraic operations to uncover relationships of necessity 
and sufficiency between conditions and outcomes across cases.  And as new 
cases are added, we are often forced into reassessing the nature of membership 
for particular sets. This is nothing new as quantitative scholars have for years 
been looking at how concepts travel and can be meaningfully quantified across 
contexts. Nevertheless, by allowing these considerations at the level of medium-
N, QCA seems to provide an alternative location for robust research along the 
spectrum of trade-offs between complexity and generalisability in social and 
political research. It is not clear, therefore, that the epistemological authority of 
QCA should be any less than that of more established methods (see Rihoux and 
Lobe: 2007). 
There is a third approach to calibration I use which is merely an expansion of 
the first two. It uses algebraic combinations– the logical ‘AND’ (focusing on case 
membership of the intersection of two or more sets) and logical ‘OR’ (focusing 
on case membership in the union of two or more sets) that were introduced 
earlier - to combine sets of conditions to create more nuanced conditions. As 
such, various combinations of multiple sets can be combined to form a single 
more complex set using simple algebraic logic. 
For example, I calculate the set ‘financial basis to spend’ from two other sets, 
namely ‘independent spending capacity’ and ‘independent fundraising capacity’ 
using  fuzzy  ‘AND’.  In  verbal  language  what  we  are  theorising  is  that  for  a 
municipality to be fiscally independent it must have both independence in its 
spending decisions and its ability to raise funds. The theory is that a municipality 
                                           
 
on other occasions I was surprised to find them defending my own methods and approach against critique 
before I had a chance.  
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may have relative legal independence to vary taxation or service charges but may 
have little discretion to implement PB projects because, for example, it needs to 
pay back high-interest loans. Correspondingly a municipality or borough may 
have relatively more expenditure available but the nature of expenditure can be 
mandated externally, e.g. by another level of government. We need the theory 
to be reflected in our measures and what we are interested in is calculating cases 
membership in the intersection of these two sets. Table 5-1 below shows how 
this calibration using the intersection of sets (logical ‘AND’) plays out for a 
sample of six cases. We calculate the target set (financial basis to spend) by 
taking the minimum membership value in the two lower-order sets (Independent 
spending capacity) and (Independent funding capacity). 
Case 
Independent 
spending 
capacity 
Independent 
fundraising 
capacity 
Financial 
basis to 
spend 
Porto 
Alegre 
0.83  0.83  0.83 
Berlin-
Lichtenberg 
0.48  0.17  0.17 
Morsang-
Sur-Orge 
0.33  0.17  0.17 
Toronto 
Community 
Housing 
Corporation 
1  0.33  0.33 
Buenos 
Aires 
0.83  0.17  0.17 
Belo 
Horizonte 
0.83  0.83  0.83 
Table 5-1 shows Calibration of set membership of financial basis for spending - 
(fbs).  
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5.12  Defining sets: Minimum membership, Maximum 
membership and the Crossover Point. 
In the analysis provided in the next chapter sets have been calibrated according 
to the following criteria: 
Full membership in the set of government leaders committed to a participatory 
governing  philosophy  (later  abbreviated  to  ‘pl’)  requires  that  the  leaders 
initiating the PB have committed to participation in manifestos and speeches 
AND that their commitment is not conditional on bargaining with non-committed 
parties. Leaders make decisions to support participatory projects irrespective of 
other political actors OR supported by them. Full non-membership requires that 
the  instigator/overseer  of  PB  is  not  ideologically  committed  to  participatory 
politics; shows little interest in participation AND is actively trying to derail or 
revoke participatory practices. At the crossover point the instigator/overseer of 
PB is ideologically committed to participatory politics only to the extent that it 
fits with other policy goals. Support is fragmented across political society in a 
way that makes ongoing support for PB precarious. 
Full membership of the set of bureaucratic support for PB (bsp) requires that 
bureaucracy actively supports and engages with participatory processes AND 
those  obstructing  advances  in  participation  are  easily  removed.  Full  non-
membership  is  observed  where  bureaucrats  actively  attempt  to  derail  the 
process, lobby for reform towards other practices and concentrate resources on 
other projects. At the point of maximum ambiguity bureaucratic support for 
participation is fragmented. Some departments may support participation while 
others oppose it. There is contestation over programmes within the bureaucracy 
and support is contingent on important bureaucratic leader’s abilities to remain 
in position. 
Full membership in the set of Active Civil Society Demand for PB (csd), requires 
that civil society is robust in numbers in the municipality AND CSOs are actively 
making demands for participation AND are willing to use contentious politics to 
secure their demands. Full non-membership denotes absence of civil society 
activism OR an active civil society which is tied to more traditional relations 
between government and the public sphere. At the point of maximum ambiguity 
there is some demand to allow civil society a greater role in governance of  
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budgets but the institutional designs that civil society are interested in are not 
necessarily radically participatory ones OR civil society is extremely fragmented 
and closely tied to partisan politics and this is mirrored in disjointed support for 
PB. 
Full membership in the set of A Financial Basis for Spending (fbs) requires that 
the government unit undertaking the PB has independent control over significant 
sums of money. There is no interference from other tiers of government in the 
spending of the relevant budget AND the municipality is not overwhelmed by 
debt or  other  pressing  financial  concerns.  Full non-membership is  observed 
where funds made available for PB are paltry. This may be because the governing 
unit is overwhelmed by debt or unable to raise any funds e.g. through tax, 
charges, sales of assets. At the crossover point some money is available for PB 
processes and projects but preferences over that spending is constrained by 
decisions  taken  elsewhere  OR  PB  competes  for  funds  with  closely  related 
projects/institutions. 
In the next chapter we analyse cases’ membership in these sets in relation to 
their membership in the outcome: The set of citizen control of participatory 
budgeting (ccpb). Full membership of this set requires a logical combination of 
sustained  control  over  decision-making  AND  control  over  agenda-setting, 
including absence of co-optation in practice and opportunities for monitoring 
and accountability. Full non-membership denotes clear co-optation and a return 
to  clientelism,  leading  to  disappointment  and  participation  fatigue  among 
citizens. The agenda for participatory decisions is set elsewhere and decisions 
of the PB are only acted on where they suit governments.  At the crossover point 
important PB decisions are implemented even when they are not clearly in line 
with government aims but this takes place on a seemingly ad hoc basis - perhaps 
agendas are constrained at government level. Citizens have to act regularly to 
take action outside of PB institutions (e.g. by protesting) in order to see decisions 
implemented and hold governments to account. 
5.13  To the analytic moment (with a return ticket) 
In summary, as we have seen, there are multiple (and potentially overlapping) 
conditions that are conceptualised and operationalized by field researchers and 
employed in different  ways to explain PB outcomes. Beyond negotiating the  
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causal  milieu,  although  most  researchers  are  interested  in  explaining  an 
outcome broadly understood as empowered participatory democracy, different 
emphases are placed on redistributive justice, changes in the role of civil society 
and transparency in governance. Definition and careful scoping of research is 
crucial for accurate measurement and to lessen impacts of ‘travelling’ problems. 
The advantage of a QCA fully-worked through and presented as it is here is that 
it allows a transparent evaluation of the level of precision available in cumulating 
case-research. 
Of  course  it  is  nothing  new  for  researchers  to  have  to  explain  their  own 
understandings of key concepts and operationalize them but we are interested 
in the potential for cumulation. We should remember that the challenge for the 
social scientist is to provide parsimonious explanations of the real world but to 
make the correct choices as to what elements of that explanation are essential. 
The question is, are we using the right tools to do this and what does it tell us 
about the substantive outcomes of participatory processes? The next chapter 
provides answers to those questions. 
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Chapter 6:   FsQCA of PB worldwide part II: 
Truth tables, Boolean reduction and causal 
analysis. 
6.1  Systematic Comparison with Truth Tables 
We have seen that when connecting causes to outcomes in case-based research, 
researchers have tended to invoke the language of set-theoretic understandings 
of the social world. That is they (often unaware of the subtle differences) tend 
to speak in terms of necessary and sufficient causation rather than correlational 
causation, and in terms of conjunctural and alternative causation rather than 
additive causation (see also Wagemann and Schneider 2012). Statements of the 
kind ‘y requires x’; ‘x is effective  only in the context of a  and b’; and ‘the 
presence of a and the absence of b are sufficient conditions for y’ are common. 
As  I  implied  previously,  these  claims  are  often  absent  of  the  logical 
counterfactual analysis desirable to make them. To verify these kinds of claims 
set-theoretic analysis is required. 
In this chapter I wish to provide a first attempt to systematically cumulate the 
lessons of some of the most well-known previous work on PB using the insights 
and  tools  of  Qualitative  Comparative  analysis  (QCA).  The  data  presentation 
techniques used in QCA take centre stage. 
QCA analysis centres on the truth table, a device which serves a number of useful 
functions. Firstly it can show which empirical cases are logically identical (in 
terms  of  their  properties)  and  which  are  not.  This  can  improve  the  logical 
formation  of  typological  construction  and  require  researchers  to  think  hard 
about how comparable cases really are. Are these cases that share a truth table 
row really the same kinds of cases or are they different? Secondly it can tell us 
which types of PB (combinations of conditions) we have empirical examples of 
and  which  we  do  not.  To  make  strong  general  claims  about  necessity  and 
sufficiency we should engage in counterfactual analysis of these unobserved 
combinations. Thirdly  when  we add the  outcome condition  we can begin to 
understand which types of PB produce the outcome of interest.   
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To begin a data matrix is constructed connecting verbal understandings with 
formal logic in the form of set membership (c.f. Ragin 2000). Scores for each 
case’s membership are carefully assembled by mapping the evidence onto the 
concept as defined in the preceding chapter.  
Coding produces a fuzzy data matrix (Table 6-1) where the following verbal 
logical  statements  correspond  to  membership  of  the  case  within  the  set  of 
observations of the condition.  
1.0  - ‘Fully in’ the set  
0.83 - ‘mostly but not fully in’ 
0.67 - ‘more or less in’ 
0.52 - ‘marginally more in’ 
0.48 - ‘marginally more out’ 
0.33 - ‘more or less out’ 
0.17 - ‘mostly but not fully out’ 
0  - ‘fully out’ 
Like the fuzzy maps presented above a key advantage of this data matrix and 
the truth table (Table 6-2) is that case researchers can transparently investigate, 
contribute to and challenge the construction of a medium-N comparison. 
6.2  From the Data Matrix to the Truth Table: Direct 
Correspondence of Fuzzy and Crisp Sets
58 
A  truth  table  differs  from  a  data  matrix  in  that  each  row  in  a  truth  table 
corresponds to a logical case rather than a data record. Before looking at our 
truth  table  it  is  important  to  reiterate  and  expound  on  the  logical 
correspondence between fuzzy and crisp sets. 
                                           
 
58 The explanation of the correspondence of crisp and fuzzy sets here draws heavily on Ragin (2009).  
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Following Zadeh (1965) and Ragin (2009: 94-103) fuzzy sets directly correspond 
to  crisp-set  dichotomies.  In  crisp  dichotomies  where  A  is  present  (set 
membership = 1) the negation of A is logically absent (set membership in ~A = 
0). That is ~A = 1 – A. This formula holds for fuzzy sets. A case holds degrees 
of membership of the negation of any set to the degree that it is not a member 
of the original set.  For example the case of Morsang in the data matrix below 
has a membership value of 0.33 in the set of Active Civil Society Demand for 
Participatory  Politics  (csd).  Therefore  its  membership  value  in  the  set 
representing the absence of this civil society demand (~csd), is [1 - 0.33] = 0.67. 
Again,  with  crisp  sets,  when two  sets  intersect  a  case  is  a  member  of that 
intersection if it is an element of each one of the two sets that intersect. That is, 
a case is present in a conjunction A*B if its set membership value for set A = 1 
and value for set B = 1. If its membership in either A or B is 0, i.e. less than 1, 
then it is not a member of A*B (where either A = 0, or B = 0, then A*B = 0). The 
value a cases membership takes in a conjunction of two or more sets is the 
minimum value that it takes in each of the individual sets that make up the 
conjunction. That is A*B = min(A,B). Again this formula holds for fuzzy sets. 
Continuing with the fuzzy-set example of the Morsang case from the data matrix 
in  Table  6-1  below  we  see  that  the  case’s  membership  value  in  the  set  of 
Participatory Leadership (pl) is 0.83 and in the set of Bureaucratic Support (bsp) 
is  0.52.  Therefore  its  membership  in  the  conjunction  of  both  conditions, 
Participatory  Leadership  AND  Bureaucratic  Support  (pl*bsp)  is  0.52  (the 
minimum  of  the two  values).  If  we  wanted  to  know  the  case’s  value  in the 
conjunction of the absence of Participatory Leadership AND the Presence of 
Bureaucratic Support (~pl*bsp) we would need to calculate the negation of the 
former set and the minimum value of both, i.e. min[(1-0.83),0.52] = 0.17. 
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Case  Participatory 
Leadership 
(pl) 
Bureaucratic 
Support  
(bsp) 
Active Civil 
Society Demand 
(csd) 
Finanancial 
Basis to Spend 
(fbs)  
Citizen 
Control of 
PB 
(ccpb) 
Porto Alegre  1  1  1  0.83  1 
Betim  0.67  0.52  0.33  0.52  0.67 
Jao 
Monlevade 
0.52  0.52  0.48  0.67  0.52 
Sevilla  0.67  0.48  0.48  0.67  0.48 
Poitou-
Charentes 
1  0.17  0  0.83  0.83 
Toronto  0  0.52  0.33  0.33  0.83 
Recife  0.67  0.83  1  0.33  0.83 
Sao Paulo  0.48  0.33  0.67  0.33  0.48 
Montevideo  0.83  0.17  0.48  0.83  0.48 
Buenos Aires  0.33  0.83  0.48  0.17  0.48 
Rome  0.83  0.48  0.52  0.48  0.52 
Ipatinga  0.83  1  0.33  1  1 
Blumeau   0.17  0.17  0.33  0.67  0 
Rio Claro  0.17  0.17  0.17  0.67  0.17 
Santo Andre  0.67  0.48  0.52  0.33  0.48 
Berlin 
Lichtenberg 
0.83  0.17  0.33  0.17  0.48 
Belo 
Horizonte 
0.67  0.17  0.83  0.83  0.52 
Morsang-Sur- 
Orge 
0.83  0.52  0.33  0.17  0.33 
Table 6-1Shows a data matrix of case membership in conditions as calibrated.  
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In a crisp-set QCA each case can only be a member of one logical conjunction of 
all the conditions under observation because a condition cannot be observed to 
be  both  present  and  absent  at  the  same  time  –  this  would  be  a  logical 
contradiction.  Each  row  in  a  truth  table  represents  one  of  these  possible 
combinations  of  presence  or  absence  of  each  of  the  observed  explanatory 
conditions in an analysis. In the analysis presented here we have 16 possible 
logical  combinations  (4
2)  and  16  rows  in  the  truth  table.  Schneider  and 
Wagemann  highlight  that  “Each  row  denotes  a  qualitatively  different 
combination of conditions, i.e. the difference in cases in different rows is a 
difference in kind rather than a difference in degree” (2012: 92, emphasis in 
original). We may therefore look at the truth table and establish what kinds of 
cases our cases are and what kinds of cases we have no empirical examples of 
(logical remainders). This of course is incredibly useful information as I will again 
show,  and  the  systematic  approach  to  revealing  and  classifying  types  it  is 
overlooked by most work in comparative social science.  
The corresponding important logical property of fuzzy-sets is that each case can 
only  have  greater  than  a  0.5  membership  value  in  one  of  these  logical 
combinations  of  conditions  representing  a  truth  table  row.  Another  way  of 
saying this is that each case is a good example of only one of the ideal types 
represented by each truth table row. Fuzzy-sets allow that each case can, and 
often  will,  have  partial  membership  in  each  of  our  16  possible  logical 
combinations.  1  and  0  as  we  know  represent  the  extreme  values  of  full 
membership  and  full  non-membership  in  the  set  representing  presence  or 
absence  of  a  condition.  It  can  be  understood  that  the  various  crisp  logical 
combinations of these extreme values that we see in the truth table represent 
ideal  types  (Wagemann  and  Schneider  idem:  98).    In  the  four-dimensional 
property-space created by four conditions, each case can only be found closest 
to the vertex representing one of these ideal types. Empirical cases have partial 
membership in all kinds of logical cases but they have strong membership only 
in  one.  This  highlights  that  cruciality  of  the  conceptual  definition  of  the 
crossover point in calibration cannot be undersold. In calibrating, the researcher  
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makes an important decision as to whether a case is more in or more out of the 
set59.  
In the truth table below (Table 6-2) we can consider conditions to be present or 
absent  depending  on  whether  they  are  ‘more  in’  or  ‘more  out’  of  the  sets 
calibrated  above.  Excluding  the  row  number  which  is  used  for  reference 
purposes only, each of the first four columns from the left represent one of the 
explanatory conditions. The cells read ‘yes’ where a condition is present, while 
‘no’ signifies absence of a condition. Each one of the sixteen rows represents an 
ideal type of PB. The second column from the right indicates which cases lie 
closer to the particular ideal type of PB represented in that row than any other 
(i.e.  the  case  has  greater  than  0.5  membership  in  that  combination  of 
conditions). The final column represents the outcome condition. The cells in this 
column tell us whether cases of this type lead to the outcome, Citizen Control 
of PB (Yes), or its negation (No). Where no empirical case has greater than a 0.5 
membership value in the combination we have a logical remainder - this type’s 
relationship with the outcome is unknown. Where we have more than one case 
in a row these cases may ‘contradict’ on whether they are more in or more out 
of the set of Citizen Control of PB.  
6.3  Dissecting the Truth Table 
QCA analysis has moved in the last number of years to be dominated more and 
more  by  larger-N  and  predominantly  fuzzy-set  analyses.  While  there  is  not 
necessarily  a  problem  with this, there has been  an increasing trend to skip 
straight  from  truth  tables  (where  they  are  still  produced)  directly  to  the 
minimisation  procedure  in  a  mechanistic  fashion.  Of  course  publication 
constraints  may  have  a  bearing on this.  As  we  shall  see  consistency  scores 
provide an important advance in dealing with logical contradictions but they are 
often interpreted mechanically without much explicit recourse to theory. There 
are many bones to be picked before moving on to minimisation. 
                                           
 
59 This also is why a set-membership value of 0.5 is undesirable, see supra note 56.  
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#  Participatory 
Leadership 
Bureaucratic 
Support 
Active Civil Society 
Demand 
Financial Basis 
to Spend  
Cases  Citizen Control 
of PB 
1  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Porto Alegre  Yes 
2  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Recife  Yes 
3  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Betim, Jao 
Monlevade, 
Ipatinga 
Yes 
4  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Belo Horizonte  No 
5  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No cases   
6  Yes  Yes  No  No  Morsang-Sur-
Orge 
No 
7  Yes  No  No  Yes  Sevilla, Poitou-
Charentes, 
Montevideo 
Contradiction 
8  No  No  Yes  Yes  No cases  Unknown 
9  No  Yes  Yes  No  No cases  Unknown 
10  No  Yes  No  Yes  No cases  Unknown 
11  Yes  No  Yes  No  Rome, Santo 
Andre 
Contradiction 
12  Yes  No  No  No  Berlin-
Lichtenberg 
No 
13  No  Yes  No  No  Toronto 
Community 
Housing, 
Buenos Aires 
Contradiction 
14  No  No  Yes  No  Sao Paulo  No 
15  No  No  No  Yes  Blumenau, Rio 
Claro 
No 
16  No  No  No    No  No cases  Unknown 
Table 6-2Truth Table showing the property space - Yes = present, No = absent. Each 
row can be considered a logical case or a type of participatory budgeting. 
The Truth table is a really useful device for cumulation, both when working alone 
and in collaboration with other researchers in any field. It is useful in the first 
instance to look at the truth table without reference to the outcome and assess 
how  empirical  cases  fall  in  relation  to  key  factors.  The  truth  table  is  not 
accidently named. It lays bare the consequences of assumptions and coding in  
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constructing comparative research. The point of looking at the truth table is to 
engineer a useful dialogue between cases in a population and the concepts we 
are trying to understand; in other words between theory and evidence. 
The first point of interest is to look at the logical remainders. In the truth table 
above these correspond to five rows - 5, 8, 9, 10 and 16, respectively. It is 
valuable to ask why we do not have empirical examples of these types of cases 
in our population. It may be that we have defined our population too narrowly. 
Are we missing something or are there good reasons why such cases do not (yet) 
exist in reality - or at least have not been studied in depth? If we take row 16 we 
might say that this is a relatively easy counterfactual to explain. It is highly 
unlikely that any unit of government would even initiate PB without at least one 
of the 4 conditions we are trying to use to explain successful PB programmes.  
Taking a more difficult counterfactual, it is interesting to note that according to 
row 5 there are no cases in our population that are strong examples of an 
absence of participatory leadership, where civil society is actively pushing for PB, 
bureaucracy is supportive, and finance is available. On the face of it we might 
explain this by saying that it is often easy for politicians when they hold the 
purse-strings  to  ignore  CSO  pressure,  and  unlikely  that  bureaucracy  would 
support participation in the absence of political leadership. However we do see 
that  some  of  these  conditions  are  present  in  the  absence  of  participatory 
leadership in other cases. This suggests that it would be very fruitful to see if 
we could find a case that represents this row 5 type of PB - it becomes a very 
good candidate for identifying a case for a follow-up study. 
Secondly, it can sometimes be useful to look at rows with single cases. If we look 
at the first row we see that no case is similar in kind to Porto Alegre in displaying 
all four key conditions of interest. This may draw us to contemplate whether we 
suffer from  a  bias  in  comparisons  in a  way that  constructs  Porto  Alegre  as 
unique. It may well be unique, but then if we take some of Wampler’s cases from 
earlier we also see that the cases do not line up in couples in the same way as 
he imagines them in his analysis (e.g. Ipatinga and Porto Alegre). Remember the 
codes are drawn from evidence provided from original researchers so it is worth 
revisiting the cases in this scenario to ascertain if such differences in coding 
were warranted. In the end though, this difference most probably points to the  
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advantages  of  comparing  across  a  wider  range  of  cases,  which  requires 
reinterpretation of concepts to allow comparability in the light of new evidence. 
The final important point of interest in a truth table takes us to rows with more 
than one empirical case. Rows 3,7,11 and 15 stand out here. Taking row 7, we 
see that three PBs that take place in ostensibly very different  circumstances 
actually are similar in type according to the key characteristics of PB in this 
model. This is interesting because it challenges the idea that cultural or country 
factors are key determinants of PB (an idea that has been common elsewhere). 
It  is  a  useful  prompt  for  case-researchers  to  think  more  ecumenically  than 
perhaps they are comfortable with and consider their cases as similar to those 
looked at by other researchers with slightly different research strategies. But it 
is  only  a  challenge  rather  than  a  knockout  blow  to  assumptions  about  the 
diversity of these cases. This may indeed be a warning signal of a coding error 
and may warrant a second look at cases. Taken in tandem with the outcome, the 
truth  table  can  show  us  logical  contradictions  in  our  models.  It  is  logically 
impossible for the same combination of conditions (in isolation to all others) to 
produce a different outcome. This can inform the researcher that there is a 
problem with their model (usually that they are attempting to achieve too much 
parsimony too quickly) or that further in-depth case research is required.  A 
contradiction can indicate the absence of a key causal condition from the model 
or ask the researcher to return to the cases to ask if they are all that different in 
outcome and if so how so. While fuzzy sets allow more nuanced strategies for 
dealing  with  such  contradictions  (see  below  discussion  on  consistency 
thresholds),  it  can  be  all  too  tempting  to  move  quickly  to  these  without 
considering the potential consequences of contradictions and it may be worth 
revisiting the cases.  
The advantage and also disadvantage of a truth table is that it requires a ‘forced 
choice’ between the presence and absence of a condition. While this can be 
instructive, it can also be limiting. Presence and absence of phenomena in the 
social  world  is  almost  always  a  matter  of  degree.  Thankfully  fuzzy-set  QCA 
provides another way of coping with this in its use of consistency scores as a 
parameter of fit. Fuzzy-set memberships allow a fine-grained analysis such that 
we can look beyond small contradictions in the subset-superset relationship that 
establishes necessity and sufficiency across our cases.  
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6.4  Boolean reduction and analysis 
At this point we can use the algorithms developed for Boolean reduction to 
assess based on the cumulated evidence presented  what conditions may be 
necessary, or what combinations of conditions may be sufficient to produce our 
outcome or negate it. Explaining logically the absence of the outcome is one of 
the most undervalued and underemphasised strengths of case-based research 
designs.  
As a reminder, for necessity to be established the set of cases containing the 
outcome must be a subset of the set of cases displaying the cause. Similarly, for 
sufficiency to be established the set of cases containing the causal condition 
must be a subset of the cases displaying the outcome (c.f. Ragin, 2000: 214-
217). Logically for one condition or combination of conditions to be a subset of 
another condition its membership value (the extent to which it is observed) 
should be less than or equal to the membership value of the superset across all 
cases. As we have said in social sciences finding such a perfect relationship sets 
a very high standard. There are likely to be some inconsistencies in such a 
relationship  across  a number of  cases.  A  social  scientist  would normally  be 
willing to accept some minor inconsistencies in a relationship armed  with a 
transparent measure of fit. We can provide a measure of the extent to which all 
rows in our data matrix confirm the subset relation with an outcome and this is 
known as consistency.  
6.5  Explaining consistency60   
To give an example, the Venn diagrams in figure 6-1 below show two tests for 
necessary conditions. We can treat each of the two Venn diagrams within the 
figure as separate tests for necessary conditions for Y. On the left the condition 
X1 is a consistent superset of Y. Whenever we see Y we see X. On the right we 
see that although Y is almost always covered by X2, there is some inconsistency 
                                           
 
60 It is important to briefly introduce consistency to the reader here to aid understanding of the output. 
This  explanation  draws  on  Wagemann  and  Schneider  (2012,  chapter  5)  and  a  much  more  detailed 
explanation and discussion of the concept can be read there.  
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in the necessity relation as elements may be present in Y but not X2. A social 
scientist might however be happy to say that X2 is ‘almost always necessary for 
Y’. As outlined, it is generally more difficult to accept substantial inconsistency 
in the case of necessary than sufficient conditions. 
 
Figure 6-1 Shows two tests for necessary conditions. 
Consistency is calculated using the formulae ∑(min(X,Y ))/∑(Y) for necessity and 
∑(min(Xi,Y  ))/∑(X)  for  sufficiency.  Consistency  scores  shown  here  are  always 
calculated  across  all  cases.  The  standard  minimum  consistency  thresholds 
within the QCA literature are 0.9/0.95 for necessary conditions and 0.75 for 
sufficient conditions. When assessing contradictory sufficient relations for crisp 
sets we can only take into account the cases in that row (often 2 or a handful), 
but fsQCA allows a much larger evidentiary base by including all the partial 
memberships of each case in a truth table row in calculating sufficiency before 
coding sufficient truth table rows. Consistency thresholds effectively serve to 
avoid dismissing super-subset relations where we have ‘very few near misses’ 
across cases (Ragin 2009: 108). However appropriate thresholds will depend on 
the nature of the inquiry (theory-testing work may require a higher threshold 
than exploratory work), the number of cases, and the nature of the data. 
6.6  Necessary conditions 
In the analysis in this chapter a consistency threshold of 0.95 is used which is 
recommended given the number of cases we are dealing with (Ragin 2007). We 
also take this as a cut off for our sufficiency analysis, where it is an unusually 
high  standard,  but  reflects  the  nature  of  data  generation  which  has  been 
constructive  and  methodical.    This  means  that  we  report  conditions  or 
combinations of conditions as necessary/sufficient if the consistency of their  
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subset relation is above this threshold for that particular analysis. A coverage 
threshold of 0.5 is taken to guard against examining trivial conditions. On the 
basis of the data we have produced we can say the following
61: 
Contrary to claims in the literature there appear to be no single conditions that 
we can confidently say are necessary to produce or to negate citizen control of 
participatory budgets. No condition achieves a consistency of greater than 0.95. 
Although participatory leadership comes closest the evidence is that it is not 
always present where we see citizen control of participatory budgets. 
Condition  Necessity consistency  Necessity Coverage 
Financial basis to spend  .758  .779 
~financial basis to 
spend  .604  .747 
Civil society demand   .750  .879 
~Civil society demand  .717  .771 
Bureaucratic Support  .774  .917 
~bureaucratic support  .649  .692 
Participatory leadership  .870  .787 
~participatory 
leadership  .489  .732 
Table 6-3 Test for single necessary conditions for the outcome citizen control 
of PB. 
We can however test for disjunctions to uncover SUIN conditions, also known as 
substitutable necessary conditions. These correspond to statements of the kind 
‘either A OR B is necessary for Y’.  Logically the more alternate conditions we 
include  in  any  one  test  the  more  likely  they  are  to  reach  the  consistency 
threshold – the more conditions, the more likely  we are to find cases where one 
or  the  other  may  be  substituted  to  allow  the  outcome  to  be  caused. 
Mathematically  we  allow  new  opportunities  to  increase  the  maximum 
                                           
 
61 Analysis is performed using Dusa, Adrian, and Alrik Thiem. 2014. QCA: A Package for Qualitative 
Comparative  Analysis.  R  Package  Version  1.1-3.2.  URL:    http://cran.r-
project.org/package=QCA. Code is reproduced in appendices. 
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membership score of any case in the disjunction. Table 6-4 below reports three 
such disjunctions of two conditions that reach the threshold for consistency.  
Boolean Expression  Necessity consistency  Necessity Coverage 
Participatory leadership 
+ ~financial basis to 
spend 
.951  .748 
Participatory leadership 
+ ~civil society demand  .951  .729 
Participatory leadership 
+ bureaucratic support  .951  .782 
Table 6-4 Test for necessary disjunctions with two SUIN conditions across 18 
cases. 
Participatory  leadership  on  its  own  is  not  a  necessary  condition  for  citizen 
control  in  PB  but it is  present in  all  of these  disjunctions.  That is, in some 
circumstances where citizen control of PB is produced, bureaucratic support, the 
absence of financial spending opportunities, or absence of civil society demand 
may provide the necessary substitute for participatory leadership. This suggests 
that although participatory leadership is not alone a necessary condition for 
citizen control, the instances where it is unnecessary are relatively specific.  
6.7  Sufficiency 
What  combinations  of  conditions  are  sufficient to  produce  sustained  citizen 
control of PB? The table below provides the answers based on comparison across 
18 cases. 
Key: pl – participatory leadership, csd – civil society demand, bsp – bureaucratic 
support,  fbs  –  a  financial  basis  to  spend,  cov  –  coverage,  con/consist  – 
consistency. 
 
Causal 
Conjunciton 
Raw 
Coverage 
Unique 
Coverage 
Consistency  Solution 
Complex/ 
Intermediate 
pl*bsp*csd  0.586  0.097  0.972  0.675(Cov) 
0.976 (Con)  pl*bsp*fbs  0.578  0.089  0.972 
Parsimonious  bsp*csd  0.65  0.128  0.975  
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bsp*fbs  0.628  0.106  0.974 
0.755(Cov) 
0.978 (Con) 
Table 6-5 Sufficient conditions for the presence of the outcome citizen control 
of PB (ccpb). 
No condition on its own is sufficient to produce the outcome, confirming that 
causation is  conjunctural. We  can  also  confirm equifinality.  The above table 
shows two potential paths to the outcome. The first ‘complex’ solution involves 
no assumptions about logical remainders (the logical cases with no empirical 
examples in table 6-2 above) and is therefore more complex, including more 
conditions. It can be represented as follows: 
pl*bsp  
 

 
 

  csd+
fbs       →       ccpb            
Citizen control occurs in two distinct contexts: 
1) Where a participatory leadership is combined with bureaucratic support and 
civil society demand for participation citizens are empowered to control political 
budgets. The fiscal situation is irrelevant when these conditions are present. This 
solution is consistent across cases (consistency = 0.972). Recife and Porto Alegre 
provide  strong  examples  of  this  type  of  case.  The  solution  suggests  that 
regardless of fiscal limits, either due to constant bargaining with other tiers of 
government or a pressing need to firefight dire poverty, participatory democracy 
can  still  be  successful  when  committed  PB  leaders  work  together  with  civil 
society  and  have  bureaucratic  support.  This  is  interesting  because  it  rebuts 
claims that within successful cases the ability to spend freely is a necessary part 
of the explanation of good PB outcomes. As discussed earlier the excuse of 
‘scarce  resources’  has  often  been  used  to  wind  up  successful  participatory 
practices. It can be surmised here that where finances were tight, participatory 
leaders,  administrators  and  civil  society  were  keenly  aware  of  the  need  for 
coordinated action and this was sufficient to allow the institutionalisation of 
programmes with high levels of citizen control.  
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2) Where participatory leadership is combined with initial bureaucratic support 
and financial independence citizens are empowered to control political budgets. 
Again this finding is 97% consistent across cases and Ipatinga, Betim and Joao 
Monlevade have strong membership in this solution. The path itself tallies with 
a number of accounts based in Brazil and Europe and so confirms previous 
findings. But civil society demand for participation is irrelevant to the solution. 
This analysis bucks a clear trend in the literature – active civil society demand 
‘from the bottom-up’ is almost universally lauded and often claimed to be a 
necessary condition or a trigger for good PB outcomes. Perhaps then we should 
treat the finding with caution - all findings that challenge the literature are due 
some - but I would prefer to say that this finding shows the advantages of a more 
ecumenical cross-case comparison. We might find here succour for those who 
believe  in  the  possibility  of  governance-driven  democratisation  and  the 
possibility for emancipatory outcomes where participation is initiated from the 
top  down  (in  specific  circumstances).  It  does  highlight  an  interesting 
counterfactual question; given the relative fiscal independence and control of 
the bureaucracy the PB had in Porto Alegre, would the PB have flourished if the 
idea had come from within the party itself decoupled from civil society? Perhaps 
the problem here is that in some of the cases the PB ended up being quite 
partisan.  Addition  of  ‘partisanship/weakness  of  opposition’  condition  (as 
proposed by Nylen, Goldfrank) in a future analysis might clarify this. 
The ‘intermediate’ solution attempts further reduction by including assumptions 
about logical remainders based on directional expectation. That is, where the 
solution can be reduced by coding the outcome of logical cases for which we 
have no empirical examples; and there is a good theoretical basis for this; we 
may achieve a more parsimonious solution. Although we may have alternate 
expectations about some of the conditions, I assumed for this analysis that high 
membership  in  political leadership  contributed to the  outcome. However no 
reduction was possible on these grounds. In fact any reduction would require 
assumptions that absence of conditions contributes to the outcome here. This 
takes us to a discussion of the ‘parsimonious’ solution.  
The (most) ‘parsimonious’ solution makes assumptions about cases for which 
we have no empirical examples in order to achieve more parsimony in causal 
descriptions. It does not favour any conditions and makes the calculation purely 
based on the possibilities allowed by the mathematical algorithm. As outlined in  
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chapter 4, the conditions in the parsimonious solution are often known as the 
‘core’ conditions of solution formulae – they are conditions that will not be 
removed from the formula regardless of future observations of new empirical 
cases where we had logical remainders. In reality it tells us that if we are willing 
to countenance it, there is no empirical reason why we cannot discard political 
leadership as a necessary part of these sufficient causal recipes. Remember it 
holds from  our necessity  analysis that this  leadership  can  be substituted in 
certain circumstances. This might be worth considering in light of the Toronto 
case. In Toronto, a relatively wealthy city amongst our population, the account 
by Lerner and van Wagner (2006) suggests that the absence of participatory 
leadership was indeed an important contributor to successful outcomes. They 
say that in general “participatory budgeting emerged when staff were passionate 
and prepared” and “politicians were looking the other way,” (2006: 15). The 
Toronto case would be an empirical example of the second parsimonious type 
[bsp*fbs] but for its slightly low score on financial advantage (the process is 
hampered in achieving high membership in the set as it was conceived by the 
fact that their funding stream is controlled by another level of government). We 
may want to go back to the case and re-examine this in future.  
This section then has shown again how Boolean analysis can cumulate findings 
in a way that points the researcher in the relevant direction of cases he or she 
needs to re-examine. The method at the very least provides the channel factors 
for  the  important  dialogue  between  cumulation  of  studies  for  cross-case 
comparison and knowledge of processes within cases. 
6.8  What negates citizen control of Participatory 
Budgets? 
It is worth reiterating again that QCA allows for asymmetric causation – a key 
piece  of  added  value  is  that  it  can  provide  analysis  of  the  negation  of  the 
outcome. Are any conditions necessary for the absence of citizen control in PBs? 
Table 6-6 below shows that once again there is no single necessary condition 
that  negates  citizen  control  of  participatory  budgets.  The  absence  of 
bureaucratic support comes closest but still shows 9% inconsistency with the 
necessity super-subset relation across all cases.  
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Condition  Necessity consistency  Necessity Coverage 
Financial basis to spend  .738  .593 
~financial basis to 
spend  .725  .701 
Civil society demand   .728  .668 
~civil society demand  .868  .731 
Bureaucratic support  .630  .584 
~bureaucratic support  .910  .759 
Participatory leadership  .761  .538 
~participatory 
leadership  .699  .808 
Table 6-6 Analysis of single necessary conditions for the outcome absence of 
citizen control of participatory budgets. 
There are six disjunctions of two conditions which are necessary at the 95% level. 
These are represented in table 6-7. Where citizen control is negated within the 
ostensibly empowering PB programmes that make up our sample, one or the 
other alternate (SUIN) conditions per row is also observed. As we have seen the 
absence  of  bureaucratic  support  to  implement  participation  and  deliver 
participatory policies is not alone necessary; the alternate absence of one or 
other of the conditions that have been seen in our first analysis to support citizen 
control can often be equivalent to negate citizen control of PB.   
Key: pl – participatory leadership, csd – civil society demand, bsp – 
bureaucratic support, fbs – a financial basis to spend. 
Boolean Expression  Necessity consistency  Necessity Coverage 
~bsp + ~fbs  .978  .673 
~bsp + ~csd  .978  .686 
~pl + ~csd   .954  .704 
~pl + ~bsp  .954  .697 
pl + ~csd   .953  .571 
pl + ~bsp   .954  .556 
Table 6-7 Necessary disjunctions with two SUIN conditions for negation of the 
outcome citizen control of PB (ccpb). 
The final two rows in the list are of interest. Here participatory leadership seems 
to act as a SUIN condition. This makes some intuitive sense and seems to confirm 
that in some cases strong ideological commitment by leaders to the PB can be 
an important part of the story of failure (e.g. because the PB becomes recognised 
as partisan or politicians make promises that they simply can’t keep leading to  
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participatory fatigue and demobilisation in the long run). The sufficiency analysis 
may shed further light on this.  
6.9  Recipes to negate citizen control? What dangerous 
combinations can we recognise? 
The analysis of sufficient combinations for the negation is interesting because it 
can help highlight which combinations of presence/absence of conditions can 
signal particular dangers for those trying to design and implement ambitious 
participatory projects in different contexts. Table 6-8 provides details of these. 
 
Key: pl – participatory leadership, csd – civil society demand, bsp – 
bureaucratic support, fbs – a financial basis to spend, cov – coverage, 
con/consist – consistency. 
  Causal Conjunction 
Raw 
Coverage 
Unique 
Coverage 
Consistency  Solution 
Complex/ 
Intermediate 
~bsp*csd*~fbs            0.572      0.005  0.928 
0.861(Cov) 
0.908 (Con) 
pl*~bsp*csd           0.642     0.097      0.957  
~pl*~bsp*~csd*fbs            0.548      0.106      0.964 
pl*bsp*~csd*~fbs       0.525     0.066      0.965  
Parsimonious62 
 
~bsp*csd          0.689      0.103      0.886  
0.901(Cov) 
0.877 (Con) 
~pl*~bsp       0.654      0.147      0.943  
pl*bsp*~csd*~fbs          0.525      0.066      0.965  
Table 6-8 Sufficient conditions for the negation (absence) of the outcome 
citizen control of PB (ccpb). 
                                           
 
62 Dominated prime implicants were eliminated from these solutions (see Thiem and Dusa 2013: 43).  
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The directional expectations used to obtain the intermediate solution here were 
to assume for all logical remainders that the absence of bureaucratic support, 
absence of civil society demand, and absence of financial basis to spend would 
contribute  towards  negation  but  no  assumptions  were  made  for  political 
leadership. The intermediate solution will always be a superset of the complex 
solution and the parsimonious solution will always be a superset of both.  Once 
again the complex and intermediate solutions are no different.  
The first thing of note here is that the solution coverage is requisitely high. This 
signals that we have been able to explain a lot of the outcome (the coverage 
score is somewhat analogous to the R
2 measure of fit in correlational analysis). 
Solution coverage measures how much of the outcome is explained by all of the 
causal conjunctions together. Raw coverage indicates how much of the outcome 
is  covered  (explained)  by  that  particular  causal  recipe.  Unique  coverage 
measures the extent to which the outcome set is uniquely covered by a solution 
formula, i.e. the extent to which cases explained are not overlapped by another 
explanatory set.  
The complex solution can be factored and written as follows: 
~bsp*(csd*~fbs  +  pl*csd  +  ~pl*~csd*fbs)  + 
pl*bsp*~csd*~fbs       →     ~ccpb  
And the parsimonious solution: 
~bsp*(csd + ~pl) + pl*bsp*~csd*~fbs   →  ~ccpb 
Perhaps  most  interestingly,  strong  participatory  leadership  and  bureaucratic 
support  can  contribute  to  negate  participatory  outcomes  where  they  are 
combined  with  a  lack  of  financial  basis  for  spending,  and  low  civil  society 
activism (blue section of solution formula). This multifinality of political and 
bureaucratic support may seem odd to begin with but we might imagine that 
committed participatory leaderships which encounter tough financial times with 
little  civil  society  demand  may  be  heightening  expectations  and  promising 
projects they cannot deliver. Morsang-sur-Orge has high membership in this  
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conjunction and is a particularly good example of this. While the municipality 
committed its resources relatively strongly to the participatory institution, a lack 
of organised civil society activism and a relative lack of freedom to spend money 
on really substantial projects provided conditions that incentivised co-optation. 
Consensus could be easily “constructed…by excluding all alternative proposals 
and by framing the debate in such a way that only a minimalist solution, decided 
beforehand by the organising board, could be agreed upon,” (Talpin, 2011: 51).  
This complex path cannot be reduced by including logical remainders. It holds 
in the parsimonious solution. In other words we can be relatively sure that none 
of  these  conditions  may  be  found  to  be  irrelevant  to  this  conjunctural 
explanation of the absence of citizen control in the light of empirical studies of 
new kinds of cases. The finding is not affected by the limited diversity of our 
empirical evidence. However, this is not to say that we could not come across 
further cases that disputed this finding directly. A case that is a strong example 
of the property type represented by row 6 in the truth table (table 6-2 above), 
and involves citizen control, now becomes an excellent candidate for a deviant 
case study. This exemplifies one of a number of ways in which QCA can implicate 
a fruitful return trip to cases. 
As can be seen in the factored solution formulae, that conjunction is the only 
occasion where the absence of bureaucratic support does not appear as an INUS 
condition for the absence of citizen control of participatory budgets. This lack 
of bureaucratic support interacts with three separate conjunctions to ensure that 
citizen control is negated. Two of these solutions have relatively high unique 
coverage  suggesting  the  added  empirical  weight  of  being  good  unique 
explanations  of  more  than  one  case.  The  most  complex  of these;  the third 
complex causal conjunction from the top in table 6-8 above; tells us that where 
real participatory leadership from politicians, bureaucratic buy-in and active civil 
society demand for participation are all absent,  and participatory budgeting 
programmes still have relatively high amounts of money to spend, then citizen 
control is negated.  
Remember  this  finding  holds  across  all  the  partial  memberships  in  these 
conditions for all our cases but there are cases  which are particularly good 
examples of the ideal type. The two cases that are good examples of this causal 
recipe are Blumenau and Rio Claro – recalling Wampler’s cases of ‘emasculated  
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participatory democracy’ described in chapter 4. In fact, as long as we allow for 
the  slight  differences  in  calibration  and  some  conditions  between  the  two 
analyses, this causal recipe is quite close to the one that was found to have the 
highest unique coverage when we looked at Wampler’s five conditions over ten 
cases (see first row of table 4-8). At that time we could only be sure that the 
absence of mayoral support was a core condition of that sufficient conjunction. 
However  with  the  benefit  of  more  cases  the  parsimonious  solution  that  is 
congruent  with  that  complex  solution  [~pl*~bsp],  shows  that  we  cannot 
eliminate the absence of bureaucratic support from this explanation any longer.  
Much of this is down to having been able to populate row 7 of the truth table 
(table 6-2) above with cases (Sevilla, Poitou-Charentes and Montevideo) which 
have diverging outcomes. This again shows the advantages of cumulation to 
reduce underdetermination. Whether this more parsimonious combination alone 
suffices  to  explain  the  ‘emasculated’  cases  or  whether  relative  wealth  and 
absence of CSO contributions are important elements of the story remains a 
question for theoretically-informed counterfactual analysis. 
We  further  see  two  complex  conjunctions  whose  parsimonious  root  is  the 
absence of bureaucratic support combined with the presence of civil society 
demand  for  participation  [~bsp*csd].  Of  the  two,  the  extension  of  this 
conjunction to include again the presence of participatory political leaders as an 
INUS condition displays by far the higher coverage. It suggests that when an 
initially unconvinced bureaucracy runs up against a demanding civil and political 
society, entrenchment may occur spoiling the chances of participatory gain. Belo 
Horizonte has a relatively strong membership in this solution and this seems to 
tally in particular with Brian Wampler’s description of the case; although there 
was some success in the case, full citizen control was negated (2007). The best 
examples  of  these  conjunctions  are  Rome  and  Santo  Andre  where  the 
parsimonious conjunction is combined with participatory leadership but also a 
relative absence of financial freedom. We cannot yet discount the importance of 
financial  constraint  in  explaining  this  entrenchment  without  careful 
counterfactual hypotheses.  
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6.10  What does this tell us about participatory budgets? 
We will return to the implications for wider debates in the closing chapter but 
there  are  some  salutary  lessons  in  the  output  generated  from  cross-case 
comparison for scholars of participatory budgets. The analysis here makes no 
hegemonic claims and attempts to caution some of the stronger claims outlined 
in previous literature. There are no single necessary or sufficient key conditions 
that explain or negate citizen control in participatory budgets. There is in fact 
clear  and  considerable  equifinality  and  multifinality  to  be  observed  in  the 
relationships between conditions and outcomes across cases.  
That is not to say that we have not made some advancements to explaining what 
exactly may cause citizens to play meaningful, empowered roles in innovative 
participatory institutions. Across our cases citizen have meaningful control of 
the participatory process where bureaucratic support is combined with either 
the  financial  conditions  to  implement  the  programme  or  active  civil  society 
demand for participation. The empirical evidence suggests that only in highly 
unusual cases would political leadership be unnecessary in conjunction.  
There  is  however  one  unusual  but  extremely  clear  circumstance  where 
established support among political leaders and bureaucrats for participatory 
democracy will lead to a failure of citizen control – that is where finance cannot 
be raised or released to implement the programme properly  and active civil 
society demand for a proper process is absent. So while we have shown that top-
down democratisation seems possible in certain circumstances even without civil 
society’s  strong  hand  in  the  process,  we  would  be  foolish  to  rely  only  on 
committed  elites  if  we  wish  for  real  democratic  outcomes  in  institutions  of 
participatory governance. However in most cases where participation becomes 
manipulatory or tokenistic the absence of bureaucratic support for the process 
plays a role. Manipulation seems certain where this is combined with either the 
absence of strong support from the political echelons overseeing the process or 
the presence of active demand for radical participatory reform from civil society. 
The empirical evidence again suggests that in the latter case the presence of 
demand  from  politicians,  combined  with  demand  from  CSOs  when  the 
bureaucracy  is  not able to  come  on board  is  sufficient to  produce negative 
outcomes. It is possible that the demand here outstrips capacity leading to policy 
failure but it would require going back to good examples of this type such as  
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Rome and Santo Andre to see if a process that links these conditions can be 
untangled and such a relationship established. This once more highlights the 
importance of a dialogue between cumulative and logical cross-case analysis, 
theory-dependent reasoning and in-depth case studies. 
All in all we see that we can uncover parsimonious explanations of participatory 
processes in a relatively transparent manner which would be difficult for any 
researcher working alone with a few of their own case-studies to parse out. This 
can  result  in  some  useful,  moderate  generalisations  based  on  cumulated 
evidence.  The  next  chapter  discusses  finally  the  implications  for  practical 
application  of  these  findings  by  actors  interested  in  improving  democratic 
innovations in the real world, and implications for future research. 
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Chapter 7:   Systematic Comparison of 
Democratic innovations: Prospects and 
Conclusions 
7.1  Looking back before looking forward 
In this thesis I have focused on Participatory Budgeting, a well-known type of 
democratic innovation, and tried to trace the development of comparative work 
on  PB  as  the  innovation  has  diffused  and  as  knowledge  of  the  field  has 
developed. I was motivated by interest in trying to help figure out under what 
circumstances citizens involved in programmes designed to engage them in 
governance gain meaningful control of important collective decisions. I have 
shown that as the field of democratic innovation and in particular participatory 
budgeting matures, significant steps have been take in the direction of a more 
systematic comparison. More fundamentally I wanted to know if there were new 
improved  ways  comparative  political  scientists  could  understand  innovative 
public policies in an era of rapid diffusion and adaptation and build on small-N 
case-based research. 
The second half of the thesis presented and discussed practical issues involved 
in  undertaking  advanced  qualitative  comparative  analysis  allowing  an 
assessment of the value and potential of cumulating existing knowledge using 
systematic formal logic. My aim was never to undercut other approaches. Neither 
do I wish to engage in methodological fetishism. The value of robust and general 
findings is that they can allow relevant actors – civil society activists, political 
leaders and even academics to plan their actions with a degree of confidence in 
the lessons of evidence. I provide some modest but notable findings and employ 
a complementary tool of analysis that should be of use to those interested in 
furthering our knowledge of participatory budgeting. 
I conclude here by outlining four key findings. The first is I show that (fs)QCA is 
a  relatively  effective  tool  for  cumulating  and  systematically  reviewing  the 
evidence of previous research. QCA can be used to remove redundant elements 
of causal claims or identify oversimplification. The second is that contrary to 
what is implied by much of the previous literature on the topic of PB, there is no  
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single  necessary  causal  condition  which  explains  successful  citizen  control. 
Instead cross-case comparison provides some specific combinations which may 
alternatively produce good outcomes. Instigators and adopters of participatory 
programmes should think about the contexts in which they innovate and what 
we know works in such contexts. The third is that QCA can be used to identify 
the  best  candidates  for  future/further  in-depth  case-studies.  QCA  is  a 
particularly useful tool for aiding further development of a field of study and 
outlining what is at stake when scoping concepts. Finally I claim that QCA can 
be usefully combined with Large-N correlational research strategies. 
7.2  Comparison and Cumulation 
The  question  of  comparability  of  cases  is  one  that  constantly  troubles 
researchers in the emerging field of democratic innovations. That inquisition is 
a good sign. We do not want to compare apples with oranges unless we are 
talking about fruit. Lijphart notes that comparative politics makes progress “as 
a result of the efforts of the field’s innovators to fashion universally applicable 
vocabularies of basic politically relevant concepts,” (1971: 686), and as Mill put 
it  the  “general  conception  is  itself  obtained  by  a  comparison  of  particular 
phenomena,” (1950: 298). The most transparent way to know the relevant level 
of  abstraction  at  which  phenomena  are  comparable  without  resorting  to 
conceptual stretching is to examine and list their key properties and compare 
them. This basic method of identifying the intension and extension of a concept 
should be no different for social or physical scientific research. What is different 
in social research is that the observation of these characteristics is more usually 
a  matter  of  degree  or  uncertainty  in  the  social  world.  This  difference  in 
certainties should not hamper efforts unduly. When it is more difficult to pin 
down and clearly observe these characteristics, especially in the early stages of 
phenomenological  development,  in  order  to  progress  our  understanding  we 
need  to  cumulate  knowledge  systematically  by  comparison.  A  cumulative 
comparison can be conscious of the accuracy of conceptual delineation. In other 
words  we  require  a  research  agenda  that  marries  sensitivity  to  theory  and 
conceptual clarity, with sensitivity to accuracy in observations of practices, and 
with sensitivity to appropriate methods of inferential comparison. My work here 
suggests that a QCA approach can plug some gaps in such a research agenda.  
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I attempted to harness the strength of previous casework and cumulate that 
knowledge to try to provide a more parsimonious statement about what causal 
processes are at work in a sample of some of the most well-known and well-
studied cases of PB. My analysis suggests that there are no clear necessary 
conditions  for  empowered  governance  by  citizens  in  PB.  Under  specific 
circumstances the participatory leadership and civil society demand often lauded 
as  necessary  can  be  irrelevant  to  explanations  of  empowered  participation. 
Moreover, a political commitment to participatory politics is only a sufficient 
condition for good outcomes in combination with bureaucratic capacities and 
either civil society support or financial freedom. Designers and adopters may 
note  that  it  is  either  of  these  combinations  that  have  been  consistently 
successful.  Later I  showed that  where  programmes have  failed to empower, 
explanations have hinged on the absence of bureaucratic support combined with 
either the absence of political leadership committed to participation or active 
civil society leads. However, causation is multifinal. Again designers/adopters 
should beware that political leadership and bureaucratic support can be the 
foundation of undesirable outcomes where civil society participation is absent 
and funds are lacking. The next sections will discuss the consequences of these 
findings  for  methodological  approaches  in  the  social  sciences  and  for  the 
prospects of putting a more democratic politics into practice. 
7.3  QCA and the middle road 
As expressed by Ragin, “The problem is not to show which methodology is best 
but to explore alternative ways of establishing a meaningful dialogue between 
ideas and evidence,” (1987: viii). In first half of this thesis I outlined that a 
qualitative  comparative  medium-N  analysis  is  only  one  of  a  number  of 
complimentary research strategies. It is not a middle-road that gives ‘the best of 
both worlds’. But it is a middle-road less travelled by. A QCA approach can 
encourage  researchers  not  to  be  afraid  of  interplay  between  induction  and 
deduction united with a theoretical framework that is sufficiently anchored but 
comfortable  with  floating.  The  discipline  of  the  QCA  approach  is  that  it 
incentives  real  concern  with  problematisation  of  concepts  and  qualitative 
variation, at the same time as concerns about replicability, logical calculation 
and extrapolation.   
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QCA on its own can only ever be a useful part of a broader research agenda. It 
is particularly good as I have shown in both chapters 4 and 6 at highlighting 
overly  parsimonious  or  complex  claims  and  highlighting  areas of  remaining 
uncertainty across cases. Using QCA we can highlight cases that need further 
ethnography or highlight conditions which need to be tested across a larger-N, 
perhaps through systematic correlation using more accessible proxies.  
I  have  shown  that  a  procedure  that  uses  systematic  Boolean  logic  when 
constructing research design can be useful to derive typologies similar to the 
method which was envisaged by George and Bennett (2005: 257) – using key 
characteristics and logical cases as the building blocks to identify types of a 
phenomenon rather than focusing on theory and ideal types before working back 
to  empirical  cases.  Of  course  this  juxtaposition  is  one  of  degrees  and  not 
absolutes as one never operates in a theoretical or empirical vacuum. Mapping 
a property space using a truth table as in table 6-2 is the first step in prompting 
investigation of strategies for further research. The truth table instantly allows 
observation of what cases we have examples of and which we do not. I identified 
that  there  were  no  empirical  examples  of  a  combination  of  an  absence  of 
participatory  leadership,  where  civil  society  is  actively  pushing  for  PB, 
bureaucracy is supportive, and finance available in my sample. Future empirical 
research could then be guided in the direction of finding an instance of such a 
case (given that 2800 cases of PB have been identified and few of these have 
been  studied  closely).  The  finding  also  prompts  thought  experiments  and 
theoretical work which can try to explain why we do not have empirical instances 
of such a combination and of other combinations of key factors. For instance 
explanations might involve assessing whether the absence of these instances 
may  be  a  symptom  of  underlying  power  structures  or  biases  in  conceptual 
approaches. 
Armed with the truth table and further with Boolean comparative analysis we can 
identify more useful strategies for further case-level research. In our analysis of 
the negation we found one conjunction which could not be minimised by Boolean 
reduction even using logical remainders. Cases that would depart from that 
finding can now be highlighted as excellent candidates for a deviant case-study.  
My  identification  of  avenues  for  the  most  appropriate  ‘new’  case-sudies 
supplements  Schneider  and  Rohlfing  (2013,  2014)  who  have  documented  a  
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number of sophisticated ways of highlighting cases within a QCA analysis which 
require further attention and can improve claims of causal inference. I show that 
as a phenomenon develops QCA can provide an effective method for efficiently 
channelling future research in fruitful directions. I also highlight cases which 
may be fruitfully revisited as a result of findings here. Armed with complex and 
parsimonious solutions a researcher or group of researchers may engage in 
efficient and effective iteration between concepts and measurement.  I asked 
whether the findings in chapter 6 suggest that I placed too much emphasis on 
formal financial freedoms and if this emphasis resulted in coding the Toronto 
case in the wrong type. We may want to go back to the case to find out. Similarly 
we might ask whether the findings in chapter 4 suggest that a researcher like 
Wampler could go back to the cases and think again about whether participatory 
leadership was really a necessary part of every sufficient combination for good 
outcomes?  
Finally  I  have  also  highlighted  that  QCA  can  provide  insights  into  which 
correlational, large-N analyses could improve our understanding of processes at 
case level. In chapter 4 we saw that it might be useful to ask whether certain 
kinds of cases are more likely to occur where cities have higher HDI and fewer 
participatory institutions. It may be that these variables are better predictors of 
certain types of PB and/or outcomes. In both cases it might be easier than in 
those of the conditions we have looked at above to create relevant and easily-
accessible proxies or gather data for large-N comparison – but this only provides 
an opportunity rather than a justification for undertaking such work. Wampler’s 
claim that cities with higher HDI will have a firmer financial base, broader CSO 
activity  and  be  more left-leaning,  if  confirmed  by  correlational analysis  may 
suggests that certain types of successful PB are more likely to occur than others. 
Such a finding may force re-evaluation of the empirical weight of some of our 
claims across 18 cases here. Similarly  we might also test the importance of 
Avritzer’s  claims  regarding  multiple  venues  for  civil  society  interaction  with 
government by looking at how the number and type of participatory institutions 
are  related  across  municipalities.  This  might  tell  us  whether  the  nature  of 
alternative venues matters for future conjunctural analysis. 
Perhaps  though  the  key  methodological  contribution  to  the  problems  of 
comparing innovative practices is that of cumulating knowledge in a way that is 
systematic yet sensitive to qualitative case-research. This has not been tried  
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before in the field of participatory innovation. QCA seems a good method for 
systematically reviewing the best evidence we have on a given phenomenon. The 
approach I take is transparent in its construction but the analysis is replicable 
and can be added to by future research. I have even shown that the logical 
approach that QCA provides could be effectively utilised by researchers studying 
a small number of cases in order to check whether their conclusions rely too 
much on intuition. 
Yet  many  things  remain  unclear.  There  may  be  a  worry  that  constructing 
research in the way I have done still falls foul of subjectivity – an unsympathetic 
critic might say it tries to mask uncertainty and subjectivity behind a veneer of 
unfamiliar language and mathematical operations. I think that would go too far; 
I certainly thought hard about whether I was sterilising qualitative research, but 
I cannot make any special claims to have interpreted raw materials any more 
objectively  than  another  capable  social  scientist  might.  Moreover,  I  always 
rearranged  case’s  memberships  according  to  the  requests  made  by  case-
researchers. There is a danger that case-researchers are already biased by the 
paradigms of the field and therefore that their considered judgements are less 
reliable than raw data. Building on the fuzzy maps, I would in future like to 
develop  tools  which  may  allow  crowd-interaction  among  researchers  while 
sorting and discussing case-calibration with swift recourse to the evidence. In 
the  end  it  will  require  further  engagement  with  QCA  among  researchers  to 
answer to some of these questions. 
The thesis would seem to recommend then much greater use of QCA in the 
future. QCA delivers insights – it gives us robust results that are of a different 
quality to results otherwise obtained. The catch is that it needs to be applied 
with an awareness of its limitations and an appreciation for signals that prompt 
future  research  using  complementary  strategies  and  tools.  QCA  researchers 
would not want to fall into trap of bending questions to fit the method.  
7.4  Expanding Comparison across Democratic 
Innovations 
At one point the idea for this thesis was to compare a number of different types 
of  democratic  innovation  to  see  if  they  were  capable  of  achieving  similar 
democratic outcomes in different ways. I was interested in testing hegemonic  
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claims  about  what  kinds  of  democratic  innovation  best  achieve  democratic 
outcomes (e.g. Fishkin 2009) with claims that plural approaches to democracy 
may achieve comparable combinations of democratic goods (Smith 2009). In the 
end I narrowed the scope of comparison to look only at participatory budgets. 
My  analysis  of  key  factors  that  have  been  used  to  explain  democratic  PB 
outcomes suggests that they are characterised by multifinality and equifinality. 
The successful cases here can in some instances confirm or deny a number of 
‘competing’ theories of democracy and governance all at once. Yet as I have 
detailed above, even a ‘within-type-of-innovation’ comparative design ran up 
against  dilemmas  in  achieving  relevant  comparability  across  cases.  If  the 
question  ‘Would  this  work  over  more  dissimilar  designs?’  were  posed  my 
unequivocal answer though would be yes. If anything we seem to be biased as a 
social research community to lay the burden of proof such that the comparativist 
must prove that two or more cases are comparable rather than incomparable. 
For comparativists there is a certain pressure not to compare ‘the incomparable’; 
to narrow the scope of their research and to favour case-based research on most-
similar systems. While there is much rationale in these ideas they should not 
dominate at the expense of more ecumenical or abstract comparisons that seek 
answers to interesting questions. It is by regularly comparing across cases we 
actually find out how far apart things are (and challenge received wisdom in a 
changing world). 
There has been a little ink spilt over questions of what is or is not a minipublic 
(Fishkin 2009, Ryan and Smith 2014) and Warren speaks of possibly over 100 
named processes of governance-driven democratisation (2009). The pressure to 
innovate can lead so-called innovators to be keen to distinguish this or that 
invention. There is a worry that incentives for action in such a direction come at 
the expense of replication of best practice across cases. It is essential that when 
we build a field of research as social scientists we too are aware of biases that 
work to privilege methods that highlight the uniqueness of events. For this we 
need methods that cumulate research in a way that is sensitive to holistic case-
research and ideally involves bringing case researchers together efficiently to 
produce robust research. QCA approaches are at least relatively transparent in 
their operationalisation of concepts and the ways in  which they are seen to 
transverse. We should look for methods that can supplement such an approach.  
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There are also opportunities now to build on the knowledge provided by this 
thesis and see if the findings that hold for PB also hold across DIs. Further work 
might also be able to apply some of the time-sensitive QCA methods above to 
test sequencing of democratic innovations and/or the use of technology in DIs. 
There may also be interesting opportunities to cumulate holistic case-research 
to explain death and resurrection of participatory projects.  
7.5  Making participation work 
Democratic theorists have been prone to hegemonic claims about whether mass 
participation  can  or  can’t  work  in  this  or  that  context.  I  have  shown  that 
successful participation is not a matter of absolutes but a matter of context. This 
is not to introduce ‘matter of degree phraseology’. It may be that ‘competing’ 
theories  of  democratic  empowerment  are  in  fact  not  really  competing  but 
explaining different specific contexts without the adequate description of their 
key conditions. Only through comparative analysis can we iterate between these 
claims effectively. 
PB can’t fix everything even at a local level and as explained in the first chapter 
it  is  somewhat  beyond  the  scope  of  this  thesis  to  consider  whether 
transformatory outcomes towards a participatory public culture may be possible 
as a result of such innovation. However it is a significant innovation and does 
drive us further in that direction. Many participatory experiments will fail. What 
I  have  tried  to  do  is  show  the  contexts  in  which  important  conditions  will 
combine to explain this failure or to explain success. 
Policy-makers will want to take note of the evidence. Even where implementers 
have strong support within their government and their executive agencies for 
participatory programmes without the support of civil society or with finance 
tied up in other agencies/levels of government, the evidence suggests they will 
fail. However if they overturn one of those conditions that should be sufficient 
to ensure success.  
7.6  Conclusion 
This thesis does two things that are not fashionable but are really important. 
Rather than search for further ‘unique’ examples of public policy innovations in  
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the field it tries to bring together existing research and in the end provides 
unique insights that can only be found through such a procedure. Secondly it 
produces research in a way that it can be added to transparently and easily 
replicated. In fact it tries to replicate some previous analyses testing them with 
a new method. I would welcome wholeheartedly on-going critique from case-
researchers and others as the point of this work is to prompt it.  
Democratic theorists have been prone to hegemonic claims. And we have an 
ever-increasing bank of case-material on democratic innovation but with few 
attempts  to  cumulate  or  even  relate  some  of  that  work  systematically. 
Disagreements  about  the  role  of  theory,  approaches  to  classification  and 
inference and appropriate levels of measurement/abstraction are not going away 
anytime  soon,  but  approaches  that  are  sensitive  to  the  nature  of  these 
disagreements are very fruitful. This thesis should push the scholarly community 
in the direction of basing future conversations about how we can gain holistic 
knowledge of when participatory politics can be institutionalised on cumulated 
comparative evidence.  
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Appendix A – Interview Transcript 
Appendix  A  provides  an  example  of  an  interview  transcript  taken  from  an 
interview with Anja Rocke 13/12/2010. The interview schedule has been used 
to interview field researchers in the first instance. The questions can also be sent 
in the form of a survey. Ethics approval for this research was received, Ref: 
SOC201011-18/25th November 2010. 
 
The Case: Poitou-Charentes 
Now  are trying to  establish  second-round for representatives to  come  together  to 
establish priorities across high schools – meetings only in single high schools at the 
moment. 
EXPLANTORY CONDITIONS 
1. Role of civil society  
1.1. Was civil society particularly vibrant prior to PB?  
- Was there a history of activism within CS in the municipality? 
- Were civil society actors involved in organised protest? 
- could mention radicalism or strength of a union 
A: Special case. High school. ‘No’ civil society ...high school community...formal bodies 
of  representation  that  exist  within  every  school  that  make  other  decisions...2006 
student  movement  in  France  against  a  reform  proposal  by  the  national 
government...but no direct link to this... I wouldn’t think that it is related... young 
between 13 and 17, some active in little sport clubs...but this question a bit difficult to 
answer...clear top-down institutionalisation...small group in regional administration had 
to convince the directors of high schools...over the years more active students already 
representatives went to the evaluation meetings organised by regional staff but no 
original bottom-up pressure. 
1.2 Did the pressure for PB come from within civil society?  
 
2. Governing strategy 
2.1 to what extent was PB central to the governing strategy of political leaders?  
- i.e. was it central to manifestos, speeches, policy documents, etc...think of 
examples  
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A: Yes definitely (was) probably a case in Europe Comparative/relative where this point 
is really strong. They really had the conviction that they wanted to implement this 
participatory democracy idea, strong. Evidence in electoral program and speeches. 
- was the strategy instrumental or ideological 
A: Too hard to say/separate it is both may leave out 
2.2 To what extent was PB supported across the governing party or coalition? 
2.3 To what extent was PB supported across the other political parties in the locality? 
-  did  you  see  active  hostility  from  other  parties  to  PB  and/or  participation 
generally 
A: Initially big scepticism among many politicians and regional staff. Members of 
governing party had to be convinced because people power not mainstream in 
France. From what I heard, yes bargaining and persuasion were used. 
But Segolene was present so could do what she wanted with her majority...not 
an idea to set up a process that would run against al kinds of political enemies 
from the outset tried to convince all of goods 
2.4 Were other agencies (e.g. national government, World Bank) involved in promoting 
PB in the locality? 
 
3. Fiscal independence 
3.1 To what extent did political leaders have fiscal independence?  
– i.e. how much control did they have over their own budgets;  
- were they able to direct revenue towards PB without the interference of other 
actors and/or raise local revenue (taxation)?   
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A: Regional level- Quite a new territorial entity in France - decentralisation since 80s. 
2004 new law with further competences for regions including high schools. No specific 
budgetary constraints. Pot of money region can spend on high school. Responsible for 
maintenance of buildings, infrastructure but not salaries of teachers. 
4. Bureaucracy 
4.1 How did the bureaucracy react to the introduction of PB?  
A:  Many  problems  for  a  couple  of  years.  Used  to  former  system.  Majority  didn’t 
understand why they needed this new system, ordinary citizens without expertise ...lots 
of scepticism...leading figures that she mentions in thesis organised this and a little 
group just dealing with this process along with the civil servants working out costs. A lot 
of internal meetings organised to work through problems. Dialogue.  
4.2 Were political leaders able to reorganise the bureaucracy to better support PB 
A: Administration became more transparent having to explain technical choices...one 
technical member had to be present to explain how a project would stand...took more 
than a year to realise projects because of decisions at the start about who was aware or 
accountable for decisions (e.g. architecture dept.) etc. In a later phase two departments 
were merged into one with a key supporter becoming director of these with a strong 
impact on administration. Organisational restructuring for effectiveness a by-product of 
the initial intentions 
4.3 Did the attitude of the bureaucracy change over time? 
A: Yes it is partially a question of hiring new people see above. A former director left for 
unofficial reasons because he was anti and couldn’t establish his reasoning so more 
convinced and partial adherents of a participatory strategy/idea replaced them. Others 
change via convincing, deal with their remaining scepticisms and cope 
Capacity to organise? 
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5. Broader participatory initiatives 
5.1 Was PB the first major participatory initiative in the locality?  
5.2 Were other participatory initiatives running at the same time as PB and what was 
their relation to the PB? 
  - avenues... 
A: Ateliers. Royale sole instigator of new style...during the election she organised public 
meetings - not sophisticated participation but...in her election mentioned citizen juries 
but started with PB no others...but then once this was done other initiatives, some 
citizen juries. European deliberative poll project with Tuscany and Spain. New officer 
dealing with participatory initiatives and establish policy orientation... 
No crossover. Parallel processes no common participatory strategy across instructions. 
OUTCOMES  
1. Finances 
1.1 How significant were the sums of money that went through PB? What proportion of 
the budget? 
  - relative terms 
A: This was in thesis clearly enough so I didn’t push on it. 
2. Democratic engagement 
2.1  To  what  extent  was  there  democratic  control  over  resource  allocation  by 
participants in the PB?  
A: They could decide about this 10% of the overall budget. 10 million per year for all high 
schools. Main message in the beginning practically this meant that each school could 
finance top 3 priorities. 150000 limit per project. People decided directly about these 
projects.  Had  informal  accountability  they  could  ask  in  meetings  about  unrealised 
projects. Every year evaluation through questionnaire and informal influence. Some  
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projects couldn’t be financed but got them on agenda so regional parliament decided in 
some cases e.g. something too expensive for PB project they would take this up for the 
budget. 
  - was there evidence of cooption? 
A: In some cases teachers were trying to influence or director but it is a public meeting 
with regional admin rep and politician so reasonable standards meant there couldn’t be 
open manipulation. One man one vote. Students have more votes than professor or 
director so needed good arguments ... some meetings smaller more teachers than 
students. 
2.2 Was PB organised to engage all citizens or was it more partisan (i.e. only towards 
groups supportive of the governing party)? 
A: Numbers in text quite high 7% or so usually less than 1% in an institutionally organised 
participation but context of high school can send invitation to every parent etc. and 
sometimes students were obliged and controlled by signing in if this was held during 
school hours but not everywhere. 
2.3 Did PB aim to engage citizens or organised interests (or both)? 
2.4 To what extent do citizens have oversight of the implementation of PB projects? 
 
And finally… 
 
Are there any other factors we haven’t discussed which you think helps explain the 
emergence of PB? 
 
A: Political initiative and wanting to start something new with regards to previous right 
wing government. Luck to have two experienced advisors. Strong political will key. Didn’t  
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set up second level because Royale became presidential candidate so seen as two 
dangerous but focus changes back when she was not elected 
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Appendix B – Data collection and sorting 
Appendix C shows an example of the kind and quality of information typically 
available for calibration of a condition in the pilot analysis. 
Cases  participatory leadership strategy/orientation  
Porto 
Alegre 
(1989-
2004) 
Specifically designed to get lower socio-economic groups into public policy-making 
venues (Wampler: 5); PT was a minority party and may have needed to support PB 
as a way of consolidating their support. Mayors were ideologically committed to 
Participatory democracy. Increasing budget transparency allowed the government 
to show the people the difficulties they faced (Wampler: 126).  (information also 
available from Abers 2000, Baiocchi 2005, Gret and Sintomer 2005) 
Berlin-
Lichte
nberg  
District mayor here Kristina Emerich was working as an activist also in the nineties 
she started some participatory initiatives. At Berlin level there were civil society 
activists who wanted to place the process on agenda which meant it was taken up 
by left-party. Didn’t have the same ideological underpinnings as other reforms (-
based on NPM reform), It was the mayor who put this on the agenda as a policy, 
...they want Lichtenberg to be a citizen’s town with people involved. There was a 
criticism that politicians weren’t active in supporting process and is probably more 
supported within the Left parties than conservative ones -, leader was convinced and 
also here the 2 main figures in policy civil servants who brought forward the process 
were really crucial figures for the success and for the district it has been a success 
story until now because it has been important for the image... Role of FIPE agency, 
2001 new red-red government in Senate. For Emrich a democratising strategy not 
an NPM tool, '68' activists who maintain radical ideology... ideological wrangling and 
accusations with Bertelsmann foundation 212- attempt to rebrand from this here, 
some sense of decentralising and self-determining strategy in the citizen's commune 
frame...  "Emmrich's  political  will  has  been  the  decisive  factor"  (Rocke:  218), 
suggestion (Rocke: 229/230) that officials did not trust citizens., citizen's community 
(burgergemeinde). (Information from Rocke 2009 and interview with Anja Rocke 
13/12/2010) 
Morsa
ng-
Municipal  Communist  party  had  a  'participatory  democracy  secretary'.  Left  list 
winning in 1997 election (Talpin, 2007) – need to ask in interview.  
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Sur-
Orge  
Toron
to 
comm
unity 
housin
g  
Idea originally came from a few staff people, in particular some staff who were from 
Latin America and so had heard about PB from their networks back in Latin America, 
in Argentina and Chile in particular. So they....decided to try it in Toronto and had 
enough power to set up an initial process so it was staff driven it wasn’t driven by 
political leaders or even the executive at the housing agency who just went along 
but driven by staff, , a couple of city councillors are on the board of the housing 
authority by law...so they heard about it but more awareness than support (Lerner 
and Van Wagner 2006, also interview with Josh Lerner 18/01/2011) 
Bueno
s Aires  
Mayor  initially  interested  in  a  bid  to  reincorporate  civil  society  in  mainstream 
governance for legitimacy but not in as strong a position as in Brazil because of need 
to bargain with rivals. Mayor later ignored PB when he fell out with the rival who 
had been his ally, FREPASO party became fragmented when PB came to be seen as 
a spent bullet in terms of party gains. Lack of enthusiasm for legalising constitutional 
provision  over  a  number  of  years  until  crisis,  D1  no-one  ascribed  to  radical 
participatory ideal in gov but contingent space of contradictory goals, even only a 
minority ideologically committed within FREPASO D11, PB an explicit response to 
argentinazo  (  13),  Schifrin  wanted  PB  for  pacifying  instrumental  reasons  and 
convinced Ibarra., Ibarra later gave minimal funding to process to control Schifrin. 
Eventually manoeuvring from higher levels as in SP brought its downfall - showing a 
lack of political freedom from higher levels. (Peruzzotti 2009, Rodgers 2010). 
Belo 
Horizo
nte 
There  is  some  unwillingness  to  devolve  authority.  Delegates  cannot  block 
government proposals (suggested in survey evidence by Wampler). Despite being 
PT, One argument is that the mayor and governing coalition intending to reform 
basic  state-society  relations  and  that  “The  willingness  to  alter  the  rules 
demonstrates an intense government commitment to identifying a new rule set that 
will  best  achieve  its  goals”,(Wampler  241) 
Despite  original  words  government  preferred  centralised  reform  clearly.  
(Wampler 2007, Avritzer 2009, also interview with Brian Wampler 16/03/2011) 
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Appendix C – R code 
Appendix D provides details of code used to produce output in chapter 6. 
 
library ("QCA") #call up QCA package library 
 
phd<- read.csv("phdanalysis.csv", header = TRUE, row.names = "caseid") #import 
data matrix from file 
 
phd #call up data matrix 
 
phdnr #call up necessary relations 
 
phdnr<- superSubset (phd, outcome = "ccpb", incl.cut = 0.95, cov.cut = 0.5) # 
perform necessary analysis 
 
phdTT # call up truth table 
 
phdTT<- truthTable (phd, outcome = "ccpb", neg.out = TRUE, complete = TRUE, 
incl.cut1 = 0.95, show.cases = TRUE) # code truth table for negative outcome 
 
phdSP # call up parsimonious solution 
 
phdSP<-  eqmcc  (phdTT,  include  =  "?",  rowdom  =  FALSE,  details  =  TRUE, 
show.cases = TRUE) # perform reduction for parsimonious solution. 
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phdSC # call up complex sufficient conditions 
 
phdSC<- eqmcc (phdTT, details = TRUE, show.cases = TRUE)# perform complex 
sufficiency tests 
 
phdSI # call up intermediate solution 
 
phdSI<-  eqmcc  (phdTT,  include  =  "?",  direxp  =  c(1,"-","-","-"),  details =  TRUE, 
show.cases  =  TRUE)  #  conduct  Intermediate  analysis  with  directional 
expectations for pl 
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Appendix D – PB in the UK 
Appendix E is a short briefing note on PB in the UK prepared in 2009 which 
shows  the  difference  in  processes  called  PB  in  the  UK  to  PB  processes  as 
understood elsewhere 
 
Having  reached the UK  from  Brazil through  international networking among 
NGOs, the implementation of Participatory Budgeting (PB) has uniquely (in the 
context of the northern hemisphere) come to be endorsed as a stated goal of 
the national government. Rocke (2008) points to a number of reasons explaining 
how the growth of PB practice here over the last decade has led to a distinctive 
style and understanding of the goals and uses of PB in the UK. Rather than being 
forced on the agenda by Left-wing parties, as was the case elsewhere, the idea 
has worked its way up through the echelons of the state bureaucracy, starting 
form a community perspective. Rocke also points to the influence of Third Way 
politics on the opportunities that have presented themselves for PB. The rhetoric 
of empowerment in the UK is often used in New Labour discourse primarily as a 
means by which other goals such as ‘community solidarity and pride to stop 
anti-social behaviour’ (CLG: 23) can be achieved. Moreover, PB must exist in a 
culture of performance targets and other central control mechanisms such as 
‘ring-fencing’ unlike in Porto Alegre where it has been most successful. 
 
With the Leftist Worker’s Party (PT) in power, government backing in Porto Alegre 
meant full support of PB as a marquee initiative, taking on service providers and 
changing tax regimes to facilitate the new democratic process. In the UK support 
has  been  less  partisan.  Nevertheless  the  Labour  government,  particularly 
through Hazel Blears in her time as CLG secretary has endorsed PB albeit in a 
different guise. Rather than seeking to transform state-society relations they 
have  preferred  to  present  PB  using  somewhat  watered  down  terms  like 
‘community kitties’. All the same, despite the nomenclature much of what has 
gone on may represent part of a process of starting small with many pilots now 
having taken place. One extremely positive aspect of PB in the UK has been the 
extent of networking and learning that is taking place among processes. What 
follows is a review evidence provided to date in order to compare and critique 
the purposes and outcomes of PB projects that have taken place in the UK. 
 
 
Participatory grant-making as Participatory Budgeting 
 
Much PB that has taken place in the UK falls into the sub-category of participatory 
grant-making.  These are processes  usually  involving  relatively small pots  of 
money, where groups (usually statutory service providers and/or Voluntary and 
Community Service (VCS) groups) bid for a sum of money on the basis of an idea 
for a project which they themselves will implement. These funds are usually 
drawn  form  existing  government  programmes  earmarked  for  spending  in 
specific geographic and policy areas by central government, e.g. community 
safety  in  priority  crime  areas  and  neighbourhood  renewal  in  disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods. As we shall see much of the criticism of the potential of these 
processes lies in the lack of pure agenda-setting power and improved budget  
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literacy afforded participants, which perhaps leaves them in a grey area between 
PB and ‘ordinary’ consultation. However, as well as considerable variation among 
these processes there are other interesting models of PB that will be outlined 
and discussed in course. I will now proceed to discuss the most important factors 
in PB, highlighting qualitative differences among models. 
 
 
Who is invited to apply for funding? 
 
One of the key differences between the ‘Participatory grant-making’ processes 
which have become common in the UK and the more traditional Participatory 
Budgeting based on the Brazilian model (which is less common in the UK) is that 
grant-making  relies  on  bidding  organisations  themselves  to  implement 
proposed projects once they are sanctioned. While this has a positive effect in 
that it motivates bidders from the CVS in particular to be clear and organised in 
planning the implementation of their projects, it does not empower any one 
unaffiliated person to come to an event and challenge governments by saying 
‘this needs to be done and you need to find out how’. In the UK people generally 
bring fully polished solutions to PB events. Therefore, the space for new ideas 
to be brought forward involves a dialogue between bidding organisations and a 
steering group and not necessarily among PB participants.  
 
Key to the success of PB in Brazil is its ability to provide opportunities to allow 
new  civil-society  groups  to  form  around  issues  and  have  their  case  for 
investment in services heard. In the UK applications were mostly invited from 
not-for-profit organisations and community groups (at least in processes where 
information on who was allowed to apply was made available). A template of an 
invitation for bids in the PB toolkit (produced by the PB Unit) states that if you 
are “confident you can deliver it you can put forward a proposal”. While the 
requirement to be able to carry out a project is important to be sure funds are 
not wasted, this may put many individuals and unorganized groups off making 
a bid. Some projects identified the need to make support available to groups not 
used to bidding for money. In the young people’s ‘U-decide’ in Newcastle groups 
of  youngsters  worked  with  a  council  officer  for  design  advice.  The  recent 
processes run by the Manchester Metropolitan Police (GMP 2009) in Stockport 
and Tameside went a step furthering, ensuring inclusivity by supporting smaller 
or  less-established  groups  to  put  governance  structures  in  place,  such  as 
opening bank accounts and setting up log books (GMP: 4). It is of course a 
positive aspect of PB in the UK that it allows opportunities for community groups 
to be involved in implementing processes themselves when they can. 
 
However, there were some other processes which took the more traditional PB 
form. These processes also were more likely to involve portions of mainstream 
funding. In Claremont and Weaste (Salford) where the PB focused on a portion 
of mainstream funding for roads and highway improvements, ideas were first 
proposed and an independent costing agency was used to cost project ideas. In 
Coedpoeth residents could initiate ideas on pre-selected themes that again, were 
subsequently worked up and costed. This example also benefited from being 
funded by precept funds, raised locally and not redistributed from a government 
pot, giving residents even greater ownership of the process. The Coedpoeth PB 
probably benefited from this freedom to innovate leading to local people, when 
the idea of introducing a pelican crossing was raised, to build a relationship with  
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the local Co-op Supermarket and persuade them to put money into the scheme. 
The Coedpoeth PB also involved a prioritisation process held with the primary 
school children who fed in their ideas for project proposals. Children were able 
to propose projects but not vote. In the various PB projects minimum voting ages 
ranged from 11 to 16. 
 
 
What can they bid for? 
 
In the context of those processes that fall into the category of Participatory 
grant-making, many chose to place a maximum and minimum to the amount 
that could be bid for any one project. This is now recommended as best practice 
by the PB Unit (see toolkit). In the most recent Blackburn and Darwen PB, the 
evaluation  also  recommended  limiting  the  number  of  successful  bids  per 
organisation to one. These mechanisms can help alleviate to some extent any 
concerns raised over swamping of events with mobilised support to try and 
‘steal’  the  pot  of  money.  However,  there  is  a  concern  that  limiting  an 
organisation’s  number  of  bids  (particularly  a  large  one  which  is  capable  of 
implementing more than one good project) is unfair and undesirable. In any case 
it might be better solution to apply higher thresholds to gain subsequent grants 
as is done for electing PB delegates in Brazil. 
 
Setting a maximum and minimum bid will have a great influence on many of the 
outcomes of a PB. It has a significant effect on deciding the proportion of bids 
that will be successful. It is interesting to note that unsuccessful applicants were 
generally less disappointed with the process when they were in the majority i.e. 
when  a  small  number  of  expensive  projects  won  the  money.  In  North 
Lincolnshire applicants were simply asked to bid for 4 different awards to the 
value of £5000 and had to implement their project within a given ‘event week’. 
In most pilots, applicants were given about six to eight weeks to produce bids, 
however in North Lincolnshire and other community safety pilots this had to be 
reduced
63. Interestingly residents seemed to have responded positively to the 
simplicity afforded by this. The short timeframe for implementation meant that 
‘demonstration effects’ were felt almost immediately and implementation was 
easily  monitored  by  residents.  Nevertheless,  although  this  process  required 
voters to discuss the opportunity costs of selecting one project over another, it 
is a bit of a stretch to say it provided any great improvements in budget literacy. 
Also, implementing the projects all in one week may have an adverse effect on 
the sustainability of the project(s). 
 
                                           
 
63 North Lincolnshire was among 24 community safety PB pilots initiated by the Home Office in early 2009. 
While the Home Office should be commended for this they required the projects to be completed within 
8 weeks of being awarded funding, which while unsatisfactory produced some interesting findings as 
projects were forced to innovate.  
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How is the PB run who decides a bid is selected to be presented at a ‘Decision 
Day’? 
PB projects are planned and implemented from the beginning by a steering 
group  usually  consisting  of  stakeholder  bodies  and  those  with  expert 
knowledge.  In  some  cases,  such  as  Salford  and  Tameside,  resident 
representatives have been included, although in both cases these residents had 
already been recruited through involvement in previous participatory processes. 
Lavan (2007: 7) found little evidence of community participation  in strategic 
planning as of yet. This may also be a consequence of the pilot nature of projects 
where it is uncertain whether processes will be repeated. It might be argued that 
where processes are repeated it would provide the opportunity for community 
delegates to be elected to strategic steering groups on a yearly cycle. In cases 
where repeat processes have occurred and are planned, however, the feeling 
seems to be that it would be adequate to engage citizens in a more traditional 
type of consultation on planning the process than involve them directly. While 
some projects such as Thornhill reported great benefits in terms of organisation 
in producing effective team working among stakeholder groups and harnessing 
their institutional support, this also has an opportunity cost of pulling time and 
human resources away from mobilisation of residents (TPY 2008). 
 
As most funding is made available under conditions for which policy arenas it 
may be spent in, it is important that projects fall within these remits. They also 
must be both legal and feasible. Therefore a scrutiny panel (usually different 
from  the  steering  group)  can  be  set  up  to  assess  whether  buds  meet 
requirements.  The  scrutiny  panel  often  takes  the  opportunity  to  allow  local 
councillors and expert bureaucrats to have an input in the process. Most projects 
stress that the scrutiny panel may only advise on the merits of a project and that 
final  decision-making  must  rest  with  neighbourhood  resident  participants. 
Despite the ‘no veto’ practice an accusation may still be levelled that scrutiny 
boards give an independent voice to the powerful local groups. Some have used 
scrutiny panels to narrow the range of projects to make the decision day event 
more manageable. For example in North Lincolnshire a shortlisting panel was 
established to identify the ten strongest proposals, which met the criteria and 
which could be put to a public vote.  
 
 
Role of Councillors 
 
Is it necessarily a bad thing to give a voice to councillors in the process? It is a 
difficult question. The PB Unit suggest that it is best for them to play the role of 
PB advocate: “When elected councillors seek citizen input in budget matters, 
their  legitimacy  increased,”  (toolkit:  5).  They  have,  in  projects  to  date, 
participated  in  scrutiny  panels,  in  presenting  the  Decision  Day  and  in  the 
evaluation and assessment processes. It is difficult to know whether councillors 
should  be  allowed  participate  in  PB  given that they  may  be  able to  capture 
support using their political skills. Some will be antipathetic towards PB in any 
case because they take a Schumpeterian view that they are elected to shape their 
communities in their own way.  
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How are participants mobilised/engaged? 
 
Participants were generally engaged and invited using news releases, posters 
and leaflets, while word of mouth is also significant in almost all cases. Cases 
where the event was publicized through schools were successful in drawing 
greater  participants.  In  Stockport  and  Tameside  letters/flyers  were  hand-
delivered by members of the local neighbourhood policing teams. In traditional 
forms of PB, voters are mobilized most clearly by ‘demonstration effects’ and by 
civil society organization and community groups themselves who need their 
vote. In Tameside, which had one of the highest turnouts of any process so far, 
mobilization by bidding organization was shown to be the key reason for the 
high attendance. This was also seen in Keighley. 
 
Other projects focused on achieving representation of diversity and engaging 
traditional hard-to- reach groups. The Open Budget process in Harrow managed 
to engage a high proportion of young people by targeting diverse groups with 
its advertising. The Harrow process was much different to the grant-making 
processes. 
300 residents turned out for a six-hour Assembly on a Sunday in Harrow to 
discuss the borough budget and set priorities. This process also went on to vote 
a budget monitoring group from among its representatives, which included a 
high number of young people. 
 
To ensure fairness processes generally required that participants had to stay all 
the way through and vote for all projects. However there were other examples 
that allowed online (Finsbury Park) or postal voting to increase participation. In 
North  Lincolnshire  instead  of  a  one  off  decision  day  a  postal  ballot  was 
conducted over a week. While the idea of a postal ballot raises questions over 
fairness and secrecy (in fact just about every process raises this to an extent), it 
allowed for a very high proportional turnout. It also allowed for an innovative 
approach to engendering deliberation. Staff conducted nearly 40 “consultation 
station” events during the voting period to bring PB to the people. This allowed 
for “speaking to young mothers at places they meet, and talking to people with 
addiction issues who were visiting the pharmacy at Westcliff Co-op.” (Brennan, 
p.6) They also identified males aged 25 – 60 as a particularly hard to reach 
group.  “These  residents  were  engaged  by  the  Acorns  team  entering  into 
environments where this target audience would be, such as local public houses,” 
(idem).    In  addition,  they  conducted  consultations  at  the  post  office,  which 
enabled them to speak with people collecting their benefits. Moreover despite 
the high turnout, they found to their surprise, that the incentive of being entered 
into a free prize draw to win £100 in shopping vouchers was cited by only 5% of 
questionnaire respondents as a mobilizing factor.  
 
Providing  disability  support  and  childcare  increased  turnout  where  it  was 
available. However this had implications for costs, venues and running length 
available to the process. In Bolton a local mosque was targeted to reach Muslim 
females, a traditional hard-to-reach group. However this resulted in fewer white 
people attending as they had only been targeted using leaflets (PB unit, 2009: 
11). In Tower Hamlets the focus was on getting a spread of cleavages across a 
number  of  wards  and  this  was  achieved  in  terms  of  ethnic  diversity  and 
geography, although no data was made available on wealth. The Tower Hamlets  
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PB is unique and is the closest process to the Brazilian model in terms of the 
magnitude of decisions at least. Here participants were involved in a number of 
parallel events across the borough, in deliberations  over presentations from 
service providers on mainstream services and chose what they wished to spend 
much of the Council non-fixed expenditure budget on.  
 
While some projects sought to maximize turnout, others  were keen to limit 
numbers. Sometimes this was for practical (space or management) reasons. This 
was the case in Tower Hamlets where participants registered and participation 
was limited to 100 per meeting in order to allow for effective facilitation of 
deliberation  and  training.  Elsewhere  numbers  were  limited  to  avoid  vote 
swamping and increase fairness. In Salford groups were limited to 5 voters per 
group and in Bradford it was just 2. In the young person’s PB in Newcastle youth 
groups were asked to send 4 delegates each. 
 
 
The event 
 
Many events were keen to place emphasis on the smooth and seamless running 
of the event day. There is no doubt that events that achieved this emphasised 
time spent on prebriefings with volunteers, and collaboratively planning and 
revising information leaflets and voting sheet templates etc. Groups also elected 
to spend time training presenters to ensure fairness. Again, the opportunity cost 
of putting this time into the event is taking resources away from reaching out to 
potential participants. 
 
While emphasizing the fun factor improved attendance, there is a concern that 
the  fear  of  ‘not  having  fun’  leads  to  a  detrimental  removal  of  all  possible 
confrontation from the process. In Thornhill it was felt that “Q&A sessions would 
be difficult to manage, especially as contentious questions might be asked and 
issues of fairness might arise” (TPY: 17). This however led to a jettisoning of any 
deliberation at all on proposals, resulting in a very individualized process. A 
related problem is a fear of telling people what PB is and ‘what it is all about’. 
The term “community kitties” is sometimes used as a catchier and voter-friendly 
term and almost all processes have been encouraged by the PB unit to brand 
their processes differently. It has somewhere along the line been decided that 
Participatory Budgeting is an ‘inhibiting’ term.  
 
 
Voting 
 
In most grant-making processes, voters were asked to rank projects on a scale 
of one to ten. These votes are then counted and projects with the most votes are 
awarded funding in order until the pot has run out. However there are a number 
of notable exceptions. In Salford a two-round system was used with the top ten 
projects from the first round going through to the final round. This system could 
be  seen  to  encourage  deliberation  and  bargaining  and  the  formation  of 
coalitions. In Stockport a proportional system was used so that everyone got 
some money. Participants were asked: “How much money would you like to give 
to this project?” You should select your answer by circling either: 
ALL of the amount requested  
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MOST of the amount requested 
SOME of the amount requested 
NONE of the amount requested, 
There was a set floor of votes received below which a group would not receive 
any money. However, all other groups were awarded some of the requested 
funding. This could be criticised for not involving citizens in realistic budget-
setting. Of course innovation is welcomed, however this would require that a 
process is able to defend this decision if projects were then subsequently not 
implemented.  
 
The  Tower  Hamlets  process  was  not  a  grant  giving  process  and  involved 
residents voting for money for their preferred service. Tower Hamlets in their 
evaluation believe that their process allowed for “what has been termed ‘shifting 
coalitions’ where different groups of people vote together at different times to 
secure different ‘items’”(Udecide p.8). However the point was later made that the 
voting  system  then  allowed  organized  groups  to  dominate  and  a  more 
proportional system would have been favoured. 
 
The mainstream budget events in Harrow and Tower Hamlets used e-voting 
machines and Big Screen instant relay. These events were clearly influenced by 
21
st century town meetings using a similar roundtable facilitated deliberation. E-
voting  was  also  used  successfully  to  increase  interest  and  engage  younger 
groups in Stockport, Rochdale, Rotherham and Newcastle, although it became a 
problem where high turnout led to insufficient number of handsets. There is a 
tradeoff to be made where the use of technology “is too “techy” it may alienate 
older people, however this might engage younger people” (PB toolkit 16). 
 
 
Costs and Funding 
 
Almost  all  the  literature  is  quick  to  make  the  claim  that  the  setup  costs 
associated with pilot schemes are high but should diminish as processes recur. 
Thus it is particularly frustrating to see instances where this opportunity has 
gone to waste, eg. Harrow. In some cases it was suggested that commercial 
sponsorship might be garnered to offset the promotion cost. In any case in order 
to ensure continuing growth PB processes should try to secure as much money 
as possible to put into outreach projects. Some projects have been successful in 
topping  up  government  grants  with  flexible  funds  from  other  parts  of 
mainstream budgets. 
 
Evaluation 
 
Most evaluation reports have been based on a similar methodology. In-depth 
interviews tend to be with staff/organisers and questionnaires with participants. 
Unfortunately this does not provide in depth information on levels of coercion 
felt by participants, motivations for voting etc. It would also be interesting to 
study whether ideological or community concerns or self-interest are foremost 
in voter’s minds. Much evaluation will naturally focus on the delivery impacts of 
projects. Independent evaluations would be preferable as evaluations by those 
involved are open to claims of adverse subjectivity 
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Whose role is the scrutiny and monitoring of the process and implementation? 
 
Monitoring of implementation was very important factor in the success of PB in 
Brazil where government was responsible for implementation and citizens held 
them to account. The UK case is a bit more complex because it may be that 
citizens can defer to government and steering organisations more easily as it is 
contractors that are responsible more often than not for implementing projects. 
Election of a monitoring group has been the exception not the rule. In the case 
of Harrow where a monitoring group was elected from the Assembly, there was 
a failure to maintain contact between the monitoring group and the participants. 
Furthermore, the terms of reference of the group were made such that it was 
impossible for the monitoring group to effectively challenge the Council when 
they deviated form PB priorities. 
 
 
Facilitation   
 
Best practice occurred where professional facilitation was used. Facilitators are 
not only able to encourage groups to deliberate but also can guide the reaction 
to presentations and avoid mob rule (Lavan: 41). GMP reported that in Stockport 
presentations from outsiders were met with boos and programmes which aimed 
to help people with criminal convictions were not received well. 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
In many of the grant-making processes deliberation is almost completely absent 
form the decision day (not even questions to presenters, given time constraints). 
Need this necessarily be the case? One problem is that although most feedback 
is positive there are large minorities in many processes who have doubts about 
the fairness of the process and want to have a greater say in how it should be 
run. Also the disappointments of those that do not get money in grant-making 
processes is greater without deliberation because they are not given reasons for 
their rejection. 
 
In  the  transfer  of  Participatory  Budgeting  to  the  Northern  Hemisphere, 
deliberation seems to have lost out to an emphasis for reaching set targets for 
community cohesion and urban renewal.  This critique is not to belittle the 
importance of those goals but only to say that without them being reached 
through deliberation they are at best being reached in a hollow fashion or at 
worst not being reached at all. Moreover, positive efforts to improve this were 
seen  in  some  of  the  recent  Policing  related  PBs.  The  U-decide  Process  in 
Newcastle which has been repeated has recognised the need to work more time 
for  deliberation  into  its  process.  Too  many  seem  PB  projects  seem  to  have 
misunderstood deliberation as a complete abandonment of confrontation.  
 
In UK culture there seems to be a tension in the strong bond with representative 
democracy and more direct forms of voting. In Tower Hamlets some would seem 
to have preferred a referendum without any deliberation (Udecide p. 12). Both 
Lavan (2007: 74) and Blakely(2008a: 62) point to emerging dangers that non- 
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deliberative aggregative PB will lead to individualistic consumerist associations 
with  PB  in  the  UK.  The  further  value  of  PB  in  Brazil  was  the  fusion  of 
representative and deliberative and participatory forms of democracy in one 
related recurring cycle. More effort could be put into delivering processes with 
the  scope  and  imagination  to  implement  such.  Rocke  (2008)  comes  to  the 
conclusion that grant-making can only be a stepping stone to a real PB. Therefore 
much of the above should be seen in their context as pilots and the better 
mechanisms  should  be  brought  forward  and  greater  innovation  and 
experimentation  should  be  encouraged.  Moreover,  many  processes  have 
suffered from the not being able to rely on money that will be raised year in year 
out and therefore fear that taking risks will raise expectations too high. 
 
A further consideration is whether a full participatory consciousness can occur 
if politicians are not willing to take less qualified political risks in devolving 
power.The recent process undertaken in Tower Hamlets provides some hope for 
progression  with  the  Council  entrusting  highly  technical  information  to 
participants  in  order  to  allow  learning  and  improved  budget  literacy.  It  is 
important to allow these processes grow over time. Many people will instinctively 
allow  others  to  explore  new  forms  of  participation  and  it  is  not  until  it  is 
demonstrated to them that participation is worthwhile that they will begin to 
consider engaging. 
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